Turner v. Hooks

Decision Date18 May 2016
Docket NumberNo. 15CA3477.,15CA3477.
Citation55 N.E.3d 1133
Parties Denelle M. TURNER, Petitioner, v. Mark HOOKS, Warden of Ross Correctional Institution, Respondent.
CourtOhio Court of Appeals

Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Eric M. Hedrick, Assistant Ohio Public Defender, Columbus, OH, for petitioner.

Michael DeWine, Ohio Attorney General, and Stephanie L. Watson, Principal Assistant Ohio Attorney General, Columbus, OH, for respondent.

HOOVER

, J.

{¶ 1} Denelle M. Turner filed a habeas corpus petition seeking his immediate release from the Ross Correctional Institution. In October 2010, a jury found Turner guilty of the murder of Robert Demons and felonious assault of Chiquita Pittman, both with a firearm specification. The trial court sentenced Turner to 15 years to life on the murder conviction, a consecutive term of three years for felonious assault, and an additional consecutive term of three years on the firearm specification. Turner appealed his convictions on the grounds that they were not supported by sufficient evidence and were against the manifest weight of the evidence. The Court of Appeals for the Tenth District affirmed the judgment.

State v. Turner, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 10AP–1051, 2011-Ohio-3705, 2011 WL 3210054

.

{¶ 2} In his petition, Turner claims he is entitled to the immediate release from prison because he was a delinquent minor at the time of the offenses and there were errors in the bindover proceedings such that the juvenile court retained exclusive jurisdiction over his case. Specifically, he argues: (1) the indictment was prematurely filed, (2) there were defects in the complaints, (3) the transfer of his felonious assault case was improper; and (4) the juvenile court failed to provide proper notice under R.C. 2152.12(G)

. To support his claim of failure to provide notice, Turner alleges that he had been adjudicated a dependent minor, removed from his mother's legal custody, and initially committed to the temporary legal custody of the Franklin County Children Services. After a year in the agency's temporary custody, he was placed in the legal custody of his maternal grandmother, Sylvia Watts. He claims that Watts did not receive notice of the juvenile proceedings, including the transfer hearing, and was not present at any of the proceedings. Turner argued that notice to his mother was insufficient because she was no longer his legal custodian.

{¶ 3} Turner argues that because of the errors in the bindover proceedings, the general division of the court of common pleas was patently and unambiguously without jurisdiction to convict him; and he is entitled to habeas relief. The State filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6)

on the grounds that habeas corpus is not available to challenge the validity or sufficiency of an indictment and Turner had an adequate remedy on appeal.

{¶ 4} We granted in part and denied in part the State's motion to dismiss and ordered the State to make a return of the writ with supporting evidence. See Turner v. Hooks, 4th Dist. Ross No. 15CA3477, Entry, May 14, 2015. We found that Turner's petition failed to state a claim for habeas corpus relief on his claims for (1) the premature filing of the indictment, (2) defects in the juvenile complaint, and (3) any purported violations of R.C. 2152.12(F)

concerning the improper transfer of his felonious assault case. However, we found that Turner's petition stated a potentially good cause of action in habeas as to his claim that the juvenile court failed to provide proper notice pursuant to R.C. 2152.12(G).

{¶ 5} The State filed its return of writ with supporting exhibits; and Turner filed a response to the return of writ with additional supporting exhibits. This Court sua sponte appointed the Office of the Ohio Public Defender to represent Turner; and Turner, through his appointed counsel, filed an additional response that included exhibits, filed under seal, from the various juvenile court records establishing Watts as his legal custodian. The State filed a reply to Turner's response and included additional exhibits filed under seal. Following oral arguments, the State filed a supplemental exhibit. Thus, the parties' arguments and evidence have been submitted in accordance with Loc.R. 16(F); and Turner's claim can now be decided.

{¶ 6} For the following reasons, Petitioner Denelle M. Turner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus is GRANTED; and Petitioner Denelle M. Turner is DISCHARGED.

I. Law and Analysis
A. Habeas Corpus is an Available Remedy

{¶ 7} Habeas corpus petitions are governed by R.C. 2725. In order to be entitled to a writ of habeas corpus, the petitioner must be able to establish that his present incarceration is illegal because the trial court that rendered the conviction lacked jurisdiction over the criminal case. R.C. 2725.05

. Where the petitioner asserts that the trial court committed non-jurisdictional errors in the underlying case, the errors can be adequately reviewed in a direct appeal of the conviction and the habeas corpus petition should be dismissed. State ex rel. Harsh v. Sheets, 132 Ohio St.3d 198, 2012-Ohio-2368, 970 N.E.2d 926, ¶ 3 ; State ex rel. Shackleford v. Moore, 116 Ohio St.3d 310, 2007-Ohio-6462, 878 N.E.2d 1035, ¶ 5. A petitioner is only entitled to habeas corpus if he can show he has no adequate remedy at law. Agee v. Russell, 92 Ohio St.3d 540, 544, 751 N.E.2d 1043 (2001). A narrow exception exists to the adequate-remedy-at-law element required for habeas relief: the situation in which the trial court patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction. Smith v. Bradshaw, 109 Ohio St.3d 50, 2006-Ohio-1829, 845 N.E.2d 516, ¶ 10 ; State ex rel. Steele v. Robinson, 4th Dist. Ross No. 12CA3359, 2013-Ohio-3541, 2013 WL 4400131, ¶ 9. Thus, even if the petitioner could have raised the errors on appeal, the petitioner may nevertheless raise the claims by a petition for habeas corpus.

