Tuskegee Land & Security Co. v. Birmingham Realty Co.

Decision Date08 April 1909
PartiesTUSKEGEE LAND & SECURITY CO. v. BIRMINGHAM REALTY CO.
CourtAlabama Supreme Court

Rehearing Denied May 11, 1909.

Appeal from City Court of Birmingham; C. W. Ferguson, Judge.

Action by the Tuskegee Land & Security Company against the Birmingham Realty Company. From a judgment for defendant plaintiff appeals. Reversed and remanded.

The complaint, as amended, is as follows:

Count 1: "The plaintiff, a corporation, claims of the defendant, a corporation, $3,000 damages for the breach of the covenant in the agreed conveyance executed by defendant to plaintiff on the 1st day of December, 1903, by which deed which is duly recorded, defendant for a valuable consideration conveyed to plaintiff certain real estate in the city of Birmingham, Jefferson county, Ala., described as follows: [Here follows the description, the material part of which is set out in the opinion.] And plaintiff says that said lot or parcel so conveyed by said deed abutted or fronted on Avenue A, which was a public street in the city of Birmingham, Ala., which had been mapped and laid off over 30 years before the date of said deed, and lots sold with reference to said street, and the use of the said street dedicated to the public, and that the conveyance of said tract included the right to the unobstructed passage of said street for safe and commodious passage over and across said street or avenue, and of egress from and access to said lot over and along said street, which was a right appurtenant to said lot so conveyed by the deed. And plaintiff says that the deed so executed by the defendant to plaintiff contained among other things, the following covenants: 'And the Birmingham Realty Company, for the consideration aforesaid hereby covenants and agrees that it is seised of an indefeasible estate in fee simple in and to the premises aforesaid, that it has a good right to sell and convey the same, that the same are free from all incumbrances, except the mortgage deed of trust to the Union Trust Company in New York, and that it will warrant the title hereby conveyed against all persons whomsoever lawfully claiming the same.' And plaintiff says that the covenants in said deed were broken by defendant, and there are breaches thereof in this: That defendant was not, at the time of the execution and delivery of said deed, seised of an indefeasible estate in fee simple in and to the premises above described in this that at and before the execution of and delivery by defendant to plaintiff of said deed the defendant did, on, to wit, June 10, 1902, execute and deliver to the Birmingham & Atlanta Air Line Railway, its successors and assigns, a written conveyance of the right to lay tracks and forever operate trains thereon along Avenue A or First Avenue South, on which avenue the premises conveyed to plaintiff by defendant abut; and said railway, or its successor, the Atlanta & Birmingham Air Line Railway, has taken possession of part of said Avenue A in front of said lot and laid two railroad tracks thereon, over which it operates cars by means of steam locomotives, one of which tracks is between the center of said avenue and plaintiff's said lot conveyed by said deed. And plaintiff says that by reason of the construction of said railway, and the operation of cars and trains thereon, plaintiff is denied either reasonable or safe access to its said premises, and said release and consent executed by defendant for laying the said railroad track and the operation of cars on the track was and is an incumbrance on the title of plaintiff, by reason of which it suffered and suffers the damages aforesaid."

Count 2: Same as 1, down to and including the words "breaches thereof, in this," and adds: "And plaintiff says that the defendant did not, at the time of the execution of said deed, have a right to sell and convey said lots, inasmuch as said lots so conveyed by defendant to plaintiff abut about 100 feet on Avenue A, which is a public street in the said city of Birmingham, and the right to the unimpeded use of said street in front of said lots was a right appurtenant to said lots; but plaintiff says that on the 10th day of June, 1902, and before the execution and delivery of said deed of conveyance by defendant to plaintiff, the defendant for a valuable consideration executed and delivered to the Birmingham & Atlanta Air Line Railway a permit, license, or consent in writing for said railway, its successors and assigns, to use said avenue for railroad purposes; that is, the defendant consented that the said railroad company, its successors and assigns, might use said Avenue A for railroad purposes; that is, the defendant consented that the said railroad and its successors might construct, maintain, use, and operate tracks of railroads along and over said avenue opposite to and in front of said lot conveyed to plaintiff by the deed aforesaid, and released the said railroad company, its successors and assigns, from any and all damages of any character whatsoever to all lots abutting said Avenue A, including the lot conveyed to plaintiff, and that said railroad company or its successors built on Avenue A two railway tracks on which it operates by means of steam locomotives, cars and trains, one track being between the center of said avenue and said lot, thereby depreciating the value of said lot and depreciating the rental value thereof, and rendering access to said lots less safe, commodious, and easy, and by breach of said covenant plaintiff has been damaged as aforesaid," etc.

