Turner v. City of Shreveport

• Decision Date: 15 August 1983
• Docket Number: No. 15561-CA,15561-CA
• Parties: Jerry L. TURNER et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants-Appellees, v. CITY OF SHREVEPORT et al., Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US

Page 961

437 So.2d 961

Jerry L. TURNER et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants-Appellees, v. CITY OF SHREVEPORT et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 15561-CA.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit.

Aug. 15, 1983.

Rehearing Denied Sept. 29, 1983.

Avant & Falcon by John L. Avant, Baton Rouge, for plaintiffs-appellants-appellees.

Charles B. Peatross, City Atty. by L. Edwin Greer, George W. Lang, II, Shreveport, for defendants-appellees.

Before JASPER E. JONES, FRED W. JONES, Jr. and NORRIS, JJ.

FRED W. JONES, Jr., Judge.

The central issue presented on this appeal requires an interpretation of that clause of La.R.S. 33:1992 which directs municipalities above a specified population level to grant fire department employees qualified thereunder annual longevity pay increases.

This suit was filed on August 15, 1979 by 373 employees of the Shreveport Fire Department, individually and as a class action seeking to recover longevity pay allegedly due under the above cited statutory provision. Made defendants were the City of Shreveport ("City"), its mayor and councilmen.

Defendants interposed a variety of defenses, including pleas of prescription and estoppel and an exception of no cause of action based upon the existence of a home rule charter. Further, defendants asserted that the City had in fact complied with the longevity pay requirements of Section 1992.

Evidence presented at the trial revealed that beginning in 1962 the following raises were given to members of the Shreveport Fire Department:

                1962  --  2%
                1963  --  2%
                1964  --  2%
                1965  --  2%
                1966  --  2%
                1967  --  2%
                1968  --  2%
                1969  --  $20 per month
                1970  --  18.7%--27.7%
                1971  --  $20 per month
                1972  --  $20 per month
                1973  --  9%--13%
                1974  --  $50 per month
                1975  --  $20 per month
                1976  --  $30 per month
                1977  --  4.4% $15 and $30 schedule
                1978  --  modification of schedule 5%
                1979  --  5% new schedule
                1980  --  8%
                1981  --  4% and 2%
                

In comprehensive written reasons for judgment, the district judge overruled defendants' exception of no cause of action, finding Section 1992 applicable to the City despite its operation under a home rule charter; gave the City credit against the mandated longevity pay increases for any annual increases in the firefighters' salaries, regardless of how designated; ruled that "base pay" for the purpose of calculating longevity increases means actual pay and includes accrued increases; and sustained defendants' plea of one year prescription, barring all claims accruing prior to August 15, 1978. After the City submitted an accounting as required by the district court, a monetary judgment was rendered in favor of plaintiffs.

Plaintiffs appealed the judgment, specifying as error the lower court's "crediting against the obligation of the City with respect to longevity pay all pay increases granted by the City irrespective of the nature thereof."

Defendants answered the appeal, complaining primarily that the district judge incorrectly calculated longevity increases upon an "increasing" rather than a "static" base and, further, should not have included longevity accruing prior to August 15, 1978 to compute back pay due after that date--since this would operate as only a partial sustaining of the plea of one year prescription. Defendants also reurged their exception of no cause of action [based on the home rule charter] and the defenses of estoppel, ratification and laches.

We held in the recent case of Ruby v. City of Shreveport, 427 So.2d 1267 (La.App. 2d Cir.1983) that the Louisiana Constitution of 1974 reserved to the State the plenary power to legislate minimum wages for municipal police and firemen, with no exception made for cities governed by home rule charters. Therefore, the district judge correctly overruled defendants' exception of no cause of action. Further discussion thereof is unnecessary.

We proceed to what the parties concede is the primary issue on appeal--to comply with the longevity pay increase mandated under Section 1992 must the municipality expressly specify and describe as longevity an exact 2% annual salary raise given on the employee's anniversary date?

Before examining the particular statutory provisions in question, it is appropriate to briefly review jurisprudentially established guidelines for statutory construction.

The paramount consideration in a case involving statutory interpretation is ascertainment of the legislative intent and reason or reasons which prompted the legislature to enact the law. Courts construe a statute to accomplish the purpose for which it was enacted and to give effect to the legislative will therein expressed. Tennessee Gas Transmission Co. v. Violet Trapping Co., 248 La. 49, 176 So.2d 425 (1965); Board of Trustees of Finance Authority v. All Taxpayers, 336 So.2d 306 (La.App. 1st Cir.1976).

The legislature is presumed to have enacted each statute with deliberation and with full knowledge of all existing laws on the same subject. The meaning and intent of a statutory provision, therefore, is to be determined by a consideration of the statute in its entirety and all other laws on the same subject matter, and a construction should be placed on the provision in question which is consistent with the express terms of the statute and with the obvious intent of the legislature in enacting it. St. Martin Police Jury v. Iberville Parish Police Jury, 212 La. 886, 33 So.2d 671 (1947); Legros v. Conner, 212 So.2d 177 (La.App.3rd Cir.1968).

Although they constitute no part of the statute under consideration, the title and preamble to an act and the organization, classification and headings of Revised Statutes may provide some aid in construction of a statutory provision, the precise import of which is unclear. Montelepre v. Edwards, 359 So.2d 1311 (La.App. 4th Cir.1978); Legros v. Conner, supra.

Turning to the statutory provision in question, we note that Chapter 4 of Title 33 of our Revised Statutes deals with Fire and Police Departments; Part II pertains exclusively to Fire Departments; Sub-part B of the latter bears the heading "Minimum Wages and Maximum Hours"; and Section 1992 has the heading "Minimum Salaries".

The legislative history of Section 1992 is enlightening. Act 59 of 1942 [the original enactment] explained in the preamble that it was "to establish and provide for minimum wages for the full time paid members of fire departments in certain incorporated cities, towns and villages in the State of Louisiana ..." The body of the legislation provided that, in certain instances, upon the completion of the first year's active service each fireman would be entitled to a $10 per month salary increase.

Act 196 of 1948 amended the original act to provide a new schedule of minimum salaries.

Act 219 of 1956 amended Section 1992 by establishing a new schedule of...