Turner v. State
| Decision Date | 19 September 2012 |
| Docket Number | No. 18A05–1112–PC–697.,18A05–1112–PC–697. |
| Citation | 974 N.E.2d 575 |
| Parties | Duane TURNER, Appellant–Petitioner, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee–Respondent. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Stephen T. Owens, Public Defender of Indiana, Kathleen Cleary, Deputy Public Defender, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellant.
Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, Jodi Kathryn Stein, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.
Appellant–Petitioner, Duane Turner (Turner), appeals the post-conviction court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions.
Turner raises two issues on appeal, which we restate as the following:
(1) Whether the post-conviction court erred in determining that Turner's life sentence without parole is constitutional; and
(2) Whether Turner received effective assistance of counsel.
Our supreme court reviewed the factual background in Turner's direct appeal as follows:
On the evening of September 24, 1994, [Turner] and a group of friends drank and parried at a graveyard near Ball State University's campus. One friend, Larry Newton, decided that he wanted to go to Ball State and rob someone and asked [Turner] if [Turner] would join him. [Turner] agreed to go with him, and another friend, Chad Wright, agreed to take them in his car. Newton stated, “I'm hyped and I feel like killing somebody.”
Once on campus the three drove around until around 2:00 a.m. when they spotted Chris Coyle. Coyle, a Ball State student, was returning from walking home a female friend. They picked Coyle up and Newton demanded money from him. Coyle did not have any money and so stated. Newton forced Coyle out of the car and shot him in the back of the head. He then handed the gun to [Turner], who shot Coyle's body, now lying on the ground, in the shoulder. Coyle died from the first shot.
Turner v. State, 682 N.E.2d 491, 493–94 (Ind.1997).
On October 19, 1994, the State filed an Information charging Turner with Count I, murder, a felony, Ind.Code § 35–42–1–1(1); Count II, criminal confinement, a Class B felony, I.C. § 35–42–3–3(1); Count III, conspiracy to commit robbery resulting in serious bodily injury, a Class A felony, I.C. §§ 35–42–5–1(1), –41–5–2; and Count IV, attempted robbery resulting in serious bodily injury, a Class A felony, I.C. §§ 35–42–5–1(1), –41–5–1. That same day, the State filed its Allegation of Capital Offense and Request for Life Sentence, in which it requested a sentence of life imprisonment without parole based upon the existence of two statutory aggravating circumstances: that Turner murdered Coyle by intentionally killing him while committing or attempting to commit (1) a robbery and (2) criminal gang activity. SeeI.C. § 35–50–2–9(b)(1)(G)–(I).
On May 8 through 12, 1995, a jury trial was held. On May 11, 1995, the jury found Turner guilty on all Counts and the trial court entered a judgment of conviction on Counts I and II. On May 12, 1995, in response to a double jeopardy issue raised by Turner's counsel, the trial court declined to find Turner guilty on Count III but entered a judgment of conviction on Count IV.
That same day, the jury convened to consider Turner's eligibility for life imprisonment without parole. The State presented evidence regarding Turner's affiliation with a criminal gang, eliciting testimony from police officers, persons connected with or members of Turner's criminal gang, and Turner's former probation officer. Turner produced mitigating evidence through testimony of his family members and the maintenance man of his apartment complex. Turner's family members testified about his troubled childhood and upbringing stemming from an absent father and a drug-addicted and often incarcerated mother. Following deliberation, the jury was unable to return a recommendation for life imprisonment without parole. The trial court dismissed the jury.
On June 8, 1995, the trial court held a sentencing hearing. While Turner presented no evidence, the State presented testimony from a family friend of Coyle's and Coyle's parents. The State also introduced evidence regarding Turner's disruptive behavior while incarcerated through testimony from a corrections officer, Turner's probation officer, and the jailhouse psychologist, Dr. Gary Meunier (Dr. Meunier). Dr. Meunier concluded that Turner was a significantly disruptive inmate while at the Delaware County Jail, a psychopath, and a danger to society. However, Dr. Meunier qualified that his observations were based on general “everyday observations and everyday behaviors.” (Transcript p. 2144).1 Admittedly, he had not examined Turner apart from an initial interview and the basis for his testimony consisted of Turner's disciplinary reports. On cross-examination, Dr. Meunier conceded that his opinion of Turner was possibly erroneous because he had not performed a psychological evaluation on Turner. Dr. Meunier also admitted that psychopathy was not a formal diagnosis recognized by the American Psychiatric Association's then current version of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM). Nevertheless, Dr. Meunier explained that a narcissistic personality disorder, which is an element of psychopathy, was in the DSM.
