Twomey v. Tuscaloosa Cnty.
| Decision Date | 30 May 2019 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 7:18-cv-01653-TMP |
| Parties | JARED AUSTIN TWOMEY, Plaintiff, v. TUSCALOOSA COUNTY; SHERIFF RON ABERNATHY, Individually; OFFICER TYLER WAID, Individually; CITY OF TUSCALOOSA, ALABAMA; OFFICER B.E.MARTIN, Individually, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Alabama |
This case is before the court on motions to dismissed filed by defendants Sheriff Ron Abernathy ("Abernathy"), the City of Tuscaloosa ("City"), and Officer B.E. Martin ("Martin"). Filed February 28, 2019, Abernathy seeks dismissal of all the plaintiff's claims pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and Rule 12(b)(1). (Doc. 42). Martin and the City allege that all of Plaintiff Jared Austin Twomey's ("Plaintiff" or "Twomey") claims against them arising from his arrest and detention on October 23, 2016, are due to be dismissed on multiple grounds. (Doc. 43). The parties have consented to the exercise of jurisdiction bythe undersigned magistrate pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) (doc. 22); accordingly, the court enters this memorandum opinion.
On a motion to dismiss, the court must accept as true all of the facts alleged in the complaint. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949-51, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires only a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Liberal notice pleading standards embodied in Rule 8(a) "do not require that a plaintiff specifically plead every element of a cause of action," Roe v. Aware Woman Center For Choice, Inc., 253 F.3d 678, 683 (11th Cir. 2001), or set out in precise detail the specific facts upon which he bases his claim. The complaint must only "contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements necessary to sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory." Id. (quoting In re Plywood Antitrust Litigation, 655 F.2d 627, 641 (5th Cir. Unit A Sept. 8, 1981)).
The Supreme Court clarified the threshold for a sufficient pleading in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly. 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1965 (2007) (). To show that "the pleader is entitled to relief,"under Rule 8(a)(2), the complaint must allege facts that "plausibly" demonstrate a viable cause of action. The threshold of plausibility is met when the plaintiff "pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009). To withstand scrutiny under Rule 12(b)(6) a plaintiff must plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face," and that will thus "nudge [his] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. This requires "more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has explained that the principles set forth in Twombly and Iqbal require the complaint to set forth sufficient facts that "raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Speaker v. U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Servs. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 623 F.3d 1371, 1380 (11th Cir. 2010).
The plaintiff commenced this action on October 9, 2018. Since then he has amended his complaint twice. The operative complaint for the purpose of the instant motions to dismiss is his second amended complaint filed on February 8, 2019, against Sheriff Ron Abernathy, in his individual capacity, County Officer Tyler Waid ("Waid"), in his individual capacity, City of Tuscaloosa, Alabama, amunicipal corporation, and City Officer B.E. Martin, in his individual capacity. (Doc. 39). Twomey's claims arise from alleged excessive force by Waid that occurred during or around the time of his processing into Tuscaloosa County Jail after he had been arrested for public intoxication by Martin. (Doc. 39). Twomey was arrested by Martin on October 23, 2016, for public intoxication. He was then transported to the Tuscaloosa County jail for processing, where he was handed off to Waid. Twomey claims that Waid shoved his head into a wall without provocation. Twomey was transported to the hospital, where he was treated for a concussion and a laceration, but he alleges his health issues persisted for some time.
