Turner v. Godinez, Case No. 2015-CV-0343
| Decision Date | 11 August 2017 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 2015-CV-0343 |
| Parties | Deion L. Turner, Plaintiff, v. S.A. Godinez, et al, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
NOW COMES The Plaintiff, Deion L. Turner, Pro Se (herein "Turner"), pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) Rules 60(b)(3) & (4), Relief from Judgment or Order and respectfully moves this Honorable Court for Relief from fraud and its void orders and judgment of May 3rd, 2016. Thereof said in support, Turner states as follows:
Pro Se litigants' court submission are to be construed liberally and held to less stringent standards than submissions of lawyers. If the court can reasonably read the submissions, it should do so despite failure to cite proper legal authority, confusion of legal theories, poor syntax and sentence construction or litigant's unfamiliarity with rule requirements. See Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364; Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106; Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46; Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519. Holding Pro Se petition can not be held in same standards as pleading drafted by attorneys. The courts provide Pro Se parties wide latitude when construing their pleadings and papers. When interpreting Pro Se papers, the Court should use common sense to determine what relief the Pro Se party desires. Courts have special obligation to construe Pro Se litigants' pleadings liberally.
This Court may relieve a party or its legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the reasons of fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party and/or judgment is void. S.H.A. FRCP Rules 60(b)(3) & (4).
This Court, May 3rd, 2016, renders orders and judgment based on, void State Court orders and judgments, The Captioned Defendants' active steps of conspiracy, deception, selective enforcement, fraud and misrepresentations, misinformation and false facts, denying Turner equal protection required and prescribed by, The August 7th, 2002 in effect, Illinois Statute 730 ILCS 150/1 et seq., 150/2 et seq., 150/2(B)(1.8) &150/3, through judicial interpretation of laws to purport innocent acts criminal, reviewed, changed and rejected the October 21st, 1998 orders and judgment rendered by said 97CR29533 State Court, finding and ordering: October 21st, 1998 said 97CR29533 State Court could not and did not convict Turner of nor for committing the offense, sexual relations, without force nor threats of force, with person 18 years of age or over, sexual relations within families, in violation of 720 ILCS 5/11-11(a)(1)(2)(iii) and did not acquitted Turner of any and all child sex offenses, sexual relations with victim, person under 18 years of age, sexual assault, criminal sexual assault and sexual abuse; Illinois Statute 720 ILCS 5/11-11(a)(1)(2)(iii), does not and did not prescribes nor describes the offense, (West 1997); and this court found that in facts, said 97CR29533 State Court, convicted Turner of and for committing the offense, sexual relations within family, sexual relations with victim, person under 18 years of age; Illinois Statute 720 ILCS 5/11-11 prescribes and describes the offense, sexual relations within family, sexual relations with victim, person under 18 years of age; sexual relations within family is a criminal offense prescribed and described by The Illinois Statute 720 ILCS 5/11-11 and Criminal Code of 1961; upon Turner's release from IDOC, August 7th, 2002, The, August 7th, 2002 in effect, Act, 730 ILCS 150/2 et seq., 150/2(B)(1.8) does not and could not prescribes and describes the offense sexual relations, without force nor threats of force, with person 18 years of age or over, sexual relations within families, in violation of 720 ILCS 5/11-11(a)(1)(2)(iii), nor defines nor prescribes nor describes "Duty to register, Section 3, (730 ILCS 150/3), A sex offender, as defined in Section 2....shall register.... any person unable to comply with the registration requirements of this Article because he or she is confined, institutionalized, or imprisoned in Illinois on or after January 1, 1996, of The Act, shall register in person within 10 days of discharge, parole or release; Section 2, (730 ILCS 150/2(B)(1.8)) not a sex offense; The, August 7th, 2002 in effect, Act, 730 ILCS 150/2 et seq., 150/2(B)(1.8) as amended, altered by legislative enactment, that took effect August 22nd, 2002, prescribes and describes, August 7th, 2002, the offense sexual relations within family, sexual relations with victim, person under 18 years of age, violating Illinois Statute 720 ILCS 5/11-11, a sex offense; Turner being convicted by said 97CR29533 State Court for committing the offense sexual relations within family, sexual relations with victim, person under 18 years of age, violating Illinois Statute 720 ILCS 5/11-11, a sex offender subjected to and required to register under The, August 7th, 2002 in effect, Act, upon Turner's release on August 7th, 2002; and Turner sought to over turn his conviction by said 97CR29533 State Court of and for the offense sexual relations within family, sexual relations with victim, person under 18 years of age, violating Illinois Statute 720 ILCS 5/11-11.
Applicable Legal Facts & Rights:
1. The U.S. Code Title 42 Section 1983, requires and prescribes, " Civil action for deprivation of rights-Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes deprivation of anyrights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress...."
2. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine recognizes that federal district courts do not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear appeals from state court decision; only the Supreme Court has the authority to reverse or modify a state court judgment. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine. Exxon Mobil Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284; Rooker v. Fidelity Co., 263 U.S. 413, 414-16; GASH Assocs. v. Village of Rosemont, Ill., 995 F. 2d 726, 728. Precisely stated, the doctrine bars "cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgment rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments" Exxon Mobile Corp., 544 U.S. at 284.
3. Obstruction of justice occurrence when two or more persons conspire to impeded, hindered, obstructed and defeated the due course of justice. U.S. Code Title 42 Sections: 1985(2) 'Conspiracy To Interfere With Civil Rights' "....(2) Obstructing Justice;...or if two or more persons conspire for the purpose of impeding, hindering, obstructing and defeating, in any manner, the due course of justice in any State or Territory, with intent to deny to any citizen the equal protection of law, The rights of access to the courts is not limited to protecting rights of access to justice of only those individuals who will ultimately prevail in judicial process but it reaches conspiracy, misconduct and unjustified acts and actions which impedes the due course of justice with the intent to deny the individual equal protection of the law. This assures that no person will be denied the opportunity to present to the judiciary allegations concerning violations of fundamental constitutional rights, rights to seek judicial redress is granted not only in the due process clause of the 14th Amendment, but also in the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and acts of deception, obstruction and intimidation in connection with judicial proceedings are violations of the due process and equal protection clauses and give raise to legal actions under U.S. Code 42 Section 1985. First Amendment, U.S.C., See Bell, 746 F.2d 1205; Also See McTigue, 60 F.3d 381, 382. Conduct which interrupts or delay or hinders prison's to pursue their legal claims and/or litigations before the courts denies access to the courts and obstructs justice. Murillo v. Page, 294 Ill. App. 3d 860; Shango v. Jurich, 965 F.2d 289; Tucker v. Randall, 948 F.2d 388; Nance v. Vieregge, 147 F.3d 589; Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351.
4. The 14th Amendments secures and guarantees rights of due process of and equal protection under the law, Due Process Clause provides that no state shall deprive any person of life, liberty nor property without due process of law. U.S. Constitution Amendment Fourteen Section One, has a substantive and a procedural component which are defined by law as follows: (1) Procedural Due Process limitation does not require that the government refrain from making a substantive choice to infringe upon a person's life, liberty or property interest, it simple requires that the government provide Due Process before making such a decision. The goals is to minimize the risk of substantive error, to assure fairness in the decision making process and to assure that the individual affected has a participatory role in the process, many procedural due process claims are grounded on violations of State-Created Rights (See Loudermill, 105 S.Ct. 1487.) and (2) Substantive Due Process, serves the goal of preventing...
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