Turner v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., Case No: 1:13-cv-01260-STA-egb

• Decision Date: 01 August 2016
• Docket Number: Case No: 1:13-cv-01260-STA-egb
• Parties: THELMA TURNER, Plaintiff, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Tennessee

THELMA TURNER, Plaintiff, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant.

Case No: 1:13-cv-01260-STA-egb

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE EASTERN DIVISION

August 1, 2016

ORDER AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE COMMISSIONER

Plaintiff Thelma Turner filed this action to obtain judicial review of Defendant Commissioner's final decision denying her application for disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act ("Act").¹ Plaintiff's application was denied initially and upon reconsideration by the Social Security Administration. Plaintiff then requested a hearing before an administrative law judge ("ALJ"), which was held on June 8, 2012. On July 27, 2012, the ALJ issued a decision, finding that Plaintiff was not entitled to benefits. The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review, and, thus, the decision of the ALJ became the Commissioner's final decision. For the reasons set forth below, the decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED.

Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), a claimant may obtain judicial review of any final decision made by the Commissioner after a hearing to which he was a party. "The court shall have thepower to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing."² The court's review is limited to determining whether there is substantial evidence to support the Commissioner's decision,³ and whether the correct legal standards were applied.⁴

Substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."⁵ It is "more than a mere scintilla of evidence, but less than a preponderance."⁶ The Commissioner, not the Court, is charged with the duty to weigh the evidence, to make credibility determinations and resolve material conflicts in the testimony, and to decide the case accordingly.⁷ When substantial evidence supports the Commissioner's determination, it is conclusive, even if substantial evidence also supports the opposite conclusion.⁸

Plaintiff was born on July 3, 1962.⁹ She has a high school diploma and past relevant work experience as a cashier and cook.¹⁰ Plaintiff alleges that she became unable to work on July 27, 2007, due to a left knee replacement; right knee problems requiring a knee replacement; a bulging disc; herniated disc in her back; tendinitis in her shoulders, elbows, and wrists; arthritis; fibromyalgia; and high blood pressure.¹¹

The ALJ enumerated the following findings:¹² (1) Plaintiff met the insured status requirements through December 31, 2007;¹³ (2) Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity from the alleged onset date through her last date insured ("DLI"); (3) Plaintiff has the following severe impairments: degenerative joint disease of both knees (status post-arthroscopic surgery on the left in August 2004 and on the right in December 2004); lumbar spinal degenerative disc disease; and obesity; but she does not have impairments, either alone or incombination, that meet or equal the requirements of any listed impairment contained in 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1 of the listing of impairments; (4) Plaintiff retains the residual functional capacity to perform a reduced range of sedentary work as defined in 20 C.F.R. 404.1567(a); (5) Plaintiff is unable to perform her past relevant work; (6) Plaintiff was a younger individual with a high school education on the alleged onset date; (7) transferability of job skills is not material to the determination of disability because Plaintiff has no transferable skills; (8) considering Plaintiff's age, education, work experience, and residual functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff can perform; (9) Plaintiff was not under a disability as defined in the Act at any time through the date of this decision.¹⁴

The Social Security Act defines disability as the inability to engage in substantial gainful activity.¹⁵ The claimant bears the ultimate burden of establishing an entitlement to benefits.¹⁶ The initial burden of going forward is on the claimant to show that she is disabled from engaging in her former employment; the burden of going forward then shifts to the Commissioner to demonstrate the existence of available employment compatible with the claimant's disability and background.¹⁷

The Commissioner conducts the following, five-step analysis to determine if an individual is disabled within the meaning of the Act:

1. An individual who is engaging in substantial gainful activity will not be found to be disabled regardless of medical findings.

2. An individual who does not have a severe impairment will not be found to be disabled.

3. A finding of disability will be made without consideration of vocational factors, if an individual is not working and is suffering from a severe impairment which meets the duration requirement and which meets or equals a listed impairment in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of the regulations.

