Tuttle v. Dobbs Tire & Auto Ctrs., Inc.

• Decision Date: 24 December 2019
• Docket Number: No. SC 97721,SC 97721
• Parties: Dwight TUTTLE, Appellant, v. DOBBS TIRE & AUTO CENTERS, INC., David Dobbs, and Dustin Dobbs, Respondents.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

590 S.W.3d 307

Dwight TUTTLE, Appellant,
v.
DOBBS TIRE & AUTO CENTERS, INC., David Dobbs, and Dustin Dobbs, Respondents.

No. SC 97721

Supreme Court of Missouri, en banc.

Opinion issued December 24, 2019
Rehearing Denied December 24, 2019

Tuttle was represented by Jerome J. Dobson and Amanda D. Anthony of Dobson, Goldberg, Berns & Rich LLP in St. Louis, (314) 621-8363.

Dobbs Tire and the Dobbses were represented by Robert D. Younger and Dean Kpere-Daibo of McMahon Berger PC in St. Louis, (314) 567-7350.

Zel M. Fischer, Judge

Dwight Tuttle appeals a judgment dismissing his claims for relief under the Missouri Human Rights Act ("MHRA") for age discrimination and retaliation. Because Tuttle was not aggrieved by any alleged act to have occurred in Missouri, the express provisions of the MHRA coupled with the presumption against extraterritorial application of laws precludes this Court from applying the MHRA to Tuttle's claims. The circuit court's judgment is affirmed.

590 S.W.3d 309

Factual and Procedural History

Dobbs Tire & Auto Centers, Inc. is a corporation formed under the laws of Missouri with its headquarters in Jefferson County, Missouri. Dobbs Tire owns and operates tire and automotive service stores in several counties in both Missouri and Illinois. Tuttle was employed by Dobbs Tire from March 1989 until March 2017. From July 2003 until November 2016, he served as the store manager of Dobbs Tire's Shiloh, Illinois, store. Tuttle alleges he was a satisfactory employee and received numerous awards. However, Tuttle alleges that, since 2015, he became the subject of discriminatory employment practices because of his age.¹

In pertinent part, Tuttle alleges the following:

(1) Dustin Dobbs² informed Tuttle he would never receive another raise during his employment with Dobbs Tire;

(2) Dobbs Tire transferred a number of illegitimate expenses to the Shiloh store, which distorted the profit numbers of the Shiloh store, and reflected poorly on Tuttle's managerial abilities;

(3) Dobbs Tire transferred Tuttle to its Fairview Heights, Illinois store which had a history of lower sales volume than the Shiloh store;³

(4) Tuttle was forced to sign a document accepting his transfer to the Fairview Heights store that also stated Tuttle could be terminated if the Fairview Heights store did not improve its performance;

(5) Younger store managers did not have to sign a similar document when they were transferred to other stores; and

(6) After the profit and loss statement for the Fairview Heights store had been completed for 2016, Tuttle's regional manager told him, "I hope you have your resume out and are looking for another job."

Because of these alleged actions taken by Dobbs Tire, Tuttle considered himself constructively discharged and tendered his resignation March 13, 2017.

Tuttle timely filed a charge with the Missouri Commission on Human Rights ("MCHR") and was issued a notice of his right to sue by the MCHR on October 16, 2017. Tuttle filed the instant lawsuit in St. Louis County, claiming both age discrimination in violation of § 213.055⁴ and retaliation⁵ in violation of § 213.070. Tuttle alleged that because "[o]ne or more of the discriminatory decisions or actions taken against the Plaintiff alleged herein took place in the State of Missouri," jurisdiction and venue were proper in the circuit court. Dobbs Tire filed a motion to dismiss arguing, among other reasons, Tuttle's petition did not state a claim upon which relief could be granted because the MHRA does

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not apply to an Illinois employee who faced alleged discriminatory acts in Illinois. The circuit court dismissed Tuttle's petition with prejudice but did not specify its reasons for the dismissal. Tuttle appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed the circuit court's judgment in an unpublished memorandum. This Court granted transfer and has jurisdiction. Mo. Const. art. V, § 10.

