Turquitt v. Jefferson County, Ala.

• Decision Date: 25 March 1998
• Docket Number: No. 96-6333,96-6333
• Citation: Turquitt v. Jefferson County, Ala., 137 F.3d 1285 (11th Cir. 1998)
• Parties: 11 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 1156 Susan W. TURQUITT, as administratrix of the estate of Phillip Edward Turquitt, deceased, Plaintiff, Isom E. Turquitt, Intervenor-Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JEFFERSON COUNTY, ALABAMA, Defendant-Appellant, Melvin Bailey, Sheriff of Jefferson County, Alabama, individually and in his official capacity, Jim McCreless, Chief Jailer of Jefferson County, Alabama, individually and in his official capacity, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

Page 1285

137 F.3d 1285

11 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 1156

Susan W. TURQUITT, as administratrix of the estate of Phillip Edward Turquitt, deceased, Plaintiff Isom E. Turquitt, Intervenor-Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JEFFERSON COUNTY, ALABAMA, Defendant-Appellant Melvin Bailey, Sheriff of Jefferson County, Alabama individually and in his official capacity, Jim McCreless Chief Jailer of Jefferson County, Alabama, individually and in his official capacity, Defendants.

No. 96-6333.

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

March 25, 1998.

Jeffrey M. Sewell, Birmingham, AL, for Defendant-Appellant.

James W. Webb, Kendrick E. Webb, Bart Harmon, Webb & Eley, P.C., Montgomery, AL, for Amicus Curiae.

Wendy Brooks Crew, Baddley & Crew, Terry McElheny, Birmingham, AL, for Intervenor-Plaintiff-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama.

Before HATCHETT, Chief Judge, and TJOFLAT, ANDERSON, EDMONDSON, COX, BIRCH, DUBINA, BLACK, CARNES, BARKETT and HULL, Circuit Judges. ^*

DUBINA, Circuit Judge:

We took this case on an interlocutory appeal to decide whether an Alabama county can be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for injuries befalling a county jail inmate arising from the sheriff's management of the jail. For the reasons outlined below, we hold that it cannot.

I. BACKGROUND

On July 29, 1995, while he was a pre-trial detainee in the county jail of Jefferson County, Alabama, Philip Turquitt ("Turquitt") was fatally injured in a fight with another inmate, who was a convicted felon, in the dayroom of the jail. The administratrix of Turquitt's estate ("Plaintiff") filed an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged violations of Turquitt's rights under the federal constitution. Named as defendants in the suit were the Jefferson County sheriff in his official and individual capacities, several deputy sheriffs in their individual and official capacities, and Jefferson County ("the County"). The amended complaint alleges that the jail was severely over-crowded and that because the jail lacked a classification system, inmates were housed together without regard to their relative dangerousness or conviction status. The complaint further alleges that the defendants knew of the dangerous propensities of the man who killed Turquitt but took no action to control him, and that they generally did not exercise adequate supervision over the inmates in the jail. Finally, the complaint asserts that the defendants failed to properly train and supervise staff members who worked in the jail.

The County filed a motion to dismiss, or alternatively for summary judgment, on the ground that the sheriff, who is the official policymaker for the jail, acts for the state rather than the county in administering the jail. The district court denied the motion on the authority of Parker v. Williams, 862 F.2d 1471 (11th Cir.1989), which held that in Alabama a sheriff is the county policymaker with respect to the operation of the county jail. Turquitt v. Jefferson County, 929 F.Supp. 1451, 1455 (N.D.Ala.1996). The district court was bound by Eleventh Circuit precedent to deny the County's motion to dismiss, but the court stated that it would have granted Jefferson County's motion if it were "writing on a clean slate." Id. Because of the importance of the issue to the parties in the instant suit, as well as to others similarly situated, the district court certified the decision for interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).

Jefferson County filed a "Suggestion of Hearing En Banc" asserting that Parker was in conflict with decisions of the Supreme Court and precedents of this court, and that the County's appeal involved a question of exceptional importance. See 11th Cir. R. 35-3. Recognizing the importance of the issues involved and the fact that a panel of this court would be bound by Parker to affirm the district court's order, a majority of the circuit judges in regular active service voted to hear this appeal en banc. Fed. R.App. P. 35(a). We ordered the parties to brief two issues:

1. Whether an Alabama sheriff is a county policymaker for purposes of § 1983 liability when operating a jail.

2. Whether Parker was wrongly decided and should be overruled.

II. THE COUNTY'S LIABILITY

A local government may be held liable under § 1983 only for acts for which it is actually responsible, "acts which the [local government] has officially sanctioned or ordered." Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479-80, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 1298, 89 L.Ed.2d 452 (1986) (citing Monell v. New York City Dept. of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978)). In determining whether Jefferson County is a proper defendant in this suit, we first look to the analysis of the Supreme Court in McMillian v. Monroe County, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 1734, 138 L.Ed.2d 1 (1997), in which the Court considered whether an Alabama sheriff was a state or a county policymaker for § 1983 purposes when engaged in law enforcement activities. To evaluate whether a local government is liable under § 1983, a court must " 'identify those officials or governmental bodies who speak with final policymaking authority for the local government actor concerning the action alleged to have caused the particular constitutional or statutory violation at issue.' " McMillian, --- U.S. at ----, 117 S.Ct. at 1736 (quoting Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 737, 109 S.Ct. 2702, 2724, 105 L.Ed.2d 598 (1989)).

