Tuttle v. People

• Decision Date: 06 March 1905
• Citation: 79 P. 1035,33 Colo. 243
• Parties: TUTTLE et al. v. PEOPLE.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

79 P. 1035

33 Colo. 243

TUTTLE et al. v. PEOPLE.

Supreme Court of Colorado

March 6, 1905

Error to District Court, Washington County; E. E. Armour, Judge.

Perry Tuttle and another were convicted of murder, and they bring error. Reversed.

Stuart & Murray, Wolcott, Vaile & Waterman, and T J. Leftwich, for plaintiffs in error.

The Attorney General, Ralph Talbot, and I. B. Melville, for the People.

GABBERT C.J.

Plaintiffs in error were convicted of the murder of Joseph Meenan. The first point we shall consider relates to the admissibility of statements made by the defendants at the coroner's inquest. They were subpoenaed as witnesses to appear before the coroner's jury, then engaged in investigating the cause of the death of deceased and ascertaining the guilty parties, and were duly sworn and testified before that body. At this time the defendants were not under arrest, nor had any information been filed against them, but they were suspected of being guilty of Meenan's murder, and knew that they were so suspected. At least Tuttle knew he was suspected, and, from the nature of the questions propounded, they must have known that they were both suspected. Their statements were not confessions or admissions of guilt, but related principally to their whereabouts and movements at and about the time of the homicide. They made no objection to testifying, were not represented by counsel, and were not warned that their statements might be used against them, or that they were privileged to refuse to testify if they so elected. Their counsel contend that the statements were inadmissible at the trial, because not voluntary. On behalf of the people, the learned Attorney General contends that the general rule now is that if the person coming before the coroner's jury is not under arrest at the time he testifies, whether he comes with or without process, his statements at the inquest can be used against him in a trial under an indictment or information charging him with the particular crime then under investigation.

The particular question presented by the record in this case has been discussed by many courts in England and in this country and has also been the subject of discussion by learned writers on criminal law. In this state it is one of first impression, and we are free to determine it by the application of those principles which should control with due regard to the rights of the accused and the people. All the authorities agree that voluntary admissions of a party are admissible as testimony at his trial for the crime to which the admissions relate. The apparent conflict in the authorities arises on the proposition as to when admissions by a party before a coroner's jury are to be deemed voluntary, and when not. The text-writers, in treating of this subject, say, in substance, that the mere fact that at the time of the inquest the party was suspected of the homicide will not exclude his incriminating statements made to the coroner's jury, if they are voluntary. Underhill on Evidence, § 131; Whart. on Crim. Ev. (9th Ed.) § 664. In 3 Russell on Crimes, *412, it is said: 'And it may be laid down generally that a statement upon oath by a person not being a prisoner, and where no suspicion attached to him, the statement not being compulsory nor made in consequence of any promise of favor, is admissible in evidence against him on a criminal charge.' The early English cases held that the statements under oath of a person before a coroner's jury, although not then specifically charged with the crime, were not receivable in evidence against him when on trial for the murder being investigated. Rex v. Lewis, 6 Carr. & Payne, *161; Regina v. Owen et al., 9 Carr. & Payne, 149. The conclusion in these cases seems to be based upon the theory that statements by the accused under oath could not be regarded as voluntary. Greenleaf, in his work on Evidence, § 225, in speaking on the subject, says: 'But it is to be observed that none but voluntary confessions are admissible, and that if to the perplexities and embarrassments of the prisoner's situation are added the danger of perjury and the dread of additional penalties, the confession can scarcely be regarded as voluntary; but, on the contrary, it seems to be made under the very influences which the law is particularly solicitous to avoid.' In discussing this question, the Supreme Court of Kansas, in State v. Taylor, 36 Kan. 329, 13 P. 550, held that the testimony of a defendant taken at a coroner's inquest could be read at his trial on behalf of the state, where it was given not under duress, or where the defendant was not compelled by subpoena or otherwise to give his testimony at the inquest. Twiggs v. State (Tex. Cr. App.) 75 S.W. 531, was a case where the defendant testified as a witness before a grand jury, then engaged in investigating a case against a third person. The defendant was before the grand jury by virtue of an attachment issued. From his examination a case against him was developed. He was subsequently indicted for perjury predicated upon his testimony before the grand jury. At his trial on this charge his statements before the grand jury were admitted on behalf of the state. The court held that where a defendant is under arrest or constraint, or held as a witness, and testifies about an offense of which he is suspected, his statements in regard to such matters cannot be used against him unless previous to making them he was warned. In Farkas v. State, 60 Miss. 847, it was decided that testimony given before a coroner's jury investigating a homicide by one under arrest because suspected of having committed the crime is not admissible in evidence against him when tried upon an indictment subsequently found, charging him with the commission of the crime investigated by the coroner's jury. In State v. O'Brien, 18 Mont. 1, 43 P. 1091, 44 P. 399, it was held that it was error to admit the statements of a defendant before the coroner to be introduced at his trial for the homicide being investigated, where it appeared that he was called before that official immediately after the homicide, and testified without any knowledge of his lawful rights, without the aid of counsel, and under the belief that he had to answer the questions put to him. In State v. Clifford, 86 Iowa 550, 53 N.W. 299, 41 Am.St.Rep. 518, it was held that where one accused of a crime is taken before a grand jury by its direction, and not by his own volition, statements then made by him without being informed of his rights, or of the possibility of their being used in evidence against him, are not admissible on a trial for the offense to which the statements related, since they were not voluntarily made. In Wilson v. State, 110 Ala. 1, 20 So. 415, 55 Am.St.Rep. 17, it was held (quoting from the syllabus) that: 'On a trial for murder, the statements made by the defendant on his examination at the coroner's inquest, at which time he was neither under arrest nor accused of the crime, are admissible in evidence, and the fact that such statements were made under oath does not render them involuntary and inadmissible.' The gist of the decision, however, is contained in the last paragraph of the opinion, wherein it is stated:

'The weight of authority and sound principle favor the rule that the statements of a witness before a coroner, given in under oath, not charged with the offense, and not under arrest, there being no constraint, are admissible in evidence against him.'

Hendrickson v. People, 10 N.Y. 13 61 Am.Dec. 721, and Teachout v. People 41 N.Y. 7, appear to be regarded by text-writers and other courts following the views announced in these cases as the leading ones supporting the contention of the Attorney General. They appear to be based upon the proposition that in all cases where a party is not under arrest, or before an officer on a charge of homicide, in testifying at a coroner's inquest he is to be regarded merely as a witness, and, although he might refuse to testify, unless he does so, or is compelled to answer after having declined to do so, his statements are to be regarded as voluntary. It will be observed, however, in the Teachout Case, the defendant was informed by the coroner that rumors implicated him, and that he had a right to refuse to testify. In People v. Mondon, 103 N.Y. 211, 8 N.E. 496, 57 Am.Rep. 709, the Court of Appeals reaffirms the doctrine announced in the Hendrickson and Teachout cases, but holds that, if at the time of the examination of a defendant before the coroner's jury, it appears that a homicide has been committed, and that he is in custody as the supposed criminal, he is not regarded merely as a witness, but as a party accused, and is to be treated in the same manner as if brought before a committing magistrate. Indiana appears to have followed the New York cases in Epps v. State, 102 Ind. 539, 1 N.E. 491, and Davidson v. State, 135 Ind. 254, 34 N.E. 972, although in the latter case the decision of the court appears, to some extent, to be based upon the provision of a statute of the state (section 1802, Rev. St. 1881) which the court construes as rendering all confessions by an accused admissible in evidence against him, except such as are made under the influence of fear produced by threats. Lovett v. State, 60 Ga. 257, holds that the minutes of evidence given by the prisoner before the coroner are admissible on his trial for the homicide to which the inquest related, but does not state, the conditions under which such testimony was given before the coroner. In State v. Mullins, 101 Mo. 514, 14 S.W. 625, the testimony of a defendant given before a coroner at an inquest was held admissible because, from the circumstances of that case, the defendant was to be treated...