Turner v. GAC Star Quality, LLC

Docket Number21 C 5867
Decision Date03 May 2023
Citation671 F.Supp.3d 897
PartiesChestley TURNER, Stephanie McCrainie, and Turner Express, LLC, Plaintiffs, v. GAC STAR QUALITY, LLC, and Grigore Cecati, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

Aimee Clare, Chittenden, Murday & Novotny LLC, Chicago, IL, Lee Charles Lee Mudd, Tariq Najeeb Mohideen, Mudd Law, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiffs.

Telly Stefaneas, Chicago, IL, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

JORGE ALONSO, United States District Judge

Plaintiffs Chestley Turner, Stephanie McCrainie, and Turner Express, LLC ("Plaintiffs") have sued an automotive repair company, GAC Star Quality, LLC, and its proprietor, Grigoire Cecati (collectively "GAC"), for GAC's alleged failure to properly repair Plaintiffs' semi-truck. GAC has moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). For the following reasons, the motion is granted in part and denied in part.

I. BACKGROUND1

Plaintiffs Turner and McCrainie together operate Turner Express, LLC, a long-haul trucking business. (Second Am. Compl. ("Compl.") ¶¶ 14, 17, ECF No. 24.) Plaintiffs purchased the business's only truck, a 2007 Peterbilt 379 truck tractor ("Peterbilt"), in August 2020. (Id. ¶¶ 15, 18.) They earn approximately $1,000 to $3,000 per day by driving the Peterbilt cross-country. (Id. ¶ 16.)

The Peterbilt's engine broke down on October 3, 2020. (Id. ¶ 19.) Two days later, Plaintiffs took the Peterbilt to GAC, an auto repair shop in Lansing, Illinois, to have the engine examined. (Id. ¶¶ 6, 20.) Cecati, GAC's president, told Plaintiffs that GAC could repair the engine by the end of November, and Plaintiffs left the Peterbilt with GAC. (Id. ¶¶ 21-22.)

When Plaintiffs inquired about the Peterbilt in mid-October, Cecati told them that they would either need a new engine or an out-of-frame engine rebuild. (Id. ¶ 28.) Plaintiffs chose the latter option and requested a cost estimate, but GAC never responded to their request. (Id. ¶¶ 29-31.) Nor did GAC obtain a signed waiver of Plaintiffs' right to receive such an estimate. (Id. ¶ 32.)

A month later, McCrairie asked Cecati for an update on the status of the repairs, but Cecati never responded. (Id. ¶¶ 37-38.) After another two weeks, McCrairie again reached out to ask when the work would be done, and although Cecati responded this time, he was unable to provide a time-frame. (Id. ¶¶ 39-40.)

The same day, McCrairie asked GAC for an invoice because Plaintiffs still had not received a price quote. (Id. ¶ 42.) Cecati responded via text that the estimated cost of the out-of-frame engine rebuild was $18,000, but stated that he could not provide them with a formal invoice. (Id. ¶ 43.) The text message contained only the $18,000 figure and did not provide a breakdown of the costs, a description of the parts used, or a calculation of labor costs. (Id. ¶ 45.)

Due to the longer-than-anticipated repair time, in early December, Plaintiffs rented a Penske truck to continue operating their business. (Id. ¶¶ 55-57.) The rental fees and increased insurance payments because of the rental cost Plaintiffs more than $15,500 and $9,600, respectively. (Id. ¶¶ 118, 124.)

Nearly four months after they had left the Peterbilt at GAC, GAC notified Plaintiffs on January 21, 2021, that the Peterbilt was ready to be picked up, and sent Plaintiffs an invoice for $18,989.75. (Id. ¶¶ 61-62.) Five days later, Plaintiffs picked up the Peterbilt and paid $18,989.75 to GAC. (Id. ¶¶ 63, 65.)

Almost immediately, Plaintiffs again experienced problems with the Peterbilt. The check engine light turned on, and the Peterbilt began leaking oil from the front engine. (Id. ¶¶ 67-69.) The truck's left turn signal, defroster, and cruise control also malfunctioned. (Id. ¶ 74.) In mid-February, GAC told Plaintiffs to bring the Peterbilt back to their shop so they could fix the oil leak and the other issues. Plaintiffs did so, but many of the problems continued. (Id. ¶¶ 72-74.)

