Turner v. United States

Decision Date13 May 1968
Docket NumberNo. 4414.,No. 4413.,4413.,4414.
Citation241 A.2d 736
PartiesCharles Ricardo TURNER, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES, Appellee.
CourtD.C. Court of Appeals

David C. Niblack, Washington, D. C. (appointed by this court) for appellant.

Roger E. Zuckerman, Sp. Asst. U. S. Atty., for appellee; David G. Bress, U. S. Atty., Frank Q. Nebeker and James E. Kelley, Asst. U. S. Attys., on the brief.

Before HOOD, Chief Judge, and MYERS and KELLY, Associate Judges.

MYERS, Associate Judge.

A jury convicted appellant of assault1 and petit larceny.2 The charges grew out of a single incident in which appellant, his codefendant, and a third man allegedly beat the complaining witness and took from him a portable phonograph. Inter alia, appellant contends that the trial judge erred in requiring him to stand trial jointly with the codefendant. Although Rule 7 (c)3 of the criminal rules of the trial court permits defendants charged in a single information with joint participation in a single transaction to be tried together, appellant contends that joinder in the instant case was prejudicial and severance should have been allowed under Rule 7 (e).4

Appellant did not testify on his own behalf at trial nor did he produce any evidence in his own defense. He complains that he was effectively precluded from putting on a defense because his codefendant testified that appellant was at the scene of the crime. Appellant had wanted to offer an alibi defense. To put conflicting evidence before the jury, he argues, would incur the risk that the jury would infer the guilt of both defendants from the conflict alone.

"The general rule is that persons jointly indicted should be tried together. Granting separate trials is a matter of discretion." Lucas v. United States, 70 App. D.C. 92, 93, 104 F.2d 225, 226 (1939), citing Commonwealth v. Bingham, 158 Mass. 169, 33 N.E. 341, 342 (1893). "The mere fact that appellant might have had a better chance of acquittal if tried separately * * * does not establish his right to a severance." Robinson v. United States, 93 U.S.App.D.C. 347, 349, 210 F. 2d 29, 32 (1954). Because one defendant testifies while the other does not is not a sufficient showing of prejudice to warrant reversal of the silent defendant's conviction. Rhone v. United States, 125 U.S. App.D.C. 47, 365 F.2d 980 (1967).

In cases where one defendant makes admissions inculpating his codefendant and those statements would not have been admissible against the codefendant in a separate trial, it has been uniformly held that, by charging the jury not to consider the inculpatory testimony as evidence against the codefendant, the trial judge cures any possible prejudice to an extent sufficient to warrant affirmance of the codefendant's conviction. Delli Paoli v. United States, 352 U.S. 232, 239, 77 S.Ct. 294, 1 L.Ed.2d 278 (1957); Dykes v. United States, 114 U.S.App.D.C. 189, 313 F.2d 580 (1962), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 837, 83 S.Ct. 1889, 10 L.Ed.2d 1059 (1963). In the present case, appellant's codefendant gave testimony which would have been admissible against appellant even in a separate trial. It was eyewitness testimony of appellant's presence at the scene of the crime. Furthermore, the testimony was generally exculpatory of appellant, as the codefendant testified that appellant did not take part in the beating of the complaining witness, but in fact tried to rescue the witness from the attack. If a codefendant's inadmissible inculpatory testimony does not require separate trials, the introduction of admissible exculpatory testimony by a codefendant is certainly not sufficient reason to compel severance. That several defendants put forth contradictory testimony is not enough by itself to force separate trials. The fact that the testimony is conflicting in a case in which one of the defendants admits...

To continue reading

Request your trial
6 cases
  • State v. Mead
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of New Mexico
    • May 5, 1983
    ...degree murder, demonstrates the jury's ability to fairly determine each defendant's guilt or innocence. See, e.g., Turner v. United States, 241 A.2d 736 (D.C.App.1968). Both defendants took the stand and each cross-examined the other; independent evidence existed to contradict their respect......
  • Ready v. United States
    • United States
    • D.C. Court of Appeals
    • May 18, 1982
    ...158, 160 (1976) (per curiam) (overwhelming eyewitness testimony outweighed prejudice resulting from joint trial); Turner v. United States, D.C. App., 241 A.2d 736, 738 (1968) (strong corroborating eyewitness testimony rendered harmless any prejudice that might have resulted from Accordingly......
  • Ellis v. United States
    • United States
    • D.C. Court of Appeals
    • December 1, 1978
    ...the testimony of appellant Barnes also would have been admissible against appellant Ellis in a separate trial. See Turner v. United States, D.C.App., 241 A.2d 736, 738 (1968). These two factors neutralize the claims of prejudice which appellant Ellis has advanced. Similarly, we are not sway......
  • Borrero v. United States, 8027.
    • United States
    • D.C. Court of Appeals
    • February 7, 1975
    ...States, 348 U.S. 84, 75 S.Ct. 158, 99 L.Ed. 101 (1954); Smith v. United States, D.C. App., 315 A.2d 163 (1974); Turner v. United States, D.C.App., 241 A.2d 736 (1968); Robinson v. United States, 93 U. S.App.D.C. 347, 210 F.2d 29 (1954); Peterson v. United States, 344 F.2d 419 (5th Cir. Borr......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT