Twa v. Mercy Health Partners
| Decision Date | 20 August 2021 |
| Docket Number | 1:19-cv-1049 |
| Parties | KATHRYN TWA, Plaintiff, v. MERCY HEALTH PARTNERS, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan |
Kathryn Twa was hired as a staff nurse at Mercy Health Partners subject to a 90-day probationary period. About two months into her job, she discovered she was pregnant, a fact that she shared with a few supervisors. Twa was terminated at the end of her probationary period. She sued Mercy Health alleging violations of Title VII, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and parallel Michigan statutes. (Compl., ECF No. 1.) Mercy Health now seeks summary judgment on all claims. (ECF No. 28.) The motion will be granted in part and denied in part.
The Court has jurisdiction over Twa's Title VII and ADA claims because they arise under federal laws. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The Court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Twa's state-law claims under the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act (ELCRA) and Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act (PWDCRA) because they share a “common nucleus of operative fact” with the federal claims. United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966); 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
Twa began her job as a staff nurse at Mercy Health on May 14, 2018. (Twa Dep. 50, ECF No. 28-12.) Her employment was subject to a 90-day probationary period. (Employment Contract, ECF No. 28-6.) Supervisors would submit performance evaluations, and an employee with unsatisfactory performance could be terminated at the end of the probationary period. (Dease-Davis Dep. 10, ECF No. 28-13.)
Twa had two direct supervisors. Marcie Klinge was her Preceptor, “a staff nurse that . . . is paired with the [new hire] to basically show the hands-on [work] . . . the actual surgery procedures.” (Id. at 11.) Terri Grego was Twa's Nurse Educator. (Id.) Nurse Educators meet with the new hire and provide feedback during the probationary period. (Id. at 10.) Nurse Educators also submit performance evaluations to a clinical manager who decides whether the probationary employee is meeting expectations. (Id. at 17.) In this case, clinical manager Chandra Dease-Davis received an intensely negative evaluation of Twa from Grego and decided to fire her at the end of her probationary period on August 8, 2018. (Id. at 25.)
Shortly after she began her job, Twa received a modestly positive performance evaluation. (6/3/2018 Evaluation, ECF No. 28-8, PageID.248.)[1] Two days before her termination, Twa received a much more critical evaluation. (8/6/2018 Evaluation, ECF No.28-8, PageID.237-238.) Between those two evaluations, Twa learned she was pregnant. Twa contends the difference between the two evaluations is the result of pregnancy discrimination. She says the latter evaluation was fabricated, a false pretext to justify her firing.
There are a few key disputes in this case: (1) whether or not Twa was doing a good job; (2) who knew that Twa was pregnant; and (3) when they learned she was pregnant. Facts pertinent to each issue will be sketched below.
There are three evaluations in the record. One is an “Initial Competency” form dated two days after Twa began her job. (5/16/2018 Evaluation, ECF No. 28-8, PageID.239.) It indicates Twa's ability to perform certain procedures. The next is an evaluation by Grego a few weeks later. (6/3/2018 Evaluation, PageID.248.) She and Dease-Davis met with Twa to discuss her progress and highlight some issues. Twa had been late to work and nurse “huddles” several times. (Id.) She also needed “to continue to learn . . . coordination and prioritiz[ation] of perioperative needs, ” which was expected to improve over time. (Id.) Twa had also talked or asked questions at inappropriate times during surgeries. (Id.) Twa seemed “very nervous, ” but she was assured that the meeting “was just a check up to see how she was doing.” (Id.) The evaluation also noted that Twa was “[i]nquisitive and ha[d] good critical thinking skills.” (Id.)
Grego's evaluation that immediately preceded Twa's termination was much more negative. (8/6/2018 Evaluation, ECF No. 28-8, PageID.237-238.) Grego said “[m]et with Marcie Klinge to discuss [Twa's] progress with concerning findings.” (Id., PageID.237.) Twa was “very slow in movement including walking, speech, opening supplies, etc.” (Id.) Her “demeanor [was] not conducive to a perioperative environment.” (Id.) Klinge “discussed how [Twa] does not sequence the correct supply needs for a procedure, or read and anticipate position needs correctly[.]” (Id.) “When given constructive criticism, [Twa] becomes defensive or does not listen with frequent interruptions[.]” (Id.) She “continue[d] to struggle with being punctual and keeping commitments.” (Id.) Twa missed several “scheduled shadow experiences” without satisfactory explanation. (Id.) She was “constantly on the phone” and frequently requested additional breaks. (Id.)
