Turner v. Wade
| Decision Date | 14 November 1919 |
| Docket Number | No. 29,29 |
| Citation | 254 U.S. 64,65 L.Ed. 134,41 S.Ct. 27 |
| Parties | TURNER et al. v. WADE, Sheriff of Brooks County, Ga |
| Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
Messrs. Arthur G. Powell, John D. Little, Marion Smith, and Max F. Goldstein, all of Atlanta, Ga., for plaintiffs in error.
Messrs. Graham Wright, of Rome, Ga., Clifford Walker, of Monroe, Ga., and Bennet & Harrell, of Quitman, Ga., for defendant in error.
This case involves the constitutional validity under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of certain provisions of the Georgia Tax Equalization Act. Laws Ga. 1913, p. 123.
The facts stated in the petition and amended petition are not disputed, and show that plaintiffs in error returned property for taxation at the value of $44,225. The county board of tax assessors, without hearing, raised the assessment to $80,650. Notice was then given to the plaintiffs in error of the increase. Following the statute, plaintiffs in error demanded arbitration, and named an arbitrator, the board selected an arbitrator, and the two selected a third. Upon meeting of the arbitrators, all agreed that the value assessed by the board was excessive. The arbitrator named by the plaintiffs in error fixed the valuation at $50,000. The arbitrator named by the board fixed the valuation at $66,000. The third arbitrator fixed the valuation at $63,000. The arbitrators could not agree; each adhering to his own view. All the arbitrators believed the assessment too high, but for lack of agreement the arbitration failed, and after 10 days from the date of naming of the arbitrator designated by the board had expired, the statutory requirement that the valuation of the board of assessors should stand affirmed was followed, and the collector demanded payment of the taxes in the sum of $80,640, the valuation fixed by the assessors. The tax collector issued execution for the taxes upon this valuation, and plaintiffs in error filed a petition in equity to prevent the enforcement of the execution, setting up the constitutional objection to which we have referred.
The superior court of Georgia, on interlocutory hearing, granted an ad interim injunction. This action was revered by the Supreme Court of Georgia. Upon a second writ of error from the Supreme Court of Georgia, the act was again held constitutional.
The assessment by the board of assessors was made under section 6 of the act, which provides that the board of county assessors shall meet each year, within 10 days of the date of the closing of the tax returns, to receive and inspect the same. It is made the duty of the board to examine the returns of both real and personal property, and if at any time, in the opinion of the board, any taxpayer has omitted from his return any property which should be returned, or has failed to return property at its fair valuation, the board is authorized to correct such returns and assess and fix the fair valuation upon the property. When the corrections, changes, and equalizations have been made by the board, it is then its duty to give notice to any taxpayer of any changes made in his return, either personally or by leaving the same at his residence or place of business, or, in case of nonresidents by mail. The section further provides that, if the taxpayer is dissatisfied with the action of the board, he may within 10 days from the giving of said notice, give notice to the board that he demands an arbitration, giving at the same time the name of his arbitrator. Whereupon the board shall name its arbitrator within 3 days thereafter and the two shall select a third, a majority of whom shall fix the assessment upon the property upon which the taxpayer shall pay taxes, except so far as the same may be affected by the findings and orders of the state tax commissioner as in the act provided. Provision is made for qualification of arbitrators, and that they shall render their decision within 10 days from the date of naming of the arbitrator by the board of assessors; otherwise, the decision of the board of assessors shall stand and be binding in the premises. (The pertinent part of section 6 is given in the margin.1)
In considering certain sections of the Georgia tax laws this court held, in Central of Georgia v. Wright, 207 U. S. 127, 28 Sup. Ct. 47, 52 L. Ed. 134, 12 Ann. Cas. 463, that due process of law requires that after such notice as may be appropriate the taxpayer have opportunity to be heard as to the validity of a tax and the amount thereof, by giving him the right to appear for that purpose at some stage of the proceedings. This case, with others, was cited with approval in Londoner v. Denver, 210 U. S. 373, 385, 28 Sup. Ct. 708, 52 L. Ed. 1103, wherein we said that if the Legislature of the state, instead of fixing the tax itself, commits to the subordinate body the duty of determining whether, and in what amount, and upon whom the tax shall be levied, due process of law requires that at some stage of the proceedings, before the tax becomes irrevocably fixed, the taxpayer must have the opportunity to be heard, of which he must have notice whether personal, by publication, or by some statute fixing the time and place of the hearing. See 210 U. S. 385, and previous cases in this court cited on page 386, 28 Sup. Ct. 708, 52 L. Ed. 1103. See, also, Coe v. Fertilizer Co., 237 U. S. 413, 425, 35 Sup. Ct. 625, 59 L. Ed. 907.
As we have understood the argument of the Attorney General, it is admitted that the provision for arbitration, under the facts herein shown, does not of itself afford due process of law. But it is now contended that section 7 saves the statute and provides for notice and hearing. Section 7 provides:
'That it shall be the duty of the county board of tax assessors to diligently investigate and inquire into the property...
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