Standard of Review

"This Court reviews the trial court's grant of a motion to dismiss de novo. " Cope v. Parson , 570 S.W.3d 579, 583 (Mo. banc 2019). "A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted is solely a test of the adequacy of the petition." Id. (quoting Bromwell v. Nixon , 361 S.W.3d 393, 398 (Mo. banc 2012) ). "When considering whether a petition fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, this Court must accept all properly pleaded facts as true, giving the pleadings their broadest intendment, and construe all allegations favorably to the pleader." Id. When the circuit court does not specify its reasons for dismissing a plaintiff's petition, this Court presumes the circuit court's dismissal was based on one of the reasons stated in the motion to dismiss. Avery Contracting, LLC v. Niehaus , 492 S.W.3d 159, 162 (Mo. banc 2016). The circuit court's dismissal will be affirmed if justified on any ground advanced in the motion to dismiss. Armstrong-Trotwood, LLC v. State Tax Comm'n , 516 S.W.3d 830, 835 (Mo. banc 2017).

Analysis

"The MHRA protects important societal interests by prohibiting unlawful employment practices on the basis of ... age." Kader v. Bd. of Regents of Harris-Stowe State University , 565 S.W.3d 182, 186 (Mo. banc 2019) (emphasis omitted). "It shall be an unlawful employment practice ... [f]or an employer ... to discharge any individual ... because of such individual's ... age[.]" § 213.055.1(1)(a). The MHRA requires that a person be aggrieved by an unlawful discriminatory practice before filing a complaint with the MCHR. See § 213.075.1 ("[A]ny person claiming to be aggrieved by an unlawful discriminatory practice may make, sign and file with the commission a verified complaint in writing[.]" (emphasis added)); § 213.111.1 ("[T]he commission shall issue to the person claiming to be aggrieved a letter indicating his or her right to bring a civil action ..." (emphasis added)).

The MHRA defines the phrase "unlawful discriminatory practice" as "any act that is unlawful under this chapter." § 213.010(18). "Aggrieved" is not defined by the MHRA. "In the absence of statutory definitions, the plain and ordinary meaning of a term may be derived from a dictionary, and by considering the context of the entire statute in which it appears." Kader , 565 S.W.3d at 187 (quoting Mantia v. Mo. Dep't of Transp. , 529 S.W.3d 804, 809 (Mo. banc 2017) ). The word aggrieved means "showing grief, injury, or offense; having a grievance; specif : suffering from an infringement or denial or legal rights." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 41 (3d ed. 2002). This Court has recognized that, for the MHRA's purposes, an alleged discriminatory act "must have had some adverse impact on the plaintiff before it becomes actionable." Kader , 565 S.W.3d at 189 (internal quotation omitted). Said another way, it is the adverse impact that is actionable under the MHRA, but only if that adverse impact resulted from a prohibited discriminatory practice.

Tuttle does not specify in his petition exactly where each alleged discriminatory action took place. Instead, he merely states, "some of the decisions and

590 S.W.3d 311

actions against plaintiff took place in Missouri."⁶ His reasoning appears to be that, because Dobbs Tire is headquartered in Missouri,⁷ the decision-making process underlying all of the discriminatory acts must have taken place in Missouri.⁸ However, as explained in Kader , it is not the decision that gives rise to a cause of action under the MHRA. Rather, it is being aggrieved by an unlawful discriminatory practice that does so.⁹ Tuttle was not aggrieved until the alleged discriminatory practice resulted in an adverse impact, but that adverse impact occurred in Illinois. Tuttle does not dispute that the manner in which he was aggrieved is his loss of wages in Illinois, benefits of his employment in Illinois, and mental anguish arising from his constructive discharge from his Illinois job. Taking all of these allegations as true, all of the adverse impact alleged by Tuttle occurred in Illinois.

Further supporting this construction of the MHRA, this Court applies the longstanding presumption that Missouri statutes, absent express text to the contrary, apply only within the boundaries of this state and have no extraterritorial effect. Rositzky v. Rositzky , 329 Mo. 662, 46 S.W.2d 591, 595 (Mo. 1931) ("[I]t is the settled law and almost axiomatic that the statutes of a state or country prescribe the law within its boundaries only, and have no extraterritorial force or effect."); Stanley v. Wabash St. L. & P. Ry. Co. , 100 Mo. 435, 13 S.W. 709, 710 (Mo. 1890) ("The legislative authority of every state must spend its force within the territorial limits of the state.").¹⁰

590 S.W.3d 312

To evade the presumption, Tuttle alleges he is not asking this Court to apply the MHRA extraterritorially because certain decisions were made in Missouri. While decisions may have occurred in Missouri, decisions are not actionable under the MHRA; adverse impacts from discriminatory practices are actionable. With no actionable adverse impact in Missouri, Tuttle is asking this Court to apply the MHRA to a purely extraterritorial event. Moreover, the...