Turner v. Ivey
| Docket Number | SC-2022-0538 |
| Decision Date | 21 July 2023 |
| Parties | Angela Turner and the State of Alabama ex rel. Angela Turner v. Governor Kay Ivey; Cam Ward, Director of the Alabama Bureau of Pardons and Paroles; and Leigh Gwathney, Dwayne Spurlock, and Clifford Walker, in their official capacities as members of the Alabama Board of Pardons and Paroles |
| Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Appeal from Montgomery Circuit Court (CV-21-900383)
In 2019, the Alabama Legislature passed -- and Governor Kay Ivey signed -- House Bill 380 ("H.B. 380"), which became Act No. 2019-393, Ala. Acts 2019. As enacted, H.B. 380 amended various Code provisions, including § 15-22-21(a), Ala. Code 1975, creating the position of director of the Alabama Bureau of Pardons and Paroles ("the Bureau"), and § 15-22-20(b), Ala. Code 1975, addressing the nomination and appointment processes for the members of the Alabama Board of Pardons and Paroles ("the Board"). After H.B. 380 was enacted, Governor Ivey appointed Leigh Gwathney as chair of the Board pursuant to the new procedures set forth in § 15-22-20(b).
In November 2020, the three-member Board -- consisting at that time of Gwathney, Dwayne Spurlock, and Clifford Walker -- convened and held a parole-consideration hearing for Angela Turner, an inmate who was serving a life sentence for murder. Following a review of Turner's file, the Board unanimously denied Turner's parole request. Around that same time, Governor Ivey appointed Cam Ward as the new director of the Bureau.
In response to the Board's denial of parole, Turner initiated an action in the Montgomery Circuit Court against Governor Ivey, Ward, Gwathney, Spurlock, and Walker, in their official capacities, in which she sought a judgment declaring that Governor Ivey's appointment of Ward and Gwathney to their respective positions pursuant to the changes created by H.B. 380 violated the Alabama Constitution of 1901. She also, on behalf of the State of Alabama, petitioned for writs of quo warranto pursuant to § 6-6-591, Ala. Code 1975, alleging that Ward and Gwathney unlawfully held their respective positions. Finally, she alleged a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against all the defendants (Governor Ivey, Ward, Gwathney Spurlock, and Walker) on the basis that she had been denied due process during her parole-consideration hearing.[1]
The circuit court dismissed Turner's claims with prejudice and she now appeals. For the reasons stated below, we affirm.
In 2019, the Legislature enacted H.B. 380, which, as stated above, creates the position of director of the Bureau and provides that the director is to be appointed by the governor. See § 15-22-21(a). H.B. 380 also clarifies that although the director, who is described as the "chief executive officer of [the Board]," is responsible for implementing the Board's parole decisions and preparing recommended rules for the Board's consideration, he or she may not exercise the Board's "power ... to make individual determinations concerning the grant or denial of pardons, the grant or denial of paroles, ... [or] the revocation of parole." § 15-22-21(b) (emphasis added); see also Ala. Admin. Code (Board of Pardons and Paroles), r. 640-X-1-.01 ( that the director of the Bureau "perform[s] all administrative duties as provided by law").
H.B. 380 also amended the procedures for filling a vacancy on the three-member Board found in § 15-22-20(b). Per those amended procedures, in the event of a vacancy, the lieutenant governor, the speaker of the Alabama House of Representatives, and president pro tempore of the Alabama Senate are required to select "five qualified persons" for the governor's consideration. See § 15-22-20(b). From there, the governor, "with the advice and consent of the Senate," appoints one of those candidates to fill the vacancy. Id.
Under Alabama law, the Board is charged with, among other things, the duty of determining "which prisoners serving sentences in the jails and prisons of the State of Alabama may be released on parole and when and under what conditions." § 15-22-24(a)(1), Ala. Code 1975. "Meetings set for the purpose of conducting hearings and making determinations concerning pardons, paroles, restorations of political and civil rights, remission of fines and forfeitures, and revocations may be set by the chairman, the board, or a panel of the board designated for such purpose." § 15-22-23(a), Ala. Code 1975.
After H.B. 380 was enacted, Governor Ivey appointed Gwathney as chair of the Board pursuant to the new appointment process provided in § 15-22-20(b). In February 2020, the Senate confirmed Gwathney's appointment. Around that time, Governor Ivey also appointed Charles Graddick to serve as the director of the Bureau pursuant to § 15-22-21(a).
As a result of the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, on March 13, 2020, Governor Ivey declared a public-health emergency in Alabama. At that time, the Board suspended in-person parole-consideration hearings.
A month later, Governor Ivey issued her "Seventh Supplemental Emergency Proclamation" ("the emergency proclamation"), which officially authorized the Board to conduct remote parole-consideration hearings. The emergency proclamation also provided, however, that, when it chose to conduct such hearings, the Board was required to accept written statements from "[a]ny individuals," including officials, crime victims, and crime-victim representatives, regarding the appropriateness of a parole request.
Around the time that these events were taking place, Turner petitioned the Board for consideration for parole. Following a remote hearing in November 2020, the Board denied Turner's request.[2]
It was after Turner was denied parole that Ward was appointed to be the new director of the Bureau following Graddick's resignation. Ward's appointment became effective on December 7, 2020.
A few months later, Turner commenced the present action. After the defendants moved to dismiss Turner's claims against them, she filed an "Amended Complaint and Motion for Bond" in which she alleged four claims and clarified that she was bringing her action both in her personal capacity and as a "relator" on behalf of the State of Alabama.
In Counts I and II, Turner, on behalf of the State of Alabama, petitioned for writs of quo warranto pursuant to § 6-6-591, alleging that Ward and Gwathney unlawfully held their respective positions. In Count III, Turner sought a judgment declaring that Governor Ivey's appointments of Ward and Gwathney to their respective positions violated the Alabama Constitution of 1901. Finally, in Count IV of her amended complaint, Turner asserted a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against all the defendants on the basis that she allegedly had been denied due process during her parole-consideration hearing.
In response, the defendants renewed their motions to dismiss, asserting that they were entitled to dismissal either because the circuit court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, see Rule 12(b)(1), Ala. R. Civ. P., or because Turner had failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted, see Rule 12(b)(6). After Turner filed her response, the circuit court held a hearing on the motions.[3] Following that hearing, the circuit court entered a judgment dismissing Turner's action. Turner appeals.
As stated previously, the defendants asserted that Turner's action was due to be dismissed either because the circuit court lacked subjectmatter jurisdiction, see Rule 12(b)(1), Ala. R. Civ. P., or because Turner had failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted, see Rule 12(b)(6). This Court has recently stated:
Hudson v. Ivey, [Ms. SC-2022-0836, Mar. 24, 2023]___So. 3d__, ___(Ala. 2023).
Turner argues that the circuit court should not have dismissed her claims seeking writs of quo warranto concerning Ward's and Gwathney's ability to lawfully hold their respective positions. She notes that the circuit court dismissed these claims for, among other reasons, her failure to post any security. However, Turner contends, among other things, that she repeatedly requested that a security bond be set but the circuit court never did so. As a result, Turner contends that the failure to post security was beyond her control and, thus, that dismissal of her quo warranto claims on this basis was improper.
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