Turner v. Lambert Const. Co.
| Decision Date | 23 June 1975 |
| Docket Number | No. 75--45,75--45 |
| Parties | Ruby TURNER, widow of James A. Turner, Deceased Employee, Appellant, v. LAMBERT CONSTRUCTION COMPANY and J. B. Lambert & Son, Employer, Appellee, Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. Insurance Carrier, Appellee. |
| Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
Schieffler, Yates & Porter, West Helena, Niblock, Hipp & Odom, Fayetteville, for appellant.
Douglas Anderson, Helena, for appellees.
This appeal from the judgment of the circuit court affirming the denial of compensation to appellant, the widow of James A. Turner, actually turns entirely upon fact issues resolved against her by the Workmen's Compensation Commission. The only issue before the commission was whether the myocardial infarction causing Turner's death arose out of and in the course of his employment. The only issue before the circuit court was whether there was substantial evidence to support the commission's action. There was medical testimony to support the views of both parties on causation.
The first point for reversal is that the circuit judge erred in denying appellant's request for oral argument on her appeal to that court. Appellant argues that it was an abuse of discretion to deny the oral argument, saying that Rule 6 of the Uniform Rules for Circuit and Chancery Courts requires the court to allow oral argument if either party desires it. We do not so interpret the rule. It reads:
a. When the Circuit Court learns that an appeal from the Workmen's Compensation Commission is on the docket the Court will determine if all parties to the appeal are represented by an attorney of record. If a party is not represented by an attorney of record, or if the Court thinks it otherwise desirable, the matter will be set for oral hearing.
b. If all parties to the appeal are represented by an attorney of record the Court will request advice from said attorneys as to whether they desire the matter to be decided upon the record and any briefs in the file, or whether they wish to be heard orally or by briefs, or both; but if no response is had from such attorneys within 10 days the Court will proceed to study the case and announce a decision.
As we interpret this rule, subsection b only requires that the circuit court ascertain the desires of both parties if both are represented by counsel, before deciding whether they should be heard orally. Subsections a and b must be read together. When they are, it seems quite clear that the appeal is to be heard on oral argument when the parties are represented by counsel only if the court thinks it desirable. If it does not think so, the case will be decided upon the record and any briefs included in it. This affords the court the broadest possible latitude of discretion in the matter. Not only do we find that the parties are not entitled to oral argument on appeal to the circuit court as a matter of right, we certainly could not say that the circuit court abused its discretion in this regard in this case. The facts as to Turner's habits and conduct, the requirements of his employment, his activities on the day he suffered the fatal heart attack, his medical history and the probabilities and possibilities relative to causation were fully developed in testimony adduced before the referee and additional testimony presented to the commission. The transcript on file in the circuit court contains extensive briefs submitted to the commission. The circuit judge was justified in feeling that oral argument would serve no useful purpose but that it would unduly and unjustifiably consume judicial time.
Appellant's second point for reversal is her contention that there was no substantial evidence to support the judgment of the circuit court. This contention is presented from that view of the evidence most favorable to her. This is not the perspective from which we must view evidence in these cases. We must view it most favorably to the findings of the commission whether they be for claimant or the employer. See Curtis Mathes of Arkansas, Inc. v. Summerville, 256 Ark. 340, 507 S.W.2d 108; Sneed v. Colson Corporation, 254 Ark. 1048, 497 S.W.2d 673; Tigue v. Caddo Minerals Company, 253 Ark. 1140, 491 S.W.2d 574. We must affirm unless there was no substantial evidence to support the commission's finding on...
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