Proceeding to sentencing, the trial court first sentenced Turner to the Department of Correction for twenty years on the criminal confinement conviction and forty-five years on the attempted robbery conviction, with sentences to run concurrently. The trial court reviewed eight mitigating factors and concluded that a majority were not applicable to Turner. However, the trial court noted that Turner had not been previously convicted of felony or a crime against a person. Further, the trial court noted Turner's assistance toward his siblings and grandparent. Turning to aggravating factors, the trial court found that Turner had three prior juvenile adjudications and ten pending adult charges, that prior attempts to rehabilitate Turner had been unsuccessful, that Coyle's family had requested an aggravated sentence, that the facts of the crimes were heinous, and that there was a significant risk that Turner would commit further crimes.
Turning to Turner's murder conviction, the trial court found that the State had proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Turner had intentionally killed Coyle while attempting to commit robbery and had also done so while committing criminal gang activity. Next, the trial court considered the statutory mitigating circumstances listed in I.C. § 35–50–2–9(c). In particular, the trial court concluded that there was no significant evidence that Turner was under extreme mental or emotional distress when the murder was committed despite evidence of Turner's troubled childhood. It also did not “see any substantial evidence of any mental defect” despite evidence from Dr. Meunier. (Tr. p. 2196). In sum, the trial court concluded that four additional mitigating circumstances existed: Turner's age of 19 at the time of the murder, his assistance to family members, his lack of a prior felony or crime against the person, and his troubled childhood. However, the trial court concluded that “their weight pales and is, at best, slight” when weighed and balanced against the statutory aggravating circumstances. (Tr. p. 2203). Determining that Turner committed a senseless act, the trial court found the risk that Turner would commit further crimes too great and imposed a life sentence without parole.
Turner appealed his convictions to our supreme court. He raised three issues on direct appeal: (1) the admission of his confession to police; (2) the admission of Ind. Evidence Rule 404(b) evidence; and (3) a fundamental error claim premised on the use of a disapproved jury instruction. The supreme court determined that evidence of probative value on the voluntariness of Turner's confession supported its admission into evidence, that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admittingRule 404(b) evidence, and that no fundamental error regarding the jury instruction existed.
On September 8, 2000, Turner filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. On May 3, 2010, he filed an amended petition alleging that his sentence of life imprisonment without parole was unconstitutional under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article One, Sections Twelve, Thirteen, Sixteen and Twenty-three of the Indiana Constitution. That same day, Turner filed a motion for summary judgment under Ind. Post–Conviction Rule 1 § 4(g) regarding the constitutionality of his life sentence without parole. On August 2, 2010, the State filed its summary disposition motion and motion to strike portions of Turner's designated evidence. On August 24, 2010, the post-conviction court held a hearing on the parties' motions. On October 8, 2010, the post-conviction court issued findings of fact and conclusions thereon granting the State's motion for summary disposition and denying Turner's motion for summary judgment.
On September 29, 2011, the post-conviction court held an evidentiary hearing on Turner's amended petition. Turner presented testimony from two witnesses, his former attorney, who served as both Turner's trial and appellate counsel, and Dr. Bart Ferraro (Dr. Ferraro), an expert witness. On December 2, 2011, the post-conviction court issued its findings of fact and conclusions of law denying Turner relief.
Turner now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
On appeal, Turner challenges two rulings of the post-conviction court. First, Turner claims that the post-conviction court erred in denying his motion for summary judgment and granting the State's motion for summary disposition on his claim that his life sentence without parole violates the United States Supreme Court's...
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