Turner v. ILG Techs.
| Decision Date | 28 September 2022 |
| Docket Number | 2:21-cv-04192-NKL |
| Parties | MADISON B. TURNER Plaintiff, v. ILG TECHNOLOGIES, LLC, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Missouri |
Pro Se Plaintiff Madison Turner claims Defendant ILG Technologies, LLC (“ILG”) offered deficient software to administer the August 2020 Florida Bar Exam which resulted in its cancelation, damaging Ms. Turner. Ms Turner brings two claims of negligence against ILG. ILG moves to dismiss Ms. Turner's claims, arguing that Ms. Turner failed to join an indispensable party, the Florida Board of Bar Examiners (the “FBBE”); that venue is improper in the Western District of Missouri; and that Ms Turner has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. As explained in detail below, only ILG's Rule 12(b)(6) arguments have merit. Accordingly, ILG's Motion to Dismiss, Doc. 32, is GRANTED in part and this case is DISMISSED without prejudice. ILG's Motion to Strike and for Sanctions, Doc. 52, is DENIED, however Ms. Turner's unauthorized declarations, Doc. 47; Doc. 48, are STRICKEN. Finally, Ms. Turner's Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint, Doc. 57, is DENIED. Within 14 days of this Order, Ms. Turner may file a Second Amended Complaint if, and only if, she can plead facts to address the deficiencies identified by this Order.
Ms. Turner originally filed a four-count Complaint on October 12, 2021. Doc. 1. The Court dismissed Ms. Turner's original complaint because she had not properly served any of the named defendants. Doc. 24. Ms. Turner filed an Amended Complaint, which named only ILG and included only two counts: (1) res ipsa loquitor and (2) emotional distress. Doc. 27. The same theory of negligence underlies each count. Ms. Turner alleges that ILG was an independent contractor engaged by the FBBE to provide software permitting portions of the Florida Bar Exam to be completed in a secure offline electronic format. Doc. 27, at ¶¶ 3 -4. Ms. Turner alleges that she was registered to take the Florida Bar Exam that was scheduled for July 2020. Doc. 27, at ¶ 11. However, because of complications caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, the July 2020 Florida Bar Exam was ultimately postponed to August 19, 2020. Doc. 27, at ¶ 12. The Exam is typically two days and completed in person, but ILG was tasked with administering the August 19, 2020, Florida Bar Exam as a one-day, fully remote examination. Just a few days before it was scheduled to take place, the FBBE cancelled the August 19, 2020, exam because of issues with ILG's technology. Doc. 27, at ¶ 13. Ms. Turner alleges that ILG knew about various technical issues with its software, and the risks posed by proceeding with that software, before agreeing to remotely administer the August 2020 Florida Bar Exam. Doc. 27, at ¶¶ 17, 21-23. Ms. Turner alleges that ILG was negligent because it knowingly offered faulty software, which failed, causing the August 19, 2020, Florida Bar Exam to be cancelled. Doc. 27, at ¶¶ 14-18. As a result, Ms. Turner alleges, she incurred various types of damages. Doc. 27, at ¶¶ 19-20.
ILG first argues that Ms. Turner's Amended Complaint must be dismissed because she failed to join an indispensable party, the FBBE. Under Rule 12(b)(7)[1] a party may move to dismiss a complaint for “failure to join a party under Rule 19.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(7). To determine whether a party is indispensable, and therefore whether dismissal is warranted under Rule 19, the Court conducts a three-step inquiry to evaluate (1) whether the absent party is “required,” (2) whether joinder of the absent party is feasible, and (3) whether the lawsuit can continue “in equity and good conscience” in that party's absence. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 19; accord Republic of Philippines v. Pimentel, 553 U.S. 851, 856-57 (2008). When conducting this inquiry, the court accepts the plaintiff's allegations as true, but may consider matters outside the pleadings. Omega Demolition Corp. v. Hays Grp., Inc., 306 F.R.D. 225, 227 (D. Minn. 2015). The burden rests with the defendant to produce evidence establishing both “the nature of the interest possessed by an absent party and that the protection of that interest will be impaired by the absence.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Although Rule 12(b)(7) permits dismissal, '” Fort Yates Sch. Dist. No. 4 v. Murphy ex rel. C.M.B., 786 F.3d 662, 671 (8th Cir. 2015).
