Turner v. Halliburton Co.

Decision Date30 July 1986
Docket NumberNo. 58647,58647
Citation722 P.2d 1106,240 Kan. 1
PartiesHiram TURNER, Appellee, v. HALLIBURTON COMPANY and William Arend, Appellants.
CourtKansas Supreme Court

Syllabus by the Court

1. K.S.A. 60-250 allows a litigant to move for a directed verdict, and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. In ruling on a motion for directed verdict pursuant to K.S.A. 60-250, the court is required to resolve all facts and inferences reasonably to be drawn from the evidence in favor of the party against whom the ruling is sought and where reasonable minds could reach different conclusions based on the evidence the motion must be denied and the matter submitted to the jury. This rule must also be applied when appellate review is sought on a motion for directed verdict. The same test is applicable to a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.

2. Whether a privilege is available in an action for defamation must be determined based on the status of the particular defendant and the content of the alleged defamatory communication. To facilitate the effective performance of government, absolute privilege is granted by constitution, legislative enactment or case law to those who serve in a legislative, executive or judicial capacity. A qualified or limited privilege is granted to those with a special interest or duty in the subject matter of the communication.

3. The availability of a limited privilege is generally restricted to those situations where public policy is deemed to favor the free exchange of information over the individual's interest in his or her good reputation. One such qualified privilege exists with respect to business or employment communications made in good faith and between individuals with a corresponding interest or duty in the subject matter of the communication.

4. The determination of whether or not a publication is privileged is a question of law to be decided by the court.

5. Where a defamatory statement is made in a situation where there is a qualified privilege, the injured party has the burden of proving not only that the statements were false, but also that the statements were made with actual malice, that is, with actual evil-mindedness or specific intent to injure.

6. In general, the question of actual malice in a defamation action is a question for the jury. However, under certain circumstances, a motion for directed verdict and the granting of that motion is appropriate. If the plaintiff fails to offer evidence of an extrinsic character to prove actual malice on the part of the defendant in the publication of a libel on a qualifiedly privileged occasion, and if the language of the communication and the circumstances attending its publication by the defendant are as consistent with the nonexistence of malice as with its existence, there is no issue for the jury, and it is the duty of the trial court to direct a verdict for the defendant.

7. A party who, without justification, induces or causes a breach of contract will be answerable for damages caused thereby.

8. A cause of action exists for tortious interference with a prospective business advantage or relationship. The requirements for this tort are (1) the existence of a business relationship or expectancy with the probability of future economic benefit to the plaintiff; (2) knowledge of the relationship or expectancy by the defendant; (3) that, except for the conduct of the defendant, plaintiff was reasonably certain to have continued the relationship or realized the expectancy; (4) intentional misconduct by defendant; and (5) damages suffered by plaintiff as a direct or proximate cause of defendant's misconduct.

9. Not all interference in present or future contractual relations is tortious. A person may be privileged or justified to interfere with contractual relations in certain situations.

10. Where the allegation of tortious interference with contract, or the prospect of a contract, is based upon alleged defamatory statements from the former employer to the prospective employer, such communication is subject to a qualified privilege which requires the plaintiff to prove actual malice by the defendant in making such communication.

Stephen J. Jones of Hershberger, Patterson, Jones & Roth, Wichita, argued cause and was on brief for appellants.

Christopher A. Rogers, Winfield, argued cause and was on brief for appellee.

HOLMES, Justice:

Halliburton Company, Inc., (Halliburton) and its employee William Arend, defendants below, appeal from a jury verdict rendered in favor of Hiram Turner in a defamation and tortious interference with the right to contract case involving Turner's termination from employment for allegedly stealing company property. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Turner for $86,700.

