Turner v. Williams
| Decision Date | 17 April 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 3:19-cv-641-J-32PDB |
| Parties | BRYAN TURNER, Plaintiff, v. MIKE WILLIAMS, as Sheriff of City of Jacksonville and Duval County, MIKE WILLIAMS, individually, BILL LEEPER, as Sheriff of Nassau County, and BILL LEEPER, individually, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
This First Amendment retaliation case is before the Court on Defendant Mike Williams's Motion to Dismiss, (Doc. 9), and Defendant Bill Leeper's Motion to Dismiss, (Doc. 8). Plaintiff Bryan Turner responded in opposition to both motions. (Docs. 17, 18). Additionally, Williams filed a supplemental brief, (Doc. 22), to which Turner responded, (Doc. 25).
Turner brings this eight-count Amended Complaint against Defendants Jacksonville Sheriff Mike Williams in his official and individual capacities, andNassau County Sheriff Bill Leeper in his official and individual capacities.2 (Doc. 7). Turner alleges that in 2008, after working for fourteen years as a deputy sheriff for Nassau County, he retired and began working for the Jacksonville Sheriff's Office ("JSO"). (Doc. 7 ¶ 10). At the time of his retirement from Nassau County, Turner did not receive a retired deputy identification card. Id. In 2016, Turner allegedly "began communicating to everyone he knew, and specifically within [the Nassau County and Jacksonville Sheriff's offices], his intention to run for the position of sheriff of Nassau County in 2020." Id. ¶ 12.
On February 6, 2017, Turner was working undercover for JSO with two other officers when he fatally shot an individual, allegedly in self-defense. Id. ¶¶ 15-20. Immediately following the shooting, the newest member of the team—who was undergoing training—asked Turner if he should dispose of the beer in their vehicle. Id. ¶ 21. Although "the possession—and even ingestion—of beer by undercover officers is specifically permitted by [JSO] as a standard operating procedure," Turner responded "yeah," and the trainee threw the beer into a nearby yard. Id. ¶ 21. After other JSO personnel arrived, Turner wasinterviewed and then placed on paid administrative leave. Id. ¶ 24. On February 12, 2017, the Integrity Division of JSO, which investigates criminal charges against officers, obtained warrants for Turner and the other two team members for tampering with evidence and conspiring to tamper with evidence. Id. ¶ 26. All three were arrested that day and placed on unpaid administrative leave. Id.
Turner alleges that Williams had him arrested because Williams wanted a different individual to be elected sheriff of Nassau County. Id. ¶¶ 29-32. Further, Turner alleges that other individuals with similar conduct were treated differently. Id. ¶¶ 35-39. In August 2017, the state attorney dropped the charges against Turner. Id. ¶ 33. The following day, Turner submitted his written resignation because allegedly JSO "[r]epresentatives" "made clear" that if he continued to work for JSO he would spend the rest of his career answering telephones. Id. ¶ 34.
While Turner was on unpaid administrative leave, he attempted to obtain a retired deputy identification card from Nassau County—which he had not previously sought because he was employed by JSO—but his request was denied. Id. ¶ 40. Turner alleges that Williams and Leeper "agreed to take all actions necessary to assure Plaintiff's defeat in the 2020 election." Id. ¶ 31. Moreover, Turner alleges that on February 15, 2018, he requested that Nassau County permit him to conduct the shooting qualification that is required tocontinue carrying a firearm as a retired deputy, but that his request was denied. Id. ¶ 41.
Turner originally filed his action in state court, but Defendants Williams and JSO removed the case. (Doc. 1). Turner subsequently filed an Amended Complaint asserting eight claims: First Amendment Retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against JSO (Count I); First Amendment Retaliation under § 1983 against Williams (Count II); First Amendment Retaliation under § 1983 against Nassau County (Count III); First Amendment Retaliation under § 1983 against Leeper (Count IV); Florida common law civil conspiracy against Williams and Leeper (Count V); Conspiracy to interfere with Civil Rights under § 1985 against Williams and Leeper (Count VI); Florida false imprisonment and arrest against JSO (Count VII); and Florida false imprisonment and arrest against Williams (Count VIII). Williams and JSO (Doc. 9) and Leeper and Nassau County (Doc. 8) moved to dismiss all counts against them. Turner responded in opposition to both motions, (Docs. 17, 18), but withdrew Count IV, (Doc. 17).
