Twyman v. State
Decision Date | 10 February 1984 |
Docket Number | No. 284S48,284S48 |
Citation | 459 N.E.2d 705 |
Parties | Nickie L. TWYMAN, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee. (2-183A3). |
Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
Susan K. Carpenter, Public Defender of Indiana, Paul Levy, Deputy Public Defender, Indianapolis, for appellant.
Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen. of Indiana, Theodore E. Hansen, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.
PETITION TO TRANSFER
In this case we undertake to explain the interrelationship between the "original exclusive jurisdiction" granted juvenile courts, and criminal court jurisdiction, over juveniles who have committed criminal acts. (For reference, see State ex rel. Hirt v. Marion Superior Court, (1983) Ind., 451 N.E.2d 308.) In doing so, we grant the "Petition for Criminal Transfer" and vacate the Court of Appeals decision reported at 452 N.E.2d 434.
We adopt the following portions of the Court of Appeals opinion:
to enter sentence. The state answered that Twyman's claim for post-conviction relief was barred by the failure to assert his claim from July 29, 1974, to the filing of the petition in June of 1982.
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452 N.E.2d 434, 435-36. (Footnotes omitted.)
The State contends the trial court did have subject matter jurisdiction to accept appellant's guilty plea, although the court lacked jurisdiction over his person.
Juvenile jurisdiction is admittedly a confused area of the law in which cases seemingly support both parties' positions. The vagaries of juvenile jurisdiction have been caused by the use of imprecise language and loose terminology in appellate opinions, and in the jurisdictional statutes as well.
The pertinent jurisdictional statutes in effect at the time appellant was charged in 1974 are:
"33-12-2-3 [9-3103]. Original exclusive jurisdiction.--The juvenile courts created by this act [33-12-2-1--33-12-2- 452 N.E.2d at 437.
28] shall have original exclusive jurisdiction, except after jurisdiction of the child is waived in all cases in which a child is alleged to be delinquent, dependent or neglected, including the alleged delinquency, dependency or neglect of a child of divorced parents. The juvenile court shall also have exclusive original jurisdiction to determine the paternity of any child born out of wedlock, and to provide for the support and disposition of such child and in all other cases that may hereafter be conferred by law. [Acts 1945, ch. 347, Sec. 3, p. 1647; 1947, ch. 354, Sec. 1, p. 1427; 1969, ch. 223, Sec. 1, p. 848.]" (Emphasis added.) [Repealed by Acts 1978, P.L. 136, Sec. 57.] (For current version, see IC Sec. 31-6-2-1 [Burns Supp.1983].
The Marion Criminal Court jurisdiction was defined at the time:
Although the legislature vested both the juvenile court and the criminal court with "original exclusive jurisdiction," it is not difficult to imagine instances in which both would have subject matter jurisdiction over a given case. When a juvenile commits acts which would constitute a crime if he were an adult, he commits an act of delinquency, but he has also committed the elements of a crime. The age of the offender is determinative of subject matter jurisdiction in the juvenile court, however, it is merely a restriction on the personal jurisdiction possessed by a criminal court.
Thus, if a non-juvenile stands before the juvenile court misrepresenting his age, and is found to be a delinquent child, such determination could be set aside based upon a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. This result occurs because the age of the offender is an essential element of the subject matter jurisdiction conferred upon the juvenile court. Any decision of the court in a delinquency action wherein the offender was over eighteen years of age would be void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
However, in a situation where an accused under the age of eighteen misrepresents his age to a criminal court, that court may accept a guilty plea assuming it has no knowledge of the misrepresentation. Such was the situation in the case at bar. Thus, the judgment of the trial court will not be...
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