Grego did note “improved . . . socialization with physicians.” (Id.) But that was the only positive thing. She assessed Twa as having “[a]verage critical thinking skills”-not necessarily bad, but worse compared to the prior evaluation. (Id., PageID.238.) Summarizing, Grego felt that Twa had “difficulty following directions and lack[ed] follow through” and she questioned Twa's “sense of integrity.” (Id., PageID.237.) Grego indicated she would “[f]ollow up with [Dease-Davis] . . . to determine options upon consulting with HR.” (Id., PageID.238.) Concluding, Grego said Twa did “not fit into the culture and values of Mercy Health” and never would; Grego was “very concerned about [Twa's] sense of integrity and fit with the organization” and believed “further issues will arise after [Twa] is off orientation.” (Id. (emphasis in original).) Dease-Davis fired Twa two days later. (Id.) According to Twa, Dease-Davis said she was being terminated for moving too slowly, for not being a good fit, and for poor progression. (Twa Dep. 129, ECF No. 28-12.)
Twa was blindsided. (Id. at 131-32; Twa-Klinge Texts, ECF No. 29-8, PageID.709.) Just after being fired, she texted Klinge “I wish I would've known that I wasn't doing very well” and that she was “very confused and . . . trying to understand” what led to her termination. (Twa-Klinge Texts, PageID.709.) Others seemed surprised too. Replying to Twa, Klinge said she had “no indication” that she was about to be fired. (Id.) Gay Hudson, who occasionally filled in as a Preceptor for Twa when Klinge was unavailable, also expressed surprise. (ECF No. 29-7, PageID.702.) Hudson said she spoke to Dease-Davis and told her that she thought Twa was “doing fine.” (Id.) A surgeon at Mercy Health, Christopher Eyke, felt Twa did a good job when they worked together and also spoke to Dease-Davis on Twa's behalf. (Eyke Aff., ECF No. 29-6.) In her own deposition, Twa said she consistently received positive feedback and that no one raised any serious issues with her performance. (Twa Dep. 75, 128, 130.) She believes that Klinge fabricated all the negative things mentioned in the August 6 evaluation. (Id. at 117.)
Between the June evaluation and the August evaluation/termination, Twa became pregnant. She first learned of her pregnancy on July 5. (Id. at 99.) Twa says she told Klinge and Dease-Davis about the pregnancy, partly because she wanted to avoid surgical procedures that involved “dangerous chemicals.” (Id. at 100, 106, 110.) Twa states that Dease-Davis promised to inform staff of this request. (Id. at 106.) Dease-Davis says she does not recall Twa mentioning her pregnancy until the termination meeting, though such information would not be memorable because “[t]he [operating room] is full of females, so it's quite a common thing for nurses to be pregnant;” it was even common to “have a number of pregnant colleagues at one time.” (Dease-Davis Dep. 26, 39.) Twa never told Grego about the pregnancy. (Twa Dep. 134-35.)
Unfortunately, Twa's pregnancy came with some complications and her health suffered as a result. One day at work, Twa was “feeling very sick and dizzy [and] lightheaded.” (Id. at 108.) Someone took her blood pressure, which was “very low.” (Id.) Twa called her doctor, who advised her to go home, which she did. (Id.) This happened a week or two before she was terminated. (Id. at 109.) Twa says she also experienced low blood pressure, lethargy, extreme nausea, and vomited during breaks. (Id. at 129-32.) She did not request any accommodations other than the time off. After being fired, Twa was diagnosed with Gestational Diabetes Mellitus, a type of diabetes tied to pregnancy. (Id. at 164.)
Summary judgment is appropriate when the moving party demonstrates that “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). Courts must examine the “pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, ” to determine whether there is a genuine dispute of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P 56(c)) (internal quotations omitted).
A fact is material if it “might affect the outcome of the suit.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A material fact is genuinely disputed when there is “sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party.” Id. at 249 5 (citing First Nat'l Bank. of Ariz. v. City Serv. Co., 391 U.S 253, 288-89 (1961)). “Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party [by a preponderance of the evidence], there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.'” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith...
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