Twedt v. Seattle Taxicab Co.

Decision Date16 October 1922
Docket Number16934.
Citation210 P. 20,121 Wash. 562
CourtWashington Supreme Court
PartiesTWEDT et ux. v. SEATTLE TAXICAB CO.

Department 1.

Appeal from Superior Court, King County; Austin E. Griffiths, Judge.

Action by Alfred Twedt and wife against the Seattle Taxicab Company. Judgment for plaintiffs, and defendant appeals. Judgment reversed, with instructions to dismiss action.

J. Speed Smith, Henry Elliott, Jr., and Wm. A Gilmore, all of Seattle, for appellant.

Jas. E Seargeant, of Seattle, and Wm. Sheller, of Everett, for respondents.

FULLERTON J.

The respondents Twedt brought this action against the appellant Seattle Taxicab Company, to recover in damages for injuries arising out of a collision between their automobile and a taxicab of the appellant. From a verdict and judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, the taxicab company brings the case here.

The record discloses that East Madison street is one of the main highways in the city of Seattle, extending from the water front on Elliott Bay in a general northeasterly direction to Madison Park on Lake Washington. The street has upon it a double track street car line, and is subject to a heavy vehicle traffic. Twenty-Fifth Avenue North is a street of the same city extending north and south, crossing East Madison street at an angle of about 45 degrees. At the time of the collision a line of billboards extended back from Twenty-Fifth Avenue North, on the south side of East Madison street, for a distance of some 150 feet. These billboards were some 11 feet in height and so obstructed the view that one driving easterly on East Madison street could not see approaching traffic coming from the south on Twenty-Fifth Avenue North, and likewise prevented one driving north on the latter street from seeing approaching traffic coming from the west on East Madison street.

At the time of the collision the appellant's taxicab was being driven easterly on East Madison street. While there is a conflict in the evidence, there was evidence which would warrant a jury in finding that the cab was then being driven considerably in excess of 20 miles per hour. As the cab approached the intersection of the street with Twenty-Fifth Avenue North, the respondents drove their automobile from the south on that avenue into the intersection. There is no dispute in the evidence as to the course the automobile was driven just prior to and after it entered the intersection. All of the evidence shows that on approaching the intersection the automobile driver drove near the center of the avenue, and turned to the left as he entered the street passing a considerable distance to the left of the center of the intersection of the streets. The taxicab and automobile collided as the front of the automobile was near the center line of East Madison street. Just prior to the collision the taxicab was traveling on the right side of the center of the street. As the driver saw the incoming automobile, he turned to his left and endeavored to stop. The vehicles, however, collided; the right front wheel of the taxicab striking the left front wheel of the automobile. The driver of the automobile, after seeing the approaching taxicab, did not endeavor to stop, nor did he change his rate of speed nor the direction of his course.

At the time of the accident both the state law and the ordinance of the city of Seattle limited the rate of speed at which a motor vehicle could be driven over the city streets to 20 miles per hour. The statute (Laws 1919, p. 123) likewise provided:

'Any person operating a motor or other vehicle shall, at the intersection of public highways, keep to the right of the intersection of the centers of such highways when turning to the right and pass to the right of such intersection when turning to the left.'

Ordinance No. 39720 of the city of Seattle provides:

'A vehicle turning into another street to the left shall turn beyond the center of the intersection of the two streets.' It is settled law in this state that 'a thing done in violation of positive law is in itself negligence.' Engelker v. Seattle Electric Co., 50 Wash. 196, 96 P. 1039; Wilson v. Puget Sound Elec. R. Co., 52 Wash. 522, 101 P. 50, 132 Am. St. Rep. 1044; Hillebrant v. Manz, 71 Wash. 250, 128 P. 892; Anderson v. Kinnear, 80 Wash. 638, 141 P. 1151; Johnson v. Heitman, 88 Wash. 595, 153 P. 331; Sundstrom v. Puget Sound Traction, Light & Power Co., 90 Wash. 640, 156 P. 828.

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