Turner v. Mich. Dep't of Corr.
| Decision Date | 03 April 2023 |
| Docket Number | 22-1562 |
| Parties | PHILLIP TURNER,Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; HEIDI E. WASHINGTON, Director; SHERRY L. BURT, Warden; DARRELL M. STEWARD, Deputy Warden; DANIEL MILLER, Acting Deputy Warden; CORIZON MEDICAL CORPORATION; DR. DALE E. ASCHE; MICHAEL WILKINSON, Health Unit Manager; NURSINGSUPERVISOR ANDERSON, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
Before: SUHRHEINRICH, COLE, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
MURPHY, J., delivered the opinion of the court in which COLE J., joined. SUHRHEINRICH, J. (pp. 10-13), delivered a separate dissenting opinion.
According to Phillip Turner, the Michigan Department of Corrections forces inmates at a Muskegon prison to climb to the top bunk in their cell by stepping onto a "wobbly" chair and a shaky desk. A doctor initially ordered prison staff to assign Turner to a bottom bunk. But staff later moved him to a top one. As he was getting down from this bunk one day, the desk tipped over. Turner fell, necessitating a trip to the emergency room. In this suit, he alleges that his top-bunk assignment violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213.
Invoking the screening provisions in the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the district court dismissed Turner's suit without serving it on the defendants. The court reasoned that Turner failed to plead that he had a "disability" under the ADA's definition of the term. Yet the court overlooked that the ADA's "disability" definition includes individuals with a "record" of a physical impairment. And Turner plausibly alleged that a doctor had issued an order requiring his bottom-bunk assignment for health reasons. We thus reverse the dismissal of Turner's ADA claim. We remand to allow the district court to consider any renewed motion-to-dismiss arguments in the ordinary course after service on the defendants and adversarial briefing.
At this early stage of the case, we must accept the complaint's factual allegations as true whether or not Turner can later prove those allegations with concrete evidence. See Rudd v. City of Norton Shores, 977 F.3d 503, 507, 511-12 (6th Cir. 2020).
The Michigan Department of Corrections operates the Muskegon Correctional Facility in western Michigan. Compl., R.1, PageID 1, 10. Prison planners allegedly designed this prison to house one inmate per cell. Id., PageID 10. But prison overcrowding eventually led administrators to place bunk beds in the cells so that each cell could house two inmates. Id., PageID 10, 13.
Because these bunk beds do not include ladders, prisoners must expend significant energy climbing to the top. They must first step onto a "wobbly plastic chair" in the cell. Id., PageID 10. From the chair, prisoners must step up to an "un-secure desk" that "moves" when prisoners shift their weight while standing on it. Id. From the desk, prisoners lastly must pull themselves into the top bunk. Id. This daily routine increases the risk of an accident when top-bunk prisoners try to get up to and down from their bunk. Id.
Recognizing this risk, many inmates have requested that administrators attach ladders to the bunk beds so that inmates sleeping in the top bunk can safely climb up and down. Id. But administrators have rebuffed these requests with full awareness of the risk that prisoners face. Id. Their own prison rules, for example, prohibit inmates from standing on chairs and desks in the "dayroom" and "tv room" due to the safety concerns. Id., PageID 14.
On November 19, 2019, prison administrators placed Turner at this Muskegon facility. Id., PageID 11. During Turner's initial processing, a physician whom Turner identifies as "Dr. Boomershine" ordered prison staff to give him a bottom bunk. Id. Nurses gave Turner a copy of Dr. Boomershine's bottom-bunk detail. Id. They also told him that medical staff had assigned him a "'chronic care' status" and that a doctor would see him soon. Id.
But Turner's assignment changed just two weeks later. Staff moved him to a top bunk despite Dr. Boomershine's orders. Id. When Turner complained, staff responded that they needed the bottom bunk for an inmate with more serious health issues. Id. Turner later saw another doctor and he too denied a bottom-bunk assignment without consulting Dr. Boomershine. Id. The warden also ignored Turner's request for a bunk-bed ladder at an open forum with prisoners. Id. The prison forced Turner to sleep in a ladder-less top bunk for months. Id.
