Tuttle v. United States

• Decision Date: 14 July 2022
• Docket Number: Civil Action 0:20-CV-00077-WOB
• Parties: RONALD TUTTLE, PLAINTIFF, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, DEFENDANT.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Kentucky

RONALD TUTTLE, PLAINTIFF, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, DEFENDANT.

Civil Action No. 0:20-CV-00077-WOB

United States District Court, E.D. Kentucky, Northern Division Ashland

July 14, 2022

REPORT AND RECOMENDATION

EDWARD B. ATKINS UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Ronald Tuttle, a federal prisoner, initiated this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2674, alleging the United States Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) acted negligently by failing to maintain safe, sanitary conditions within the cells occupied by Tuttle [R. 1]. The Court recognizes that Tuttle is proceeding pro se and construes his petition more leniently. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Castro v. United States, 540 U.S. 375, 381-83 (2003). The matter before the Court is the United States' Motion for Summary Judgment. [R. 89]. Having considered the motion, fully reviewing the record, and being sufficiently advised, the Court RECOMMENDS that summary judgment be granted in favor of the United States.

I. FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff Ronald Tuttle, was transferred to and housed in the Special Housing Unit (“SHU”) at FCI Ashland from June 2019 through November 2019. [R. 1 at pg. 3-4]. During those months, Tuttle was housed in different cells along Ranges 3 and 4. [R. 89-2 at pg. 8]. Tuttle alleges black mold growth in and around leaking toilets and cracked walls. [R. 1 at pg 2]. Moreover, Tuttle further alleges inadequate ventilation as he claims the vents in said cells were blocked by a piece of metal welded atop the vents. [R. 1 at pg. 3]. Toward the end of his sixth month in the Ashland SHU, around November 19, 2019, he developed chest congestion and a sore in his left nostril that bleeds [R. 90-1 at pg. 10]. On December 20, 2019, after being transferred to another facility, Tuttle was diagnosed with chronic asthma along with acute bronchitis and pneumonia according to BOP medical records. [R. 90-1 at pg. 11]. On January 10, 2020, the sore in his left nostril was confirmed as a lesion. [R. 90-1 at pg. 12]. Tuttle was seen again on February 19, 2020, the physician noted his affliction with chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (“COPD”). [R. 90-1 at pg. 13].

Tuttle initially filed an administrative complaint with the Bureau of Prisons and, after denial of that administrative complaint, and in full compliance with 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a), Tuttle filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky on June 29, 2020. [R. 1]. In his pleadings Tuttle alleges toxic mold was present in the cells of the SHU, the air vents were obstructed, and the cells were small enough so that he was forced to inhale the toxic mold that led to him developing a nose lesion, COPD, and asthma. [R. 1]. Tuttle originally requested relief in the form of immediate release from prison and $20 million. [R. 1] While awaiting an answer from the United States, he filed a motion for default judgment on October 26, 2020. [R. 23]. The Court denied the Tuttle's motion, [R. 25], and gave the United States until November 18, 2020, to answer or otherwise respond to his complaint. [R. 20]. Tuttle filed two further motions for default judgment before November 18, 2020, [R. 27; R. 28], which were denied. [R. 29]. Fact discovery closed on August 16, 2021. [R. 77].

The United States filed the instant motion for summary judgment on December 15, 2021. [R. 89]. The United States alleges that there is no genuine issue of material fact concerning the issues of breach and causation. [Id.]. Therefore, the United States asserts it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. [Id.]. Plaintiff responded. [R. 90, 91]. Defendant replied. [R. 92]. Plaintiff further responded. [R. 93, 96].

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A. SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Under Rule 56, “[a] party may move for summary judgment, identifying each claim or defense-or the part of each claim or defense-on which summary judgment is sought.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). “[A] party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Such a motion then “requires the nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings and by [his] own affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 324 (internal quotation marks omitted). This is so because “[o]ne of the principal purposes of the summary judgment rule is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims or defenses.” Id. at 323-24. To avoid summary judgment, the non-movant must come forward with evidence on which a jury could reasonably find in its favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986).

The following factors bear consideration by a court when entertaining a motion for summary judgment:

1. Complex cases are not necessarily inappropriate for summary judgment.

2. Cases involving state of mind issues are not necessarily inappropriate for summary judgment.

3. The movant must meet the initial burden of showing “the absence of a genuine issue of material fact” as to an essential element of the nonmovant's case.

4. This burden may be met by pointing out to the court that the respondent, having had sufficient opportunity for discovery, has no evidence to support an essential element of his or her case.

5. A court should apply a federal directed verdict standard in ruling on a motion for summary judgment. The inquiry on a summary judgment motion or a directed verdict motion is the same: whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.

6. As on federal directed verdict motions, the “scintilla rule” applies, i.e., the respondent must adduce more than a scintilla of evidence to overcome the motion.

7. The substantive law governing the case will determine what issues of fact are material, and any heightened burden of proof required by the substantive law for an element of the respondent's case, such as proof by clear and convincing evidence, must be satisfied by the respondent.

8. The respondent cannot rely on the hope that the trier of fact will disbelieve the movant's denial of a disputed fact, but must “present affirmative evidence in order to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment.”

9. The trial court no longer has the duty to search the entire record to establish that it is bereft of a genuine issue of material fact.

10. The trial court has more discretion than in the “old era” in evaluating the respondent's evidence. The respondent must “do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Further, “[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find” for the respondent, the motion should be granted. The trial court has at least some discretion to determine whether the respondent's claim is “implausible.”

Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1479-80 (6th Cir. 1989).

“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. When reviewing a motion for summary judgment, “this Court must determine whether ‘the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.'” Patton v. Bearden, 8 F.3d 343, 346 (6th Cir. 1993) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-52). “[T]he existence of a mere scintilla of evidence in support of the non-moving party's position will not be sufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the non-moving party.” Sutherland v. Mich. Dept. of Treasury, 344 F.3d 603, 613 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251). The evidence, all facts, and any inferences that may permissibly be drawn from the facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). “Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.” Id. (citing First Nat'l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288 (1968)).

In such a case, summary judgment is warranted. Alabama v. North Carolina, 560 U.S. 330, 344 (2010); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.

B. FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT

The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) serves as a derogation of sovereign immunity by stating, “the United States shall be liable, respecting the provisions of this title relating to tort claims, in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances.” 28 U.S.C. § 2674. Pursuant to the act, exclusive jurisdiction of civil claims against the United States was granted to United States District Courts and the substantive tort law selected was the tort law of the state where the claim's act or omission occurred.

[T]he district courts... shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the United States, for money damages, accruing on or after January 1, 1945, for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.

28 U.S.C. § 1346(b).

The FTCA dictates that the federal government be liable in tort "in the...