Turner v. Mendenhall, No. 11095

• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Idaho
• Writing for the Court: McQUADE; DONALDSON
• Citation: 95 Idaho 426,510 P.2d 490
• Parties: Jay TURNER and June Turner, husband and wife, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. LaVern MENDENHALL et al., Defendants-Respondents.
• Docket Number: No. 11095
• Decision Date: 25 May 1973

Page 490

510 P.2d 490 95 Idaho 426 Jay TURNER and June Turner, husband and wife, Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
LaVern MENDENHALL et al., Defendants-Respondents. No. 11095. Supreme Court of Idaho. May 25, 1973.

Merrill K. Gee, Gee & Hargraves, Pocatello, for plaintiffs-appellants.

Wallace M. Transtrum, Soda Springs, for defendants-respondents.

McQUADE, Justice.

In 1962 Jay Turner and June Turner, plaintiffs and appellants, leased 240 acres of farm land in Caribou County from LaVern Mendenhall and Vonda Mendenhall, then husband and wife. Although the initial term of the lease was five years, the lease's renewal provision was used to extend the lease for an extra five years until December 31, 1972. Respondents obtained a Utah divorce which resulted in the wife, Vonda Mendenhall, receiving an undivided one-third of the 240 acres of Idaho farm land here in question, and the husband, LaVern Mendenhall, receiving an undivided two-thirds of the Idaho property. In August of 1968 and action was filed against [95 Idaho 427]

Page 491

the former wife, Vonda Caine, (now remarried) by LaVern Mendenhall and his daughter seeking enforcement of the Utah decree by partition or sale of the premises and the apportionment of the proceeds. The Idaho district court ruled in July of 1970 that the interests of the parties were the same as decided by the Utah decree, and ordered a sale of the property and division of the the proceeds.

During the progress of the above memtioned divorce and decree enforcement proceedings, certain negotiations were occurring between the lessors (Mendenhalls) and the lessees (Turners). The lease of the 240 acres in Caribou County contained a provision providing that the Turners would have the right of meeting any offer that the Mendenhalls might have for the sale of the leased land. ¹ In March of 1968, the Turners received an alleged offer in writing ² from Vonda Mendenhall Caine and her new husband to sell their interest in the leased land for $22,000. This was before the Idaho district court had ruled on the percentage of interest owned by each respondent. The $22,000 represented $20,000 for 160 acres claimed at the time as totally hers by Vonda Mendenhall Caine and $2,000 for her interest in the remaining 80 acres. LaVern Mendenhall gave Jay Turner, several days later, an alleged written offer ³ to sell his interest in the leased land for a percentage of a total purchase price of $20,000. In November of 1968, Mr. Turner received a letter from Mr. Mendenhall's attorney, Wallace M. Transtrum, which stated that Vonda Mendenhall Caine denied any option to sell with Turner. On April 15, 1969, appellant Turner allegedly accepted in writing the above alleged offers. ⁴

On March 1, 1971, LaVern Mendenhall gave written notice to the Turners that they must quit possession by April 1, 1971, and that the Mendenhalls desired and intended to sell the property for $50,000. Under the first option provision of the lease, this allowed the Turners 180 days to purchase the property at the $50,000 price. The present action was brought by the Turners on April 1, 1971. The Turners' first cause of action sought performance of a covenant of quiet enjoyment. The second cause of action asked for specific performance of the alleged option to buy at the $20,000 (plus $2,000) price or in the alternative $36,000 in damages for breach of contract. The district court granted summary judgment for respondents, holding that at best only a 'naked offer without consideration' had been made and that before any acceptance the 'offer' was withdrawn. On appeal, the Turner's assign[95 Idaho 428]

Page 492

error to the lower court summary judgment arguing that under the evidence present the decision was improper. It is argued that the option provision was validly invoked and was supported by proper consideration. It is further argued that the first cause of action precluded dismissal of the complaint and required granting of attorney fees.

Respondent urges that this appeal should not be heard since it was not taken within the statutory time for appeal. ⁵ The judgment in this case was filed on January 26, 1972, and the motion to reconsider was filed on February 2, 1972. This met the requirement of Rule 59(e) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. ⁶ The statutory sixty day period was complied with since the appeal was lodged eight days after denial of appellants' motion to reconsider. ⁷ The...