On July 10, 2020, Turner got out of his bunk by stepping onto the desk. Id. As he did so, the desk tipped over. Id. Turner fell, slamming into the desk and chair on his way to the ground. Id., PageID 11-12. His posterior allegedly "split" during this fall. Id. Turner's severe injuries required prison staff to take him to the emergency room. Id., PageID 12. On his return to the prison, Turner could not walk on his own. Id. The prison provided him with crutches. Id.
After Turner's fall, a prison counselor repeatedly asked administrators to give Turner a bottom bunk. Id. They denied these requests and continued to force an injured Turner to climb to the top. Id. Although administrators eventually assigned Turner to a bottom bunk for a short time, they soon moved him back to the top. Id. At another open meeting with the warden, Turner renewed his request for a secure ladder. This time, the warden allegedly responded that the prison lacked the funds to pay for bunk-bed ladders. Id., PageID 12-13.
Turner chose to sue over the issue. In his pro se complaint, he asserted constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a disability claim under the ADA, and claims under state law. Id., PageID 14-16. Turner asked for damages against several defendants, including the Michigan Department of Corrections and various state employees at the Muskegon prison. Id., PageID 2-4, 15.
The district court dismissed Turner's complaint without serving the defendants. See Turner v. Mich. Dep't of Corr., 2022 WL 2071729, at *8 (W.D. Mich. June 9, 2022). As relevant now, the court rejected Turner's ADA claim because his complaint failed to plead that he had a disability. Id. at *6. The court also held that the complaint failed to allege that prison officials had denied Turner a public service, program, or activity in violation of the ADA. Id. at *7. Turner, with the help of newly retained counsel, appeals the dismissal of his ADA claim.
The Prison Litigation Reform Act directs district courts to screen prisoner complaints before serving them on government defendants. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). A court must immediately dismiss a complaint if it "is frivolous malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted[.]" Id. § 1915A(b)(1). The court also must immediately dismiss a complaint if it "seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief." Id. § 1915A(b)(2); see 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c) (prisoner complaints); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) ().
When a district court dismisses a complaint without hearing from a defendant, we follow the standards that would apply if the court had served the defendant and granted its motion to dismiss after full briefing. See Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010). We thus review the court's dismissal de novo. See Grinter v. Knight, 532 F.3d 567, 571-72 (6th Cir. 2008). When doing so, we disregard a complaint's legal conclusions. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). But we accept its factual allegations. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam). And we ask whether the alleged facts plead a plausible claim for relief after making all reasonable inferences in the prisoner's favor. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. We lastly hold a pro se prisoner's pleadings to "less stringent standards" than the standards that govern a trained lawyer's pleadings. Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94 (citation omitted).
Under these pleading rules, Turner's factual allegations did not justify the district court's immediate dismissal of his ADA claim. The ADA protects individuals with disabilities in the employment context, the government-services context, and the public-accommodations context. See Madej v. Maiden, 951 F.3d 364, 372 (6th Cir. 2020). Title II's government-services provision provides: "Subject to the provisions of this subchapter, no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity." 42 U.S.C. § 12132. This provision applies to the "services," "programs," and "activities" of state prisons. See Pa. Dep't of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 210, 213 (1998).
We (and the Attorney General) have read Title II's text to impose two general requirements on public entities. See Keller v. Chippewa Cnty., Mich. Bd. of Comm'rs, 860 Fed.Appx. 381, 385 (6th Cir. 2021); Roell v. Hamilton County, 870 F.3d 471, 488 (6th Cir. 2017); 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b). A government may not intentionally discriminate against people with disabilities by denying public services to an individual because of the individual's disability. See Roell, 870 F.3d at 488. And the government generally must grant a disabled individual a "reasonable modification[]" to its policies or practices when the individual needs the modification to receive public services. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7)(i); cf. Madej, 951 F.3d at 372.
These requirements apply only if the individual who seeks the public services has a "disability." 42...
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