Tuttle v. Hi-Land Dairyman's Assn.

• Decision Date: 23 March 1960
• Docket Number: HI-LAND,No. 9126,9126
• Citation: 350 P.2d 616,10 Utah 2d 195
• Parties: d 195 Ernest C. TUTTLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v.DAIRYMAN'S ASSOCIATION, Ray Harris; and Elmer Houston, Clerk of the Murray City Court, Defendants and Appellants.
• Court: Utah Supreme Court

Page 616

350 P.2d 616

10 Utah 2d 195

Ernest C. TUTTLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. HI-LAND DAIRYMAN'S ASSOCIATION, Ray Harris; and Elmer Houston, Clerk of the Murray City Court Defendants and Appellants.

No. 9126.

Supreme Court of Utah.

March 23, 1960.

W. C. Lamoreaux, Salt Lake City, Robert R. Dansie, Murray, for appellants.

J. Richard Bell, Jacque B. Bell, Salt Lake City, for respondent.

WADE, Justice.

This is an appeal by the Hi-Land Dairyman's Association, a corporation, Ray Harris, its credit manager, and Elmer Houston, the Clerk of the Murray City Court, from a judgment of the District Court granting a money judgment against the corporation and enjoining the corporate appellant and Ray Harris, its credit manager, from instituting proceedings in the small claims division of the Murray City Court, except through an attorney, and enjoining the clerk of the court from issuing garnishments out of the small claims division of that court.

The facts are that Ray Harris, the credit manager of Hi-Land Dairyman's Association for and on its behalf commenced an action against Ernest C. Tuttle in the small claims division of the Murray City Court for monies due the corporation for merchandise purchased by Tuttle. He did this by preparing and executing an affidavit setting forth the nature and basis of the claim. An order was then issued and served on Tuttle. At the hearing Harris testified for the corporation. Tuttle admitted owing the money and the court granted judgment. Tuttle having failed to pay the judgment a garnishment was issued by the clerk of the court and the judgment was collected by service of a garnishee execution. This suit was commenced for the return of the money so collected and for injunctions against the corporation from proceeding further in the small claims court without an attorney and against the clerk of the court for issuing garnishments out of that court.

Appellants' main contentions are that the court erred in finding that (1) a corporation cannot institute proceedings in the small claims court except through a licensed attorney and (2) that the clerk of such court cannot issue garnishments.

As to the contention that the court erred in finding that a corporation cannot proceed in a small claims court except through a licensed attorney, appellants argue, and we agree, that a corporation is a 'person' within the meaning of the provisions of Sec. 78-6-2, U.C.A.1953. That section provides that actions may be maintained in the small claims court by any person who executes an affidavit setting forth the nature of the claim. However, from the fact that a corporation is a 'person' which can maintain an action in a small claims court, it does not follow that any officer or employee of such corporation can properly institute such an action by executing such affidavit and appearing in behalf of the corporation at the hearing provided in the Small Claims Court Act. Corporations are different in that respect from natural persons. A corporation cannot practice law and must have a licensed attorney representing it in court matters. As stated in Paradise v. Nowlin, ¹ on page 867 of the Pacific Reporter:

'A composite of the rule in the decided cases, overwhelmingly sustained by the authorities, may be thus stated: A natural person may represent himself and present his own case to the court although he is not a licensed attorney. A corporation is not a natural person. It is an artificial entity created by law and as such it can neither practice law nor appear or act in person. Out of court it must act in its affairs through its agents and representatives and in matters in court it can act only through licensed attorneys. A corporation cannot appear in court by an officer who is not an attorney and it cannot appear in propria persona * * *.'

The case of Paradise v. Nowlin, supra, then goes on to point out the reason for the court's holding in the case of the Prudential Insuance Co. v. Small Claims Court ² that a corporation may appear in that court through its officers or agents was because attorneys were expressly excluded by the provisions of their statute from taking part in the litigation of claims in the small claims court, and therefore, of necessity, since a corporation is a 'person' within the meaning of the small claims act, it must act through some natural person, other than a licensed...