A party is “required” if:
Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(1). ILG argues that the FBBE is a necessary party because Ms. Turner's claims ultimately turn on actions taken by the FBBE. For example, ILG notes that Ms. Turner's Amended Complaint includes numerous allegations regarding “apparent miscommunications between Plaintiff and FBBE,” which led to Ms. Turner's registering for the July 2020 Florida Bar Examination. See Doc. 32, at 11. ILG also says that Ms. Turner is attempting to have “ILG defend, and hold ILG liable for, actions that were taken by the FBBE that relate to her petition for admittance to [t]he Florida Bar[.]” Id. This, however, incorrectly describes Ms. Turner's claims.
While the Amended Complaint does include factual allegations relating to Ms. Turner's interactions with the FBBE after Ms. Turner failed the Florida Bar Exam in February 2020, Ms. Turner's claims do not turn on the FBBE's actions. C.f. Two Shields v. Wilkinson, 790 F.3d 791, 797 (8th Cir. 2015) () (quoting Laker Airways, Inc. v. British Airways, PLC, 182 F.3d 843 (11th Cir. 1999)). This case is about ILG's technology failures and how they contributed to the cancellation of the August 2020 Florida Bar Exam for which Ms. Turner subsequently registered. Contrary to ILG's suggestions, this case is not about-and has never been about-Ms. Turner's original failing score or the FBBE's actions thereafter. Compare Doc. 32, at 2 (“Plaintiff purports to hold Defendant responsible for her failure to pass the Florida Bar Exam in February 2020[.]”) with Doc. 27. at 10-14 (). Nor does Ms. Turner fault the FBBE for canceling or postponing the August 2020 Florida Bar Exam because of ILG's technology failures.
ILG has the burden of identifying the FBBE's interest in this litigation. Omega Demolition Corp., 306 F.R.D. at 227. The only FBBE interest identified by ILG related to Ms. Turner's properly construed claims appears to be that litigating this negligence cause of action might implicate the contract between the FBBE and ILG. But ILG does not explain why that would be true. Indeed, as ILG points out, the contract creates no third-party rights which would benefit Ms. Turner. Doc. 32, at 13. Accordingly, the duty Ms. Turner claims ILG violated arises only under tort law, not the contract between the FBBE and ILG, and the contract therefore should bear little on whether ILG breached that duty and caused Ms. Turner to suffer damages.
Simply referencing a third party in a complaint does not make it legally required or indispensable. The FBBE is not an “active participant” in Ms. Turner's allegations against ILG, and resolving this matter will not require an evaluation of the propriety of the FBBE's actions. C.f. Two Shields, 790 F.3d at 797 (quoting Laker Airways, 182 F.3d 843). In short, ILG has not explained why the Court cannot afford Ms. Turner complete relief without joining the FBBE, and therefore has failed to show the FBBE is required under Rule 19(a)(1)(A). ILG also has not adequately explained how proceeding without the FBBE would imperil its interests, or risk ILG incurring double, multiple, or inconsistent obligations, as required under Rule 19(a)(1)(B). ILG has not met its burden, and the Court therefore concludes that the FBBE is not a required party under Rule 19(a).[2]
Therefore, ILG's Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Join an Indispensable Party is DENIED.
ILG also argues that this case should be dismissed because venue is improper pursuant to Rule 12(b)(3). Claims should be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(3) “when venue is wrong or improper in the forum in which it was brought.” Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist Court for W. Dist. of Tex., 571 U.S. 49, 55 (2013). A party seeking dismissal under this rule bears the burden to establish that venue is improper. United States v. Orshek, 164 F.2d 741, 742 (8th Cir. 1947).[3]Ms. Turner claims venue is proper in this District under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2), which provides: “A civil action may be brought in . . . a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is...
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