Turner v. Ransom

• Decision Date: 23 June 2021
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 2: 20-cv-0197
• Parties: JAMES R. TURNER, JR., Petitioner, v. KEVIN J. RANSOM, SUPERINTENDENT SCI DALLAS; ATTORNEY GENERAL OF PENNSYLVANIA, AND DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF BEAVER COUNTY, Respondents.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania

JAMES R. TURNER, JR., Petitioner, v. KEVIN J. RANSOM, SUPERINTENDENT SCI DALLAS; ATTORNEY GENERAL OF PENNSYLVANIA,AND DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF BEAVER COUNTY, Respondents.

Civil Action No. 2: 20-cv-0197

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

June 23, 2021

Chief United States Magistrate Judge Cynthia Reed Eddy

MEMORANDUM OPINION¹

Petitioner, James R. Turner, Jr., a prisoner currently confined at the State Correctional Institution - Dallas, in Dallas, Pennsylvania, has filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (ECF No. 1). He is challenging the judgment of sentence imposed on him on March 3, 2016, by the Court of Common Pleas of Beaver County, Pennsylvania, at its criminal case at CP-04-CR-0001944-2014. For the reasons outlined below, the Petition will be denied and a certificate of appealability will also be denied.

II. REPORT

A. Jurisdiction

This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, the federal habeas statute applicable to prisoners in custody pursuant to a state court judgment. That provision allows a federal court to grant a state prisoner the writ of habeas corpus "on the ground that he or she is in custody in violation of the Constitution . . . of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). It is Turner'sburden, as petitioner, to prove he is entitled to the writ. Id., see, e.g., Vickers v. Superintendent Graterford SCI, 858 F.3d 841, 848-49 (3d Cir. 2017).

B. Relevant Factual and Procedural Background²

1. State Court Proceedings

A jury trial commenced on September 4, 2016, before the Honorable James J. Ross. Turner was represented at trial by Assistant Beaver County Public Defenders Frank Paganie, Esquire, and William Braslawsce, Esquire. The Pennsylvania Superior Court, in its Memorandum filed March 11, 2019, affirming the dismissal of Turner's PCRA petition, recounted the factual background and procedural history of the case:³

On the night of August 14, 2014, Appellant and his girlfriend ("Victim") went to a bar. After a few drinks, Victim left the bar and did not return, leaving Appellant behind. Appellant obtained a ride to Victim's home and confronted Victim about leaving him at the bar. In the course of this confrontation, Appellant repeatedly stabbed Victim in multiple parts of her body. Appellant left Victim's home, taking her car and the knife he used to stab her. Later, Appellant discarded the knife in the Ohio River. The stab wounds to Victim's left carotid artery and vein caused her to bleed out slowly and die. Appellant surrendered to police the next day, claiming he had acted in self- defense because Victim attacked him first with a knife. Evidence indicated Appellant was intoxicated when he attacked Victim, and Appellant claimed he was also intoxicated when he gave his statement to the police. On the day of Appellant's arrest, the police obtained a search warrant to collect blood samples from Appellant to compare to blood samples obtained from the scene of the attack. The Commonwealth utilized the blood samples for DNA analysis and the crime lab later destroyed them pursuant to lab protocol.

On February 12, 2016, a jury convicted Appellant of third degree murder. The court sentenced Appellant on March 3, 2016, to twenty (20) to forty (40) years imprisonment. On March 11, 2016, Appellant timely filed post sentence motions, filed by numerous pro se and counseled filings and extensions of time. The court denied Appellant's post-sentence motions on November 2, 2016. On November 23, 2016, Appellant filed a petition for appointment of new counsel. On December 2, 2016, Appellant's prior counsel timely filed a notice of appeal on Appellant's behalf. Appellant filed a motion to withdraw the notice of appeal on December 9, 2016. Following a hearing on the same day, the court allowed Appellant to discontinue his direct appeal and appointed conflict counsel to pursue a PCRA petition instead. Appellant first filed a pro se position, and new counsel filed an amended PCRA petition on June 19, 2017.

At a PCRA hearing on September 25-26, 2017, the court heard testimony from Appellant's sister, brother-in-law, son, and trial counsel. Also at the PCRA hearing, Appellant made an oral motion to reinstate his direct appeal rights nunc pro tunc, which the court denied on December 5, 2017. On January 30, 2018, the court also denied PCRA relief. Appellant filed a pro se notice of appeal on February 12, 2018. On February 15, 2018, the court ordered Appellant to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal, pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. Rule 1925(b). Counsel timely filed an amended notice of appeal on February 26, 2018, and a timely rule 1925(b) statement on March 8, 2018.

