Turturro v. United States

Decision Date09 October 2015
Docket NumberNo. 14-3834,14-3834
PartiesJOSEPH N. TURTURRO, ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF ADAM B. BRADDOCK, DECEASED; CHARLES ANGELINA, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF CHARLES ANTHONY ANGELINA, DECEASED; VIRGINIA ANGELINA, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF CHARLES ANTHONY ANGELINA, DECEASED, Appellants v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION; AGUSTA AEROSPACE CORPORATION
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civ. No. 2-10-cv-02460)

Honorable R. Barclay Surrick, District Judge

Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

October 6, 2015

BEFORE: SHWARTZ, KRAUSE, and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges

OPINION*

GREENBERG, Circuit Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

These consolidated cases arise out of a tragic airplane crash at Northeast Philadelphia ("the airport") Airport that resulted in the death of flight student Charles Angelina and his instructor Adam Braddock. The crash occurred when Angelina's and Braddock's Grumman AA-1C airplane (the "Grumman") stalled while making a right turn during departure. Decedents' estates brought suit for negligence against both the United States of America as air traffic controller ("ATC") and Agusta Aerospace Corporation ("Agusta"), which owned an Agusta 139 helicopter that was departing from the airport at the same time as the Grumman. Plaintiffs claim that ATC breached its duty of care by clearing the Agusta helicopter for a westerly departure in the direction of the Grumman's operation and then suddenly and urgently instructing the Grumman to turn right, placing it on a potentially conflicting path with the Agusta; they claim that the Agusta pilots breached their duties of care by making the westerly departure and inadequately communicating their intentions. Although the Grumman and the Agusta did not come close to colliding, plaintiffs claim that defendants' conduct caused Angelina toexperience an involuntary startle reaction when he saw the Agusta, leading him to lose control of the Grumman. Defendants each moved for summary judgment, and the District Court granted the motions on August 22, 2014. Because plaintiffs did not produce sufficient evidence that the Agusta pilots breached any duty of care or that Angelina actually experienced the alleged startle reaction, we conclude that plaintiffs, now appellants, cannot support their claims against either defendant and therefore we will affirm the order for summary judgment.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The crash occurred at approximately 11:58:05 A.M. on May 22, 2008, at the airport. The airport houses several flight training schools and has two intersecting runways: Runway 33 which runs to the northwest at 330 degrees, and Runway 24 which runs to the southwest at 240 degrees. Agusta's facility and the Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA") Air Traffic Control Tower are both located around midfield, to the east of the intersection of the two runways.

The Grumman AA-1C is a small, two-seat airplane, and the Agusta 139 is a much larger, fifteen-seat helicopter. Angelina was operating the Grumman from the left seat, while Braddock was in the right seat. They were practicing touch-and-go takeoffs and landings on Runway 33. At that time Agusta company pilot Steven Farr and his customer trainee pilot Alan Baldwin were in the Agusta, preparing to depart on a training flight to Lancaster, Pennsylvania, to the west of the airport.

Local controller Jennifer Richburg at the airport took over responsibility for active runways about five minutes before the crash, at 11:53:04 A.M., facing a "light to moderate" air traffic load. J.A. 798. She almost immediately began having trouble. The Air Traffic Control Manual ("ATCM") provides that when communicating with aircraft, ATC should use an identification prefix such as the aircraft's type, model, or manufacturer's name, followed by the last three digits or letters of the aircraft's registration number. ATCM §§ 2-4-9.a., 2-4-20.a.1. J.A. 814-15. For example, the Grumman, which had registration number N9555U, would be referred to as "Grumman 55U." Plaintiffs' ATC expert, Richard P. Burgess, explained that the purpose of these ATCM provisions "is to avoid confusion caused by just using only numbers and also to identify the type aircraft for other traffic in the pattern or airport traffic area." J.A. 973. Throughout the period leading up to the crash, however, Richburg referred to aircraft based on identification prefix or its registration number.

There was an additional problem because Richburg gave instructions to the wrong aircraft and then misidentified another aircraft. First, after the Grumman pilots requested a left downwind touch-and-go, she directed, "55U altitude and speed permitting make right traffic runway 33." J.A. 1441. After the Grumman pilots pointed out the error in this instruction, Richburg corrected herself: "55U disregard that call[;] correction 76M make right traffic runway 33." J.A. 1441. Richburg made a further error because she incorrectly identified an aircraft called a Caravan as a Cheyenne, a different aircraft.