The Second Amended Complaint asserts claims of excessive force under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and § 1985 and Alabama state law against all defendants, assault and battery against defendant Waid, negligence and/or wantonness against all defendants, negligent hiring, training, and supervision under a theory of Monell liability against defendant Abernathy and the City of Tuscaloosa, inadequate policy under a theory of Monell liability against defendant Abernathy and the City, and civil conspiracy. The complaint does not state which defendants the plaintiff alleges participated in the civil conspiracy, but the court construes that claim to be asserted against defendants Waid and Martin. The City and Martin filed the joint motion to dismiss on March 1, 2019. (Doc. 43).Claims Against Sheriff Ron Abernathy
Twomey alleges that defendant Ron Abernathy acted under color of state law to deprive him of his constitutional rights by way of excessive force (Count One), negligence and/or wantonness (Count Three), negligent hiring, training, and supervision (Count Four), inadequate policy (Count Five), and civil conspiracy (Count Six).2 Abernathy filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and 12(b)(1), contending that Twomey has failed to state a claim as to Count One. (Doc. 42, p. 1) and that Count Five should be dismissed because plaintiff's "conclusory allegations are insufficient to support a cause of action for inadequate policy." (Doc 42, p. 4). Finally, Sheriff Abernathy argues this court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to consider Counts Three, Four, and Six. (Doc. 42, p. 3). The court will examine the arguments in turn.
In light of the complaint, Count One asserts a plausible claim for excessive force pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Supervisors, such as sheriffs, may be liable "only if they personally participated in the allegedly unconstitutional conduct or if there is 'a causal connection between [their] actions . . . and the alleged constitutional violation.'" West v. Tillman, 496 F.3d 1321, 1328 (11th Cir. 2007). A causal connection is established three ways: 1) "a history of widespread abuseputs the responsible supervisor on notice of the need to correct the alleged deprivation, and he fails to do so," 2) "when a supervisor's custom or policy . . . result[s] in deliberate indifference to constitutional rights," or 3) where "facts support an inference that the supervisor directed the subordinates to act unlawfully or knew that the subordinates would act unlawfully and failed to stop them from doing so." Harper v. Lawrence Cty. Ala., 592 F.3d 1227, 1236 (11th Cir. 2010).
With respect to Count One Twomey alleges that Abernathy "permitted, encouraged, and ratified a pattern and practice" of excessive force by failing to discipline or prosecute incidents of excessive force; failing to investigate incidents of excessive force; and actively participating in covering up prior excessive force incidents involving Officer Waid and others.3 (Doc. 39, ¶ 42). While the reference to a "pattern and practice" is a legal conclusion, the remaining portions of the allegation are factual in nature. They allege that Abernathy "failed to discipline or prosecute" Waid and other (unnamed) jailors for "known incidents" of excessive force; "refused to investigate complaints of excessive force" by Waid and other (unnamed) jailors; and "actively participated in covering up prior acts of Waid and other (unnamed) jailors" by which arrestees were deprived of the right "to be freefrom excessive force."4 This allegation, if proven by the evidence, would tend to establish the required "causal connection" under Harper. See Harper, 592 F.3d at 1236. He has alleged that, at the time of his arrest, Sheriff Abernathy knew of prior instances when Waid and other unnamed officers used unnecessary force against arrestees, yet Abernathy failed or refused to investigate these instances or to discipline or prosecute Waid and the other officers engaged in misconduct. More so, he alleges that Abernathy actively assisted such officers in covering up instances of unnecessary force, thus encouraging them to continue to do so. Because the court is required to accept the factual allegations as true when evaluating a motion to dismiss, the allegations contained in the complaint, if proven, could plausibly result in Twomey obtaining a favorable legal outcome. See American Dental Assoc., 605 F.3d at 1290. Accordingly, the court finds that Twomey has nudged his claim over the line from conceivable to plausible. Twombly, 555 U.S. at 570. Sheriff Abernathy's motion to dismiss as to Count One is due to be denied.
Sheriff Abernathy argues that Count Five should be dismissed because Twomey fails to sufficiently plead a claim for inadequate policy. (Doc. 42, p. 4).Sheriffs may be held liable "due to the existence of an improper policy or [for] the absence of a policy," which is the cause of violations of constitutional rights. Rivas v. Freeman, 940 F.2d 1491, 1495 (11th Cir. 1991). Liability also is possible where "the custom or policy established result[s] in deliberate indifference to constitutional rights." Id. Where untrained employees are concerned, it is "'ordinarily...
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