Two principles guide our analysis of which governmental actors speak with final authority. McMillian, --- U.S. at ----, 117 S.Ct. at 1737. First, we must focus our attention on the particular area or issue for which the government official is alleged to be the final policymaker. Id. (citing Jett, 491 U.S. at 737, 738, 109 S.Ct. at 2724; City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 123, 108 S.Ct. 915, 924, 99 L.Ed.2d 107 (1988) (plurality opinion)). Second, our inquiry depends upon an analysis of Alabama law. McMillian, --- U.S. at ----, 117 S.Ct. at 1737 (citing Jett, 491 U.S. at 737, 109 S.Ct. at 2724; Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 483, 106 S.Ct. at 1300 (plurality opinion)). We must determine the "actual function" of an official in a particular area by reference to "the definition of the official's functions under relevant state law." Id.

Initially, we determine who the policymaker is and in which particular area that policymaker acted. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 123, 108 S.Ct. at 924 ("[T]he challenged action must have been taken pursuant to a policy adopted by the official ... responsible under state law for making policy in that area of the [local government's] business."). The Plaintiff explains that her theories of recovery against the County are based on three alleged acts or omissions:

(1) deliberate indifference to the substantial risk of serious harm to the inmates of the jail;

(2) lack of an adequate policy to control inmate violence in the jail, as well as a failure to enforce a policy of classifying and segregating inmates based upon status, propensity for violence, medical needs, etc.; and

(3) failure to adequately staff, train, and supervise its employees, officers and agents, and a failure of such employees, officers and agents to supervise and control the inmate population.

En Banc Brief of Appellee at 2. Alabama law provides that it is the sheriff who has the duty to ensure that inmates do not come to harm, to develop a policy of controlling inmate violence, and to staff the jail with appropriately trained jailors. Ala.Code §§ 14-6-1, 14-6-105 (1995). Because the parties agree that the sheriff possesses the authority to make final policy with respect to these actions, the contested issue is whether the sheriff functions as the County's policymaker when he takes those actions.

Our answer to this question turns on state law, including state and local positive law, as well as custom and usage having the force of law. McMillian v. Johnson, 88 F.3d 1573, 1577 (11th Cir.1996) (citing Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 124 n. 1, 108 S.Ct. at 924 n. 1 (plurality opinion, adopted by the Court in Jett, 491 U.S. at 737, 109 S.Ct. at 2724)), aff'd --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 1734, 138 L.Ed.2d 1 (1997). ¹ Furthermore, the federal judiciary must "respect state and local law's allocation of policymaking authority," and not "assume that final policymaking authority lies in some entity other than that in which state law places it." McMillian, 88 F.3d at 1577 (citing Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 126, 131, 108 S.Ct. at 925-26, 928). Our review of Alabama law persuades us that an Alabama sheriff acts exclusively for the state rather than for the county in operating a county jail.

We begin, as did the Supreme Court in McMillian, with the supreme law of the state, the Alabama Constitution. McMillian, --- U.S. at ----, 117 S.Ct. at 1737 (citing Alexander v. State ex rel. Carver, 274 Ala. 441, 150 So.2d 204, 208 (1963)). Alabama's Constitution clearly denominates the sheriff as a member of the state's executive department. Ala. Const. of 1901, Art. V § 112. The Alabama Supreme Court, construing Art. V, § 112, as well as its legislative history, concluded that a sheriff is an executive officer of the state. Parker v. Amerson, 519 So.2d 442, 443 (Ala.1987). The court further held that because a sheriff is an executive officer, "a sheriff is not an employee of a county for the purposes of imposing liability on the county." Id. at 442; see also Hereford v. Jefferson County, 586 So.2d 209, 209 (Ala.1991).

The legislative history of the Alabama Constitution reflects an intent to bring sheriffs under the control of superior state officials. Sheriffs were first named executive department officials when the state constitution was amended in 1875. Ala. Const. of 1875, Art. V § 1. At that time, authority to impeach a sheriff resided in the court of the county in which the sheriff held office. Ala. Const. of 1875, Art. VII § 3. In 1901,...