The Peterbilt's issues persisted over the next three weeks, which forced Plaintiffs to spend thousands of dollars on inspections, parts, and repairs. (See generally id. ¶¶ 86-102.) Then, on March 13, 2021, the Peterbilt broke down again in California. (Id. ¶ 103.) Because they were unable to complete their haul, Plaintiffs lost $6,900 in income. (Id. ¶ 104.) Plaintiffs again paid thousands of dollars for repair services to return the Peterbilt to working order. (Id. ¶ 108.)

All told, Plaintiffs estimate that GAC's faulty repairs have cost them $65,393.21 in actual damages. They filed this suit asserting five claims against GAC: (I) violation of the Illinois Automotive Repair Act ("Repair Act"), 815 ILCS 306/1 et seq.; (II) negligence; (III) breach of the implied warranty of workmanlike performance; (IV) negligent misrepresentation; and (V) violation of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act ("ICFA"), 815 ILCS 505/1 et seq. Defendants have filed a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim.2 The Court addresses each claim in turn.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). This standard "is not akin to a 'probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955). "Where a complaint pleads facts that are 'merely consistent with' a defendant's liability, it 'stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.' " Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (internal quotation marks omitted)).

When considering a motion to dismiss, courts "accept the allegations in the complaint as true, and . . . draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff." Crescent Plaza Hotel Owner, L.P. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 20 F.4th 303, 307 (7th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted). But "allegations in the form of legal conclusions are insufficient" to survive a motion to dismiss, as are "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements." Defender Sec. Co. v. First Mercury Ins. Co., 803 F.3d 327, 334 (7th Cir. 2015) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

III. ANALYSIS
A. Repair Act Claim

GAC moves to dismiss the Repair Act claim on grounds that the Repair Act contains no private right of action. Enacted to promote "improved communications and accurate representations between automotive repair facilities and their customers," 815 ILCS 306/5, the Repair Act imposes certain disclosure and transparency obligations on automotive repair facilities. As relevant here, these include a requirement that a covered facility "give to each consumer a written estimated price" for every repair that costs more than $100 before commencing the repair; that it provide oral or written notice to the consumer before charging for work that exceeds the estimated price by more than ten percent; and that it provide the consumer with "an estimate of the time necessary to complete the repair, if in excess of one working day." 815 ILCS 306/15(a)-(b). A covered facility must also notify the consumer and give them an option to pick up their vehicle from the facility if the facility is unable to complete the repairs within the estimated time. 815 ILCS 306/40.

The Repair Act contains no express private right of action. Instead, it provides that knowingly engaging in a "persistent practice or pattern" of conduct that violates the Act constitutes an "unlawful practice" under the ICFA. 815 ILCS 306/85. Such a violation empowers the attorney general to exercise "all remedies, penalties, and authority available" under the ICFA to enforce the Repair Act. Id.3

Where a statute—like the Repair Act—contains no express private cause of action, a court may recognize an implied private right of action "if the underlying statute can be interpreted to disclose the intent to create one." Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Sci.-Atlanta, 552 U.S. 148, 164, 128 S.Ct. 761, 169 L.Ed.2d 627 (2008). To determine whether a statute contains an implied private right of action, Illinois courts apply a four-factor test, asking whether "(1) the plaintiff is a member of the class for whose benefit the statute was enacted; (2) the plaintiff's injury is one the statute was designed to prevent; (3) a private right of action is consistent with the underlying purpose of the statute; and (4) implying a private right of action is necessary to provide an adequate remedy for violations of the statute." Metzger v. DaRosa, 209 Ill.2d 30, 282 Ill.Dec. 148, 805 N.E.2d 1165, 1168 (2004) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Illinois courts "will recognize an implied right of action in [the] statute only if the plaintiff demonstrates all four of those factors." 1541 N. Bosworth Condo. Ass'n v. Hanna Architects, Inc., 458 Ill.Dec. 548, 196 N.E.3d 1108, 1116 (Ill. App. Ct. 2021) (citing Abbasi v. Paraskevoulakos, 187 Ill.2d 386, 240 Ill.Dec. 700, 718 N.E.2d 181, 187 (1999)), appeal denied, 453 Ill.Dec. 251, 187 N.E.3d 704 (Ill. 2022); see also Patel v. Zillow, Inc., No. 17-CV-4008, 2017 WL 3620812, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 23, 2017) (finding no implied cause of action where plaintiff had not shown that statute's enforcement scheme would be inadequate absent an implied private cause of action), aff'd, 915 F.3d 446 (7th Cir. 2019).

Plaintiffs do not directly address the relevant test. They do, however, assert generally that the purpose of the Repair Act—to protect...

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