Tyler M. v. Saul
| Decision Date | 03 September 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 3:19-CV-426 (CFH),3:19-CV-426 (CFH) |
| Parties | TYLER M., Plaintiff, v. ANDREW SAUL, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of New York |
| APPEARANCES: |
| OF COUNSEL: |
| Lachman, Gorton Law Firm |
| P.O. Box 89 |
| 1500 East Main Street |
| Endicott, New York 13761-0089 |
| Attorney for plaintiff |
| PETER A. GORTON, ESQ. |
| Social Security Administration |
| Office of Regional General Counsel, |
| Region II |
| 26 Federal Plaza, Rm. 3904 |
| New York, New York 10278 |
| Attorney for defendant |
| LUCY WEILBRENNER, ESQ. |
CHRISTIAN F. HUMMEL U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff Tyler M.2 brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) seeking review of a decision by the Commissioner of Social Security ("the Commissioner"),which denied his application for supplemental security income benefits under Title XVI of the Social Security Act. See Dkt. No. 1. Plaintiff moves for, inter alia, reversal and remand for further administrative proceedings, while the Commissioner cross moves for judgment on the pleadings. See Dkt. Nos. 9, 11.
After a careful review of the record that was before the Commissioner