A complaint must contain a short plain statement showing the plaintiff is entitled to relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). "[A] complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations . . . ." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). However, "a plaintiff'sobligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The complaint's factual matter, which is accepted as true, must be "plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
The Eleventh Circuit has also repeatedly lectured that shotgun complaints violate the federal pleading rules. Weiland v. Palm Beach Cty. Sheriff's Office, 792 F.3d 1313, 1321-23 (11th Cir. 2015). In Weiland, Chief Judge Carnes identified four types of shotgun complaints:
The most common type—by a long shot—is a complaint containing multiple counts where each count adopts the allegations of all preceding counts, causing each successive count to carry all that came before and the last count to be a combination of the entire complaint. The next most common type, at least as far as our published opinions on the subject reflect, is a complaint that does not commit the mortal sin of re-alleging all preceding counts but is guilty of the venial sin of being replete with conclusory, vague, and immaterial facts not obviously connected to any particular cause of action. The third type of shotgun pleading is one that commits the sin of not separating into a different count each cause of action or claim for relief. Fourth, and finally, there is the relatively rare sin of asserting multiple claims against multiple defendants without specifying which of the defendants are responsible for which acts or omissions, or which of the defendants the claim isbrought against.
Id. at 1321-23 (footnotes omitted). "Relevant to the case at bar, a shotgun complaint also may 'begin with a long list of general allegations' that are later 'incorporated by reference into each count of the complaint.'" Boswell v. Gee, No. 8:18-cv-1769-T-17AEP, 2019 WL 3718206, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 6, 2019) (quoting Johnson Enters. of Jacksonville, Inc. v. FPL Grp., Inc., 162 F.3d 1290, 1333 (11th Cir. 1998)). "The unifying characteristic of all types of shotgun pleadings is that they fail to one degree or another, and in one way or another, to give the defendants adequate notice of the claims against them and the grounds upon which each claim rests." Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1323.
Smith v. City of Atl. Beach, No. 3:18-CV-1459-J-34MCR, 2019 WL 2330470, at *2 (M.D. Fla. May 31, 2019). Here, Turner incorporates all of his factual allegations into each count and fails to identify which allegations form the basis of his different causes of action. For example, it isunclear under Count I whether Turner is alleging that only the arrest was the retaliatory action, or if the arrest and the threat that Turner would be relegated to "teleserve" were both separate retaliatory actions. (Doc. 7 ¶ 50). "Indeed, in previous cases involving Plaintiff's counsel, this Court and the court of appeals have noted the problems created at summary judgment by the vague and conclusory manner in which she drafts her pleadings." Smith, 2019 WL 2330470, at *2 n.4 (compiling cases). Thus, notwithstanding the additional deficiencies identified below, if Plaintiff files a second amended complaint, it must connect specific factual allegations with the elements for each cause of action.
Turner alleges that JSO, Williams, and Nassau County all retaliated against him for exercising his First Amendment rights—specifically for stating his intention to run for sheriff of Nassau County.
"'[T]he First Amendment prohibits government officials from subjecting an individual to retaliatory actions' for engaging in protected speech." Nieves v. Bartlett, 139 S. Ct. 1715, 1722 (2019) (quoting Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 256 (2006)). "To state a § 1983 First Amendment retaliation claim, a plaintiff generally must show:" (1) that the plaintiff engaged in constitutionally protected speech; (2) the defendant took retaliatory action that adversely affected that protected speech; and (3) a causal connection between thedefendant's retaliatory conduct and the adverse effect on the plaintiff's speech. DeMartini v. Town of Gulf Stream, 942 F.3d 1277, 1289 (11th Cir. 2019) (citing Bennett v. Hendrix, 423 F.3d...
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