{¶ 8} In Gaskins v. Shiplevy, 74 Ohio St.3d 149, 656 N.E.2d 1282 (1995)

, the Court held that a petitioner should have been permitted to amend his habeas corpus petition to include a claim of improper bindover from juvenile court because it stated a potentially good cause of action in habeas:

In State v. Wilson (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 40, 652 N.E.2d 196

, we held that, without a proper bindover procedure under R.C. 2151.26, a juvenile court's jurisdiction is exclusive and cannot be waived. Id. at paragraphs one and two of the syllabus. Accordingly, we hold that appellant's amended petition stated a potentially good cause of action in habeas corpus, alleging, as it did, that the court of common pleas lacked jurisdiction over appellant because of improper bindover. Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand the cause for the court of appeals to allow the writ, require appellee to make a return, and determine whether the bindover was improper. See

Hammond v. Dallman (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 666, 668, 590 N.E.2d 744, 746, fn. 7.

Id. at 151, 656 N.E.2d 1282

; see also State v. Wilson, 73 Ohio St.3d 40, 44–46, 652 N.E.2d 196 (1995) (when a court lacks jurisdiction to convict a juvenile due to an improper bindover, the judgment of conviction it enters is void ab initio). A habeas corpus petition in which petitioner challenges his conviction on that grounds that no proper bindover proceedings occurred states a potentially viable cause of action in habeas corpus, even though petitioner may have possessed an adequate remedy at law. State ex rel. Harris v. Anderson, 76 Ohio St.3d 193, 195, 667 N.E.2d 1 (1996). “Absent a proper bindover procedure * * *, the jurisdiction of a juvenile court is exclusive and cannot be waived.” Johnson v. Timmerman–Cooper, 93 Ohio St.3d 614, 617, 757 N.E.2d 1153 (2001) (granting a writ of habeas corpus because the general division of the common pleas court patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction and the conviction rendered was void); see also

State v. Golphin, 81 Ohio St.3d 543, 547, 692 N.E.2d 608 (1998) (the juvenile court's failure to comply with the mandatory provisions of the bindover statute resulted in a judgment of conviction in the general division that was void ab initio).

{¶ 9} The State argues that Turner's petition is barred because he is challenging the constitutionality of R.C. 2152.12(G)

. Because a constitutional challenge must be made at trial or it is waived, the State claims that Turner waived any challenge to the constitutionality of R.C. 2152.12(G)

. To support this argument, the State cites the recent case, State v. Quarterman, 140 Ohio St.3d 464, 2014-Ohio-4034, 19 N.E.3d 900.

{¶ 10} Turner's petition is distinguishable from Quarterman because Turner's petition does not challenge the constitutionality of a statute. Instead, he argues that the juvenile court failed to properly follow a statute; and the court's failure resulted in an improper bindover such that the adult court patently and unambiguously lacked subject matter jurisdiction.

{¶ 11} In Quarterman, Quarterman challenged the constitutionality of the mandatory bindover statute on the grounds that the statute removed the trial court's discretion to decide if he had a capacity for rehabilitation. Quarterman argued that fundamental fairness demanded that he have an opportunity to demonstrate his capacity for rehabilitation and the statute denied him that right because it made his bindover mandatory, removing the court's discretionary powers. The Court held that even though Quarterman failed to raise his constitutional challenge at the trial court level, the Court could still review his claim for “plain error” or “where the rights and interests involved may warrant it.” Quarterman at ¶ 16, citing In re M.D., 38 Ohio St.3d 149, 151, 527 N.E.2d 286 (1988)

(an appellate court's invocation of the waiver doctrine is discretionary). The Court was prepared to address Quarterman's constitutional claim but found that he failed to make any assertion that the plain error doctrine...

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3 cases
  • Mullins v. Wicker
    • United States
    • Ohio Court of Appeals
    • June 22, 2017
    ...775 N.E.2d 517, ¶ 27 (doctrines of invited error and waiver do not apply to subject-matter jurisdiction); Turner v. Hooks, 2016-Ohio-3083, 55 N.E.3d 1133, ¶ 55 (4th Dist.) (adverse parties may not confer jurisdiction upon a court by mutual consent). {¶49} Because the trial court lacked juri......
  • Turner v. Hooks, 2016–0788
    • United States
    • Ohio Supreme Court
    • January 24, 2018
    ...court also gave notice to Derrick Wilford, as Turner's father, although his paternity has apparently not been established. See 2016-Ohio-3083, 55 N.E.3d 1133, ¶ 25. Regardless of Wilford's paternity status, service upon Tara Turner alone would be sufficient. R.C. 1.43(A) (the "singular incl......
  • Smith v. Marquis, Case No. 17 CA 37
    • United States
    • Ohio Court of Appeals
    • January 25, 2018
    ...notations of service upon Petitioner's Father/parent(s). {¶8} Petitioner cites Turner v. Hooks, 4th Dist. No. 15CA3477, 2016-Ohio-3083, 55 N.E. 3d 11331 in support of his claim. The Turner court held where notice of the bindover hearing was improper, the court of common pleas was deprived o......

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