At 11:56:06 A.M., the Agusta pilots requested a "westerly departure." J.A. 1443. The wind at the time was blowing at eight knots from a northwest direction of 330degrees, a significant fact because aircraft should take off into the wind. Indeed, one of the plaintiffs' experts, Vernon Albert, testified that "aircraft are supposed to take off and land into the wind," J.A. 1685, and that "as far as wind direction, [the Agusta pilots' requested takeoff] was probably appropriate." J.A. at 1687. After the Agusta pilots requested the westerly departure, Richburg momentarily held them due to the Grumman's intended departure on Runway 33 and asked the Agusta pilots if they had "that Grumman" in sight. J.A. 1444. When the Agusta pilots confirmed that they did, Richburg informed them that "that Grumman will be in a left downwind departure" and cleared the Agusta to "proceed on course" with its departure. J.A. 1444.

The Agusta took off and began moving to the northwest while the Grumman began its climb for its "left downwind departure" on Runway 33. Suddenly, Richburg directed, "55U make right traffic." J.A. 1444. Unlike in an earlier instruction, she did not use the phrase "altitude and speed permitting" at this time. Burgess testified that the timing of the instruction and the sound of Richburg's voice conveyed a sense of urgency. J.A. 1029-30. As a result, Angelina immediately commenced a right-hand turn, a move that surprised the Agusta pilots as they had not heard Richburg change her directions to the Grumman. Albert noted that this missed transmission by the Agusta pilots may have indicated that they were not aware of the situation, although he acknowledged that a single missed call generally does not reflect such a loss of situational awareness. Another of plaintiffs' experts, Carlos Diaz, a medical doctor, testified that a pilot reasonably might not hear a communication between ATC and another aircraft due to other factors requiring the pilot's attention, including operation of the pilot's own aircraft as well asthe pilot's own communications with ATC. Burgess added that other pilots could have missed this particular transmission because by referring to "55U" without using the prefix "Grumman," "it's questionable . . . whether the other pilots would know exactly what airplane [Richburg was] talking about." J.A. 1029.

Upon seeing the Grumman begin its right-hand turn, Baldwin uttered "what the F," J.A. 1385, and the Agusta pilots immediately executed a maneuver called a "quick stop" to prevent the two aircraft from "converging on each other" if they each continued on their respective paths. J.A. 745, 838. The Grumman, however, banked too far to the right, stalled, and crashed into the ground, killing both Angelina and Braddock.

At the time of the accident, Agusta and the airport were developing a Letter of Agreement ("LOA") to facilitate Agusta helicopter departures to the east and south, away from the two active runways. The LOA provided that Agusta pilots would request such departures "[u]nless otherwise coordinated" by the pilot and ATC. J.A. 1367. Although the LOA was not yet in effect at the time of the crash, on request Agusta helicopters at that time could utilize similar eastern and southern routes. Furthermore, the helicopters could turn and depart in such directions even if the wind required them to take off to the north or west.

Different witnesses offered different meanings of the Agusta pilots' request for a "westerly" departure, ranging from within five degrees of due west (270 degrees) to anywhere up to due north (360 degrees). Plaintiffs' ATC experts opined, however, that the Agusta's northwest departure complied with the clearance that it received: Burgess testified that from an ATC perspective, the Agusta pilots did nothing wrong based on"the clearance that they received and how they responded," J.A. 1700, and another plaintiffs' expert, Joseph Gramlich, testified: "Based on an air traffic control perspective, no, I did not see anything wrong from the Agusta pilots." J.A. 471. Plaintiffs' accident reconstruction expert, Douglas Stimpson, likewise testified that the Agusta pilots' northwest departure was "within their ATC instructions." J.A. 446. Finally, plaintiffs' pilot expert, John L. Suchocki, testified that the Agusta pilots complied with their duties under the Federal Aviation Regulations ("FARs") and that they did not do anything wrong on the day of the accident. J.A. 455. In addition, Richburg testified that she saw no problem with the Agusta pilots' request for a westerly departure or their taking off to the northwest after receiving clearance.

When Baldwin took off he intended to turn the Agusta even further to the right and fly parallel with Runway...

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