Twyman v. State

Decision Date10 February 1984
Docket NumberNo. 284S48,284S48
Citation459 N.E.2d 705
PartiesNickie L. TWYMAN, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee. (2-183A3).
CourtIndiana Supreme Court

Susan K. Carpenter, Public Defender of Indiana, Paul Levy, Deputy Public Defender, Indianapolis, for appellant.

Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen. of Indiana, Theodore E. Hansen, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.

PETITION TO TRANSFER

GIVAN, Chief Justice.

In this case we undertake to explain the interrelationship between the "original exclusive jurisdiction" granted juvenile courts, and criminal court jurisdiction, over juveniles who have committed criminal acts. (For reference, see State ex rel. Hirt v. Marion Superior Court, (1983) Ind., 451 N.E.2d 308.) In doing so, we grant the "Petition for Criminal Transfer" and vacate the Court of Appeals decision reported at 452 N.E.2d 434.

We adopt the following portions of the Court of Appeals opinion:

"Nickie L. Twyman appeals from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief under Indiana Rules of Procedure, Post-Conviction Rule 1.

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"In May of 1974, Nickie L. Twyman was arrested on a charge of robbery. An information was filed on May 15th charging William Twyman with the robbery. Nickie Twyman was in fact the person arrested on this charge. William is Nickie's brother who was then twenty years old. At the time, Nickie was three months short of seventeen. Nickie Twyman appeared in the Criminal Court of Marion County, Division Two, and pleaded not guilty. At no time did he reveal either his true age or identity to the court although he testified he told his lawyer. Later, pursuant to a plea agreement, the charge was reduced to assault and battery with intent to commit a felony, and Nickie pleaded guilty on July 24, 1974, receiving an indeterminate sentence of one to ten years. At the guilty plea hearing, Nickie twice told the court he was twenty years old. At his sentencing hearing on July 29, 1974, Nickie stated, in response to the court's question, that he knew of no reason why the court should not enter sentence on his guilty plea. Nickie's identity as the person who committed the offense clearly was established at the guilty plea hearing by the testimony of the victim and the arresting officers. Nickie served the sentence imposed.

"In 1978, and again in 1980, Nickie was convicted of burglary. In the 1980 charge, an additional count charging him with being an habitual offender was added and his sentence was enhanced by thirty years for a total sentence of forty years. The 1974 conviction is one of the underlying felonies supporting the habitual offender charge. He appealed the habitual offender determination challenging only the sufficiency of the evidence of identification of him as the same person as the William Twyman whose prior convictions were the basis for the habitual offender adjudication. Our supreme court affirmed. Twyman v. State, (1982) Ind., 431 N.E.2d 778.

"Twyman then filed this petition for post-conviction relief on June 23, 1982, asserting for the first time his juvenile status in 1974, and attacking the 1974 conviction on the ground the court lacked jurisdiction to accept his guilty plea and "Following a hearing on the petition, the trial court entered its findings of fact and conclusions of law denying post-conviction relief on the ground that '[t]he issue raised by the Petitioner has been waived for purposes of Post-Conviction Relief under the doctrine of laches because the issue has been available to Petitioner since July 29, 1974.' Record at 70.

to enter sentence. The state answered that Twyman's claim for post-conviction relief was barred by the failure to assert his claim from July 29, 1974, to the filing of the petition in June of 1982.

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"Twyman argues that because of his juvenile status and lack of a waiver from juvenile court in July 1974, the Criminal Court of Marion County lacked subject matter jurisdiction to accept his guilty plea and to enter sentence. Thus he contends his 1974 conviction is void and cannot form the basis for his enhanced sentence as an habitual offender." 452 N.E.2d 434, 435-36. (Footnotes omitted.)

The State contends the trial court did have subject matter jurisdiction to accept appellant's guilty plea, although the court lacked jurisdiction over his person.