Count 3: Same as 1, down to and including the words "breaches thereof, in this," and adds: "And plaintiff says there is a breach of the covenant in said deed in this: In that the said lands conveyed by the said deed were not free from incumbrance, except the mortgage deed of trust to the Union Trust Company in New York, in this: That the defendant, before the execution and delivery of the deed of conveyance of said lot to plaintiff, had for a valuable consideration consented in writing, on, to wit, June 10, 1902, that the Birmingham & Atlanta Air Line Railway Company, its successors and assigns, might construct, maintain, use, and operate tracks of railroads along and over Avenue A, and did release said railroad company, its successors and assigns, from any and all damages of any character whatsoever to the lots described in said deeds to plaintiff abutting on said Avenue A or contiguous thereto, which defendant might suffer from the construction, maintenance, use, and operation of said tracks over, along, and across said Avenue A. And said railway, or its successors, have taken possession of part of said avenue in front of said lots, and laid two tracks of railroad thereon, over which it operates cars by means of steam locomotives, one of which tracks is between the center of said avenue and the lots conveyed by said deed to plaintiff. And said railway constructed said track and so operated trains thereon under and by virtue of an ordinance of the mayor and aldermen of Birmingham, and that said railway, under its charter, had authority to construct, maintain, and operate said tracks and cars as aforesaid. And plaintiff says that the premises described in the deed of defendant to plaintiff abuts on said Avenue A, and the right of ingress to and egress from and approach to said premises over said Avenue A, which was and is a public street of said city of Birmingham, and used by the public for over 30 years, was appurtenant to said real estate so conveyed, and, defendant having already conveyed the right above described to said railway company and its successors, such conveyance was an incumbrance on said property, whereby plaintiff was and is damaged as aforesaid."

Count 4: Same as count 1, down to and including the words "breaches thereof, in this," and adds: "In and by an ordinance adopted on the 30th day of April, 1902, the mayor and aldermen of Birmingham, then and there having the power under and by virtue of its charter then existing, then and there being a municipal corporation, by an ordinance duly adopted, the said mayor and aldermen in meeting duly assembled empowered and authorized the said Birmingham &amp Atlanta Air Line Railway Company, its successors and assigns, to build and construct along Avenue A, in said city, from Thirty-First street, on the east side of Birmingham, Ala., to Thirteenth street, on the west side of Birmingham, Ala., a double-track railroad along the center of said Avenue A, in said city, with all necessary turnouts and side tracks, and that pursuant thereto said defendant executed and delivered to the said railway company in writing a right, license, power, and release of damages because of constructing and operating said railroad along said Avenue A, in said city of Birmingham; and plaintiff says that, pursuant to said ordinance of the mayor and aldermen of Birmingham and said contract of license executed by the defendant to the said railroad company on the 10th day of June, 1902, the said railway company constructed its double-track railway, to the damage of plaintiff alleged in breach D, as set forth in this count, as follows: D. And plaintiff said that there is a breach of the covenant of warranty in the said deed, for that, before the execution and delivery of said deed to plaintiff, said defendant on the 10th day of June, 1902, had for a valuable consideration executed and delivered a consent to the Birmingham & Atlanta Air Line Railway Company, its successors and assigns, the right to lay a railroad track along said Avenue A, in front of the lots described in said deed, and to operate cars and trains thereon, and release said railway from all damages to said lot by reason of laying said track and operating said railway, whereby...

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  • Magraw v. Dillow
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    • September 1, 1995
    ...elements to Judge Eli Frank. Similar formulations may be found nationwide. A good example is Tuskegee Land & Security Co. v. Birmingham Realty Co., 161 Ala. 542, 556, 49 So. 378, 382 (1909) (citing Prescott v. Trueman, 4 Mass. 627, 629, 3 Am.Dec. 246, 247 (1808)). In Levine v. Hull, 135 Md.......
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