4. An individual who can perform work that she has done in the past will not be found to be disabled.

5. If an individual cannot perform his or her past work, other factors including age, education, past work experience and residual functional capacity must be considered to determine if other work can be performed.¹⁸

Further review is not necessary if it is determined that an individual is not disabled at any point in this sequential analysis.¹⁹ Here, the sequential analysis proceeded to the fifth step with a finding that, although Plaintiff cannot perform her past relevant work, there are substantial numbers of jobs that exist in the national economy that he can perform.

Plaintiff argues that substantial evidence does not support the ALJ's findings. She specifically argues that the ALJ erred by not properly weighing the opinions of her treating physicians and by making an improper credibility determination. Plaintiff's arguments are not persuasive.

Medical opinions are to be weighed by the process set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c). Generally, an opinion from a medical source who has examined a claimant is given more weight than that from a source who has not performed an examination,²⁰ and an opinion from a medical source who regularly treats the claimant is afforded more weight than that from a source who hasexamined the claimant but does not have an ongoing treatment relationship.²¹ In other words, "[t]he regulations provide progressively more rigorous tests for weighing opinions as the ties between the source of the opinion and the individual become weaker."²² Opinions from nontreating sources are not assessed for "controlling weight." Instead, these opinions are weighed based on specialization, consistency, supportability, and any other factors "which tend to support or contradict the opinion" may be considered in assessing any type of medical opinion.²³

In contrast, it is well-established that the findings and opinions of treating physicians are entitled to substantial deference.²⁴ A treating physician's opinion is entitled to substantially greater weight than the contrary opinion of a non-examining medical advisor.²⁵ If a treating physician's "opinion on the issue(s) of the nature and severity of [a claimant's] impairment(s) is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in [the] case," the opinion is entitled to controlling weight.²⁶ Furthermore, "[i]f the ALJ does not accord controlling weight to a treating physician, the ALJ must still determine how much weight is appropriate by considering anumber of factors, including the length of the treatment relationship, supportability of the opinion, consistency of the opinion with the record as a whole, and any specialization of the treating physician."²⁷

Closely associated with the treating physician rule, "the regulations require the ALJ to 'always give good reasons in [the] notice of determination or decision for the weight' given to the claimant's treating source's opinion."²⁸ Moreover, "[t]hose good reasons must be 'supported by the evidence in the case record, and must be sufficiently specific to make clear to any subsequent reviewers the weight the adjudicator gave to the treating source's medical opinion and the reasons for that weight.'"²⁹

In the present case, concerning Plaintiff's knees, on July 31, 2007, Plaintiff told Dr. David Deneka of OrthoMemphis that she had fallen the day before and had aggravated her knee pain.³⁰ She reported that she had been doing water aerobics twice a week and that the exercise did "help a bit."³¹ She returned on October 24, 2007, using a quad cane and reported continuing knee pain, worse on the left.³² Dr. Deneka performed a series of three Euflexxa injections in both knees on November 13, 2007, November 21, 2007, and November 28, 2007, and fitted her for a left knee support brace.³³ On January 23, 2008, Dr. Deneka reported that the injections hadbeen effective and that Plaintiff's left knee brace, in particular, had "helped her tremendously."³⁴ Plaintiff had no significant knee tenderness, full range of knee motion, and no instability.³⁵ She was no longer taking anti-inflammatory medications and was only using Gabapentin for pain control.³⁶

Plaintiff did not go back to Dr. Deneka until June 4, 2008, because she had aggravated her knee pain in a fall in late May 2008.³⁷ Dr. Deneka reported that Plaintiff had been "doing fairly well up until her fall over the Memorial Day weekend."³⁸ She received another series of three Euflexxa injections at weekly intervals in August 2008.³⁹ Those injections were not as effective as they had been in the prior year.⁴⁰ Dr. Deneka continued to describe Plaintiff as not in acute distress.⁴¹ On July 29, 2009, he reported that gradual progression of knee...