Commonwealth v. Turner, No. 294 WDA 2018 (Pa. Super. March 11, 2019) (unpublished memorandum) (SCR No. 1241 - 1251). On PCRA appeal, Turner raised seven ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims. The appellate court dismissed on the merits six claims and dismissed one claim based upon a violation of state procedural rules. (Id.) Turner filed a Petition for Allowance of Appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which was denied on December 9, 2019. (ECF No. 1-2 at 44).

2. Federal Court Proceedings

Having been denied relief in state court, Turner filed the instant federal habeas petition, in which he raises eight claims, some with multiple sub-parts. (ECF No. 1). Respondents have filed an Answer (ECF No. 12), to which Turner filed a Summary of Argument (ECF No. 21), a 55-page Reply (ECF No. 22), and an Amendment to his Reply, with attached exhibits. (ECF No.25). The Court has reviewed the filings of the parties, the electronic copies of the state court record, and the Memorandum Opinion of the Superior Court filed March 11, 2019. The matter is fully briefed and ready for disposition.^.

C. The Standard for Habeas Relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254

"The writ of habeas corpus stands as a safeguard against imprisonment of those held in violation of the law." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 91 (2011). Federal courts reviewing habeas corpus petitions "must be vigilant and independent . . . a commitment that entails substantial judicial resources." Id. This case is governed by the federal habeas statute applicable to state prisoners, 28 U.S.C. § 2254, as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA"), "which imposes significant procedural and substantive limitations on the scope" of the Court's review. Wilkerson v. Superintendent Fayette SCI, 871 F.3d 221, 227 (3d Cir. 2017). Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, federal courts in habeas cases must give considerable deference to determinations of state trial and appellate courts. See Renico v. Lett, 599 U.S. 766, 772 (2010). Various standards must be met before the Court can review the merits of this habeas petition.

1. Timeliness

Before the Court can address the merits of Turner's petition, it must first decide whether it was timely filed. Romansky v. Superintendent Green SCI, 933 F.3d 293, 298 (3d Cir. 2019). Pursuant to AEDPA, a state prisoner must file his federal habeas claims within one year of the date his judgment of sentence became final. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). Respondents do not contest that the petition was timely filed and the Court independently finds that the petition was timely filed. (ECF No. 12 at 8).

2. Has the Petition Presented Cognizable Habeas Claims?

Habeas relief may be afforded to a state prisoner only when his or her custody violates federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); Wilson v. Corcoran, 562 U.S. 1, 6 (2010). The Petition presents a due process claim and numerous ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims. All of the claims are cognizable in habeas proceedings.

3. Federal Habeas Review of Properly Exhausted Claims

Among AEDPA's procedural prerequisites is a requirement that the petitioner "has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State" before seeking relief in federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). An exhausted claim is one that has been "fairly presented" to the state courts "by invoking one complete round of the State's established appellate review process," and which has been adjudicated on the merits. Carpenter v. Vaughn, 296, F.3d 138, 146 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 844-45 (1999)); Johnson v. Williams, 568 U.S. 298, 302 (2013). "Fair presentation" of a claim merely requires the petitioner to "present [the] federal claim's factual and legal substance to the state courts in a manner that puts them on notice that a federal claim is being asserted." Greene v. Palakovich, 606 F.3d 85, 93 (3d Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). For § 2254(d) purposes, a claim has been adjudicated on the merits "when a state court has made a decision that finally resolves the claim on the basis of its substance, rather than on a procedural, or other, ground." Collins v. Sec'y of Pa. Dep't of Corr., 742 F.3d 528, 545 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Thomas v. Horn, 570 F.3d 105, 117 (3d Cir. 2009)).

When a claim is properly exhausted in the state courts and then raised on federal habeas review, the level of deference afforded to the state-court decision is substantial. Bey v. Superintendent Greene SCI, 856 F.3d 230, 236 (3d Cir. 2017), cert. denied sub nom., Gilmore v. Bey, 138 S.Ct. 740 (2018). AEDPA "does not 'permit federal judges to . . . casually second-guess the decisions of their state-court colleagues or defense attorneys.' " Collins, 742 F.3d at 543 (quoting Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. 12, 14 (2013)). As a result, under § 2254(d), federal habeas relief is unavailable for exhausted claims unless the state-court adjudication "resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law . . . or resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

This is an intentionally difficult standard to meet. Richter, ...