Appellee first went to work for Halliburton in early 1981 as a bulk material operator in Winfield. He was considered a good employee until March 1983, when the events leading to his discharge and this lawsuit occurred. On March 11, 1983, Turner, who had the day off, and his neighbor John Coffey set out to find some automobile parts with which to repair Turner's car. Coffey drove his pickup truck and, upon leaving Gueda Springs where both lived, they proceeded to Arkansas City, Winfield, and Newkirk and Ponca City, Oklahoma. During their travels the two consumed a case of beer but were unsuccessful in locating the needed automobile parts. Finally, about 2:00 p.m. they contacted a man in Winfield who indicated he might have the necessary parts but that he would not be available until after 5:00 p.m. Turner and Coffey then decided to go fishing and on the way stopped in Gueda Springs and picked up Mike Burr. The next stop was Arkansas City where they replenished their beer supply and purchased some whiskey. They then spent the rest of the afternoon fishing and around 5:00 p.m. returned to Winfield where Turner was successful in obtaining the necessary parts. Turner claims the last thing he remembers is passing the Desperado Saloon on old highway 77, headed toward Gueda Springs. The next he remembers is waking up at home in Gueda Springs on the morning of March 12, 1983.

The evidence at trial disclosed that on the way home the three decided to stop at Daisy Mae's Cafe. Ron Ryser, another Halliburton employee, who was in the cafe, had his Halliburton truck parked in the parking lot. While in the parking lot, the three men took some Halliburton tools from Ryser's truck and placed them in Coffey's truck. They were observed taking the tools by other patrons of the cafe, who advised Ryser and also told him the other truck had a personalized license plate reading "Wizard." Ryser proceeded to the lot but before he could get there the truck with Wizard plates had departed. Ryser then reported to the Arkansas City police and to his superiors that the tools had been stolen by three men at Daisy Mae's parking lot. He also reported the description of Coffey's truck, including the distinctive Wizard license plate.

On Saturday morning, after Turner awoke, he went to Coffey's truck to retrieve his newly purchased auto parts and his fishing equipment. When he did so he observed the Halliburton tools and thought they looked familiar due to some distinguishing features. Later that day, Daniel Krueger, another Halliburton employee and a friend of Turner's, stopped by Turner's house and told him about the missing tools and the theft at Daisy Mae's Cafe. Turner took no action at that time. On Monday, March 14, 1983, Turner reported for work at Halliburton where the employees were talking about the theft of Ryser's tools. Investigation by the Arkansas City police inevitably led to John Coffey, who was picked up by the Sumner County sheriff's office on March 15. Turner was aware of Coffey's arrest (on other charges) and then called Ryser and told him he knew where the missing tools were located. Ryser advised Turner to return them to him and then called his superiors at Halliburton to report these latest developments. Turner waited until the evening of March 16 to return the tools to Ryser and during that same evening, Turner was notified by telephone to report to the company offices at 8:00 a.m. the next morning. Also that evening Turner was contacted by an officer of the Arkansas City police department relative to the missing tools. Turner advised the officer he did not know anything about them. The next morning Turner reported to the appellant William Arend and Gary Rodveldt, both managerial and supervisory employees, at the Halliburton offices. During this confrontation Turner's employment with Halliburton was terminated on the grounds he had stolen company property. During the interview he made no explanation of his connection with the missing tools except to state that he had been drinking the day of the theft and that he hadn't had anything to do with the missing tools. At trial Coffey and Burr testified that the tools were taken from the Halliburton truck because Turner wanted to play a joke upon his co-worker Ryser and that at the time all three of them were intoxicated. This testimony was consistent with the statements originally given to police by Coffey and Burr. At the meeting with Arend and Rodveldt, it was made clear to Turner that he was being terminated and that the reason was his theft of company property. While the appellant Arend was obviously upset and the conversation became heated and loud, there was no evidence that any other employees of Halliburton heard any part of the confrontation except Rodveldt, who was present in a supervisory capacity. There was no evidence that Arend or Rodveldt told any other Halliburton employees of the firing and reason therefor, except such supervisory and managerial personnel as were required to be notified under standard company procedure. It is also clear that Turner told his friend Krueger, and perhaps others, that he had been fired and the reason therefor. In any event...

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