Turner v. Manufacturers Cas. Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 25 March 1955
• Docket Number: No. 118,118
• Citation: 112 A.2d 670,206 Md. 601
• Parties: Charles TURNER v. MANUFACTURERS CASUALTY INS. COMPANY.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Page 601

206 Md. 601

112 A.2d 670

Charles TURNER v. MANUFACTURERS CASUALTY INS. COMPANY.

No. 118.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

March 25, 1955.

John Brockenbrough Fox, Baltimore (David Friedman, Baltimore, on the brief), for appellant.

Jack L. Medwedeff and Robert E. Coughlan, Jr., Baltimore, for appellee.

Before BRUNE, C. J., and DELAPLAINE, COLLINS and HAMMOND, JJ.

COLLINS, Judge.

This is an appeal by Charles Turner, appellant, from a judgment for costs entered in favor of Manufacturers Casualty Insurance Company, appellee, on the sustaining of appellee's demurrer without leave to amend.

On November 13, 1953, the plaintiff, appellant here, filed a petition for a declaratory judgment in the Court of Common Pleas of Baltimore City, under the provisions of Code, 1951, Article 31A. This petition alleged (1) that the appellee had issued to Susquehanna Orchards, Inc., (Susquehanna), a body corporate of the State of Pennsylvania, a policy of insurance under the terms of which said policy, known as 'voluntary coverage policy,' the said appellee did insure the agricultural employees of Susquehanna for loss and disability due to accidental injuries arising out of and in the course of their employment with Susquehanna. This policy, at the time of the accident hereinafter referred to, was in full force and effect.

(2) On or about September 22, 1952, the appellant, Charles Turner, was an employee of Susquehanna, and an insured under the aforesaid policy and entitled directly and otherwise to claim benefits thereunder in accordance with the terms thereof. The said policy undertook and stated that the benefit payments and liability thereunder were in accordance with the Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Statute, Title 77, Chapter 1 et sequentia, Purdon's Pennsylvania Statutes, Annotated.

(3) On or about September 22, 1952, the said Charles Turner did suffer an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of his employment with Susquehanna in the State of Pennsylvania, and was seriously and grievously injured to such an extent that the said Charles Turner is still and will be permanently, totally and completely disabled within the meaning of the applicable policy and statutory terms and is entitled to the maximum payments and benefits under the terms of said policy.

(4) That the appellee did from the 7th day after the accident viz.: September 29, 1952, until September 6, 1953, pay the appellant the sum of $1,045.66 at the rate of $21.34 per week, same being two-thirds of the appellant's wages. On or about September 6, 1953, the appellee advised the appellant that no further payments were to be paid to him, although under the terms of the aforesaid policy a person totally and permanently disabled, by virtue of the provisions of the statute aforesaid, is entitled to payments for a period of 700 weeks.

(5) That the appellant has not been able to examine the said policy of insurance, although he, through counsel, has requested opportunity to do so, which request has not been complied with.

The appellant prays a declaratory decree that the appellee is liable under the terms of the aforesaid policy unto the appellant for payments of compensation in accordance with the schedules set forth for permanent and total disability under the Pennsylvania Statutes aforesaid and construing the provisions of the said policy to such effect. He also prays that issues of disability, as may be raised, be tried by a jury, as provided in the Maryland Statute aforesaid and for other and further relief and especially under Code 1951, Article 31A, Section 8.

For the purposes of this case it is admitted here that there is no jurisdiction under the Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act; that there is no liability in a suit at law against Susquehanna; that the insurance policy adopts the Pennsylvania schedule as a yardstick to govern the amount of compensation payable; that the substantive law of Pennsylvania governs; and that under the Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act, if totally permanently and completely disabled, appellant would be entitled to $21.34 per week for 700 weeks. It is also admitted that, although suit could have been maintained against the insurance company either in Pennsylvania or Maryland, as the suit is brought here, the procedural law of Maryland governs.

The question before us here is whether the Petition for Declaratory Judgment presents such a controversy as entitles the appellant to relief under the provisions of Code, 1951, Article 31A, supra.

In Gnagey v. Pennsylvania T. & F. Mutual Casualty Ins. Co., 1938, 332 Pa. 193, 2 A.2d 740, 741, an employee brought an action in assumpsit directly against an insurance company under a policy issued by that company in the form of a Workmen's Compensation Insurance Policy. The policy contained an endorsement undertaking coverage of farm labor of the employer "in accordance with the liability for compensation benefits under the Workmen's Compensation Act of Pennsylvania." Apparently, according to the allegations of the declaration in the instant case, that policy was similar to the one before us here. In the Gnagey case, the employee was injured when kicked by a colt and suffered a paralysis of his left side. He was paid compensation for a total of 53 weeks according to the schedule of the Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act. The insurance company then refused to make further payments, claiming that the employee had fully recovered. On November 4, 1935, the plaintiff filed his claim with the Workmen's Compensation Board of Pennsylvania. The claim was dismissed because the claimant was an agricultural worker. The suit in assumpsit was instituted on April 1, 1937, and at the trial a verdict was directed in favor of the plaintiff in the sum of $4,421.02. On appeal the insurance company claimed, among other things, that limitations under the Workmen's Compensation Act barred the claim and that the judgment was not in proper form. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania there held that the effect of the policy merely made the schedule of rates and manner of payments of the Workmen's Compensation Act a part of the contract and that other parts of the Act, such as the period of limitations, did not apply. The Court further held that the judgment was correctly entered for the full amount recovered, whether then due or whether payable in future installments. The Court had ample power to control or stay any writ of execution attempting to compel the payment of the judgment more rapidly than contemplated by the Workmen's Compensation Act, and that the judgment was subject to any future termination or modification justified by the death of the claimant or by a change in the character of his disability.

As pointed out by the appellant, it is said in 142 A.L.R. 65: 'The remedy of declaratory judgment has been held or assumed to be proper to determine the rights and obligations of the insurer and the insured under disability provisions of life and of health and accident insurance policies.' Stephenson v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 1937, 4 Cir., 92 F.2d 406; Ostroff v. New York Life Ins. Co., 1939, 9 Cir., 104 F.2d 986; Ballard v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York, 1940, 5 Cir., 109 F.2d 388; Business Men's Assurance Co. of America v. Sainsbury, 1940, 10 Cir., 110 F.2d 995; Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York v. Drummond, 1940, 8 Cir., 111 F.2d 282; Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York v. Tormohlen, 1941, 7 Cir., 118 F.2d 163; Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Krejci, 1941, 7 Cir., 123 F.2d 594; Columbian National Life Ins. Co. v. Goldberg, 1943, 6 Cir., 138 F.2d 192; Travelers Ins. Co. v. Helmer, 1936, D.C., 15 F.Supp. 355; Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Harris, 1940, D.C., 32 F.Supp. 90; Travelers Ins. Co. v. Wechsler, 1940, D.C., 34 F.Supp. 721; Braun v. New York Life Ins. Co., 1941, 46 Cal.App.2d 335, 115 P.2d 880; Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Cannon, 1947, 211 S.C. 134, 44 S.E.2d 25; Illinois Law Review, Vol. 34, 1939-1940, page 245; Columbia Law Review, Vol. 53, 1953, pages 1130, 1133.

In Aetna Life Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn. v. Haworth, 1937, 300 U.S. 227, 57 S.Ct. 461, 465, 108 A.L.R. 1000, five life insurance policies were involved. There was a single clear-cut issue in the case--whether disability existed when payment of premiums ceased, the policies...