"Jurisdiction is the legal power to entertain any matter or proceeding, and the power to act must be derived from the Constitution or from some statute. Farley v. Farley, (1973) 157 Ind.App. 385, 300 N.E.2d 375, trans. denied (1974). Jurisdiction, in this state, embraces three essential elements: (1) jurisdiction of the subject matter, (2) jurisdiction of the person, and (3) jurisdiction of the particular case. State ex rel. Dean v. Tipton Circuit Court, (1962) 242 Ind. 642, 181 N.E.2d 230; State ex rel. Gilbert v. Circuit Court of Koscuisko County, (1960) 241 Ind. 122, 170 N.E.2d 51; Farley [supra ]. Subject matter jurisdiction concerns whether or not the particular court has jurisdiction over the general class of actions to which the particular case belongs. Pund v. Pund, (1976) 171 Ind.App. 347, 357 N.E.2d 257; Brendanwood Neighborhood Association, Inc. v. Common Council, (1975) 167 Ind.App. 253, 338 N.E.2d 695, trans. denied (1976). Subject matter jurisdiction must be derived from the Constitution or a statute and cannot be conferred by the consent or agreement of the parties. Carpenter v. State, (1977) 266 Ind. 98, 360 N.E.2d 839; City of Marion v. Antrobus, (1983) Ind.App., 448 N.E.2d 325. Neither can an objection to subject matter jurisdiction be waived. Carpenter [supra ]; Shanholt v. State, (1983) Ind.App., 448 N.E.2d 308 (transfer pending).

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"Jurisdiction of the person refers to the particular parties who are brought before the court, and the right of that particular court to exercise jurisdiction over those parties. Farley [supra ]. Objections to jurisdiction of the person may be waived by failure to assert them in a timely manner. Vogelgesang v. Metropolitan Board of Zoning Appeals, (1973) 157 Ind.App. 300, 300 N.E.2d 101, trans. denied (1974); Ind.Rules of Procedure, Trial Rule 12(H).

"Having made these general observations concerning jurisdiction and its elements, we turn now to a determination of whether or not the criminal court, where there had been no waiver from the juvenile court, lacked subject matter jurisdiction in the 1974 charge against Twyman. Or, if there was a jurisdictional defect, was it merely lack of jurisdiction of the person ...." 452 N.E.2d at 436.

Juvenile jurisdiction is admittedly a confused area of the law in which cases seemingly support both parties' positions. The vagaries of juvenile jurisdiction have been caused by the use of imprecise language and loose terminology in appellate opinions, and in the jurisdictional statutes as well.

The pertinent jurisdictional statutes in effect at the time appellant was charged in 1974 are:

"33-12-2-3 [9-3103]. Original exclusive jurisdiction.--The juvenile courts created by this act [33-12-2-1--33-12-2- "A delinquent child was defined, inter alia, as a child under eighteen years of age who had committed an act which would be a crime not punishable by death or life imprisonment if committed by an adult. Ind.Code Sec. 31-5-7-4 (Burns' Code Ed.1973, since repealed)." 452 N.E.2d at 437.

28] shall have original exclusive jurisdiction, except after jurisdiction of the child is waived in all cases in which a child is alleged to be delinquent, dependent or neglected, including the alleged delinquency, dependency or neglect of a child of divorced parents. The juvenile court shall also have exclusive original jurisdiction to determine the paternity of any child born out of wedlock, and to provide for the support and disposition of such child and in all other cases that may hereafter be conferred by law. [Acts 1945, ch. 347, Sec. 3, p. 1647; 1947, ch. 354, Sec. 1, p. 1427; 1969, ch. 223, Sec. 1, p. 848.]" (Emphasis added.) [Repealed by Acts 1978, P.L. 136, Sec. 57.] (For current version, see IC Sec. 31-6-2-1 [Burns Supp.1983].

The Marion Criminal Court jurisdiction was defined at the time:

"33-9-1-4 [4-5704]. Jurisdiction.--Such criminal court shall have original exclusive jurisdiction within the county, of all crimes and misdemeanors, except where jurisdiction is by law conferred on justices of the peace, and such appellate jurisdiction in criminal cases as may, by law, belong to the circuit court in the counties having no criminal court. [Acts 1881 (Spec. Sess.), ch. 34, Sec. 4, p. 111.]"

Although the legislature vested both the juvenile court and the criminal court with "original exclusive jurisdiction," it is not difficult to imagine instances in which both would have subject matter jurisdiction over a given case. When a juvenile commits acts which would constitute a crime if he were an adult, he commits an act of delinquency, but he has also committed the elements of a crime. The age of the offender is determinative of subject matter jurisdiction in the juvenile court, however, it is merely a restriction on the personal jurisdiction possessed by a criminal court.

Thus, if a non-juvenile stands before the juvenile court misrepresenting his age, and is found to be a delinquent child, such determination could be set aside based upon a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. This result occurs because the age of the offender is an essential element of the subject matter jurisdiction conferred upon the juvenile court. Any decision of the court in a delinquency action wherein the offender was over eighteen years of age would be void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

However, in a situation where an accused under the age of eighteen misrepresents his age to a criminal court, that court may accept a guilty plea assuming it has no knowledge of the misrepresentation. Such was the situation in the case at bar. Thus, the judgment of the trial court will not be...

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