Turner v. Wolfe
| Decision Date | 21 November 2022 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 5:22-CV-197 |
| Parties | ROBERT T. TURNER, Petitioner, v. R.M. Wolfe, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of West Virginia |
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
On August 17, 2022, Robert T. Turner, acting pro se filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 [Doc. 1] (the “Petition”). Petitioner is a federal inmate housed at FCI Gilmer and is challenging the validity of his conviction from the Southern District of Illinois. On September 26, 2022, petitioner paid the $5 filing fee. The matter is currently pending before the undersigned for a Report and Recommendation pursuant to LR PL P 2. For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned recommends that the Petition be denied and dismissed without prejudice.
On June 6, 2017, a three-count Indictment was filed in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois, against the petitioner. Counts 1 and 2 charged him with Distribution of Methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(C). Count 3 charged him with Possession with Intent to Distribute Methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).
On October 19, 2017, before United States District Judge Gilbert, petitioner entered a plea of guilty to Counts 1, 2, and 3 of the Indictment pursuant to a written, binding Rule 11(c)(1)(C) Plea Agreement. On February 9, 2018, petitioner was sentenced for 264 months on each of Counts 1, 2, and 3 of the Indictment. All counts were ordered to run concurrently. Petitioner was remanded to the custody of the United States Marshal.
On February 14, 2018, the petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal to the Seventh Circuit. On December 11, 2018, the appeal was dismissed. Petitioner stated that he filed a Motion to Vacate pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, labeled as “Motion for Reconsideration,” which was denied on June 7, 2022. Since then, the petitioner filed a motion for an order directing an immediate return of property, motion for an order directing prosecutors to provide a copy of exhibit #2, motion for reconsideration, and motion for new trial, all of which have been denied. On May 26, 2022, petitioner filed a motion for sentencing transcripts, which is still pending.
Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and this Court's local rules, the undersigned is authorized to review such petitions for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the District Court. This Court is charged with screening the petitioner's case to determine if “it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court.” Rule 4, Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the U.S. District Courts (2014); see also Rule 1(b) Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the U.S. District Courts (2014) (a district court may apply these rules to a habeas corpus petition not filed pursuant to § 2254).
Courts must read pro se allegations in a liberal fashion and hold those pro se pleadings “to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b), the Court is required to perform a judicial review of certain suits brought by prisoners and must dismiss a case at any time if the Court determines that the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. A complaint is frivolous if it is without arguable merit either in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989) (superseded by statute). The Supreme Court in Neitzke recognized that:
Section 1915(d)[2] is designed largely to discourage the filing of, and waste of judicial and private resources upon, baseless lawsuits that paying litigants generally do not initiate because of the costs of bringing suit and because of the threat of sanctions for bringing vexatious suits under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. To this end, the statute accords judges not only the authority to dismiss a claim based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, but also the unusual power to pierce the veil of the complaint's factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.
Even under this less stringent standard, the Petition in this case is subject to summary dismissal. The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the Court can ignore a clear failure to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Social Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990). As discussed more fully below, the petitioner clearly is not entitled to relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, and therefore, no response has been required of the respondent.
In his Petition, petitioner states three grounds. First, petitioner asserts that he is innocent of the sentence imposed, which was incorrectly based on non-qualifying predicates used to support a career offender enhancement to the offense of the conviction. Specifically, he states that current jurisprudence establishes that petitioner's prior State of Illinois drug convictions no longer qualify as predicates for purposes of enhancing his sentence under 21 U.S.C. § 851, or U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 as they do not match the federal counterpart for a Controlled Substance. He asserts that his sentence of 262 months[3] exceeds the statutory maximum of 240 months, thus it is an illegal sentence that requires resentencing. Second, petitioner argues that his guilty plea was not voluntarily, intelligently, or knowingly made because it was coerced by telling him that if he failed to plead guilty then a life sentence could be imposed if a jury trial was held and he was found guilty. Third, petitioner states that his initial arrest on state charges was unlawful because all of the evidence and statements associated with that arrest were illegally obtained. He asserts that the arrest was illegal because there was a twelve-day delay before he was arraigned in state court.
Title 28, United States Code, Sections 2241 and 2255 each create a mechanism by which a federal prisoner may challenge his or her detention. However, the two sections are not interchangeable. Prisoners seeking to challenge the validity of their convictions or their sentences are required to proceed under section 2255 in the district court of the conviction. Rice v. Rivera, 617 F.3d 802, 807 (4th Cir. 2000); In re Vial. 115 F.3d 1192, 1194 (4th Cir. 1997).
Under § 2255, a prisoner may move the sentencing court “to vacate, set aside or correct” his sentence if he claims it “was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). Second or successive petitions pursuant to § 2255 must be certified by the appropriate court of appeals. Id. § 2255(h). Courts of appeals grant such requests only if newly discovered evidence establishes “by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable factfinder would have found the movant guilty” or that a previously unavailable “new rule of constitutional law” has been “made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court.” Id.
A petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to § 2241, on the other hand, is intended to address the execution of a sentence, rather than its validity, and is to be filed in the district where the prisoner is incarcerated. Fontanez v. O'Brien, 807 F.3d 84, 85 (4th Cir. 2015). In O'Brien v. Moore, 395 F.3d 499, 505 (4th Cir. 2005), the Court noted that the “‘essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that custody' and ‘the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal custody.'” Obando-Segura v. Garland, 999 F.3d 190, 194 (4th Cir. 2021), quoting Preiserv. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973). Examples of an appropriate use of § 2241 include “actions challenging the computation of parole, computation of good time or jail credits, prison disciplinary actions, or imprisonment allegedly beyond the expiration of a sentence.” Anderson v. Pettiford, 2007 WL 15777676 (internal citations omitted).
While the terms of § 2255 expressly prohibit prisoners from challenging their convictions and sentences through a habeas corpus petition under § 2241, there is nonetheless a “savings clause” in § 2255, which allows a prisoner to challenge the validity of his conviction and/or his sentence under § 2241, if he can demonstrate that § 2255 is “inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e). The law is clearly developed, however, that relief under § 2255 is not inadequate or ineffective merely because relief has become unavailable under § 2255 because of (1) a limitation bar,[4] (2) the prohibition against successive petitions, or (3) a procedural bar due to failure to raise the issue on direct appeal. In re Vial, 115 F.3d 1192, 1194 n. 5 (4th Cir. 1997).
A petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating that the § 2255 remedy is “inadequate or ineffective,”[5] and the standard is an exacting one. The Fourth Circuit has announced two tests for evaluating whether a petitioner's claim satisfies the § 2255(e) savings clause. Which test is to be applied depends on whether the...
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