Tuttle v. Reid, 30965

• Decision Date: 06 May 1966
• Docket Number: No. 30965,30965
• Citation: 247 Ind. 375,216 N.E.2d 34
• Parties: Edwin E. TUTTLE, Appellant, v. Marjorie Mary REID, Ralph Dean Grant, Appellees
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Page 34

216 N.E.2d 34

247 Ind. 375

Edwin E. TUTTLE, Appellant, v. Marjorie Mary REID, Ralph Dean Grant, Appellees.

No. 30965.

Supreme Court of Indiana,

May 6, 1966.

William B. Weisell, Indianapolis, Waldo C. Ging, Greenfield, Locke, Reynolds, Boyd & Weisell, Indianapolis, Ging & Free, Greenfield, of counsel, for appellant.

John T. Hume, III, Indianapolis, Glenn T. Williams, Greenfield, Smith & Jones, Indianapolis, Williams & Cone, Greenfield, of counsel, for appellee Marjorie Mary Reid.

T. L. Davis, Indianapolis, George Dickmann, Greenfield, Davis & Buehl, Indianapolis, of counsel, for appellee Ralph Dean Grant.

MYERS, Chief Justice.

This case comes to us on petition no transfer from the Appellate Court, pursuant to Burns' Ind. Stat., § 4--215, 1946 Replacement, and Supreme Court Rule 2--23. See Tuttle v. Reid (1964), Ind.App., 198 N.E.2d 610.

This is an action for damages based upon personal injuries sustained by appellant's wife who was a passenger in an automobile driven by appellee, Marjorie Mary Reid, which collided with an automobile driven by appellee, Ralph Dean Grant, at the intersection of Spring Mill Road and 73rd Street in Marion County, Indiana. At the conclusion of plaintiff's evidence, the trial court gave the jury a peremptory instruction to return a verdict in favor of appellee Reid. The jury returned a verdict for appellee, Marjorie Mary Reid, based on this instruction. After hearing defendant Grant's evidence, it later returned a verdict in favor of appellee Grant and against appellant Tuttle. Motions for new trial were filed by appellant against each of appellees, which motions were overruled. This appeal followed.

Evidence most favorable to appellees is as follows: Appellant's wife, Mary S. Tuttle, was riding in the front seat of a four-door hardtop automobile with appellee, Marjorie Mary Reid, who was the driver. One Mary Frances Kern was sitting in the middle and next to Mary S. Tuttle was was on the right of the seat. The three of them were going to a bridge-luncheon being given by a mutual friend. It was about 1:00 p.m. on January 16, 1959. The day was cold, but there was no snow, ice or water on the road. They were proceeding north on Spring Mill Road, which is a straight north-south, two-lane paved road. Seventy-third Street runs east and west and crosses it.

As they approached the intersection at 73rd Street, appellee Grant was driving his motor vehicle in an eastward direction on 73rd Street. This street was a preferential highway, while Spring Mill Road was not. There was a stop sign a few feet south of 73rd on the right-hand (east) side of Spring Mill Road. As appellee Reid approached the intersection, she did not slow up. Mrs. Kern called out a warning to the effect that there was a car and a stop sign. A Deputy Sheriff said that at the scene of the accident, Mrs. Reid gave the explanation that they were all laughing and talking, and she saw the stop sign after it was too late. Appellee Grant sounded his horn and attempted to apply his brakes. but appellee Reid had entered the intersection without stopping, saying: 'If I speed up, do you think I can beat it?' She attempted to accelerate, but the collision took place immediately.

The evidence is uncontradicted that appellee Reid was unaware of the stop sign until the warning was given by Mrs. Kern as they were passing a house on the southeast corner of the intersection. At the time, appellee Reid was traveling at a speed of approximately forty miles per hour, which was ten miles per hour over the speed limit which was thirty miles per hour. As a result, the evidence shows that it was impossible for her to stop at the stop sign, and she had a very short time to act when she became aware of the peril.

Appellant's wife suffered servere injuries because of the accident, and her husband, appellant herein, sued for loss of services.

Appellant may recover for his wife's injuries against appellee Reid only if the above facts are sufficient to warrant a finding that she was guilty of 'wanton or wilful' misconduct under the Indiana Guest Statute, which reads as follows:

'The owner, operator, or person responsible for the operation of a motor vehicle shall not be liable for loss or damage arising from injuries to or death of a guest, while being transported without payment therefor, in or upon such motor vehicle, resulting from the operation thereof, unless such injuries or death are caused by the wanton or wilful misconduct of such operator, owner, or person responsible for the operation of such motor vehicle.' Burns' Ind. Stat., 1965 Replacement, § 47--1021.

The action taken by the trial court in directing a verdict favorable to Mrs. Reid was proper only if all the evidence favorable to appellant and all the inferences which reasonably might have been drawn therefrom were not sufficient to establish wilful or wanton misconduct on the part of appellee Reid. Under these circumstances, a trial court may properly give a peremptory instruction to find for the defendant. Reynolds, Admtrx., etc. v. Langford (1961), 241 Ind. 431, 172 N.E.2d 867.

Here there was no conflict in the evidence. There seems to be a question that appellee Reid may have been careless and negligent in the operation of her automobile at the intersection where the collision occurred. But does this mean that she could be held liable under the terms of the Guest Statute? In regard to 'wanton and wilful' misconduct on the part of the operator of a motor vehicle, this court has said as follows:

'Accordingly, the foregoing decisions are consistent with the proposition that the misconduct of a host driver, in order to bring it within the purview of the guest statute (§ 47--1021), supra, must be committed while the driver is possessed of a mental attitude with respect to both his driving and his guest, which is adverse to the welfare of his guest. This mental attitude is necessary if the conduct of the operator is to be described as being either 'wanton or wilful' misconduct.

'As stated * * * in the concurring opinion of Brown v. Saucerman, supra, 237 Ind. 598, at page 619, 145 N.E.2d 898, at page 907:

"To be guilty of wanton misconduct within the meaning of the statute (§ 47--1021, supra), the driver must (1) be conscious of his misconduct; (2) be motivated by a desire to assert himself or his interests above or beyond, or in reckless indifference for, the safety of his guest, and (3) he must do so knowing that his conduct subjects them to a * * * probability of injury.' (Our italics.)' Clouse, etc. v. Peden (1962), 243 Ind. 390, 396, 397, 186 N.E.2d 1, 3, 4.

And has said in Reynolds, Admtrx., etc. v. Langford, supra, at pages 438, 439 of 241 Ind., at page 870 of 172 N.E.2d, as follows:

'The rule as to what is necessary to show 'willfull or wanton' misconduct is succinctly stated in Bedwell v. DeBolt, supra, 1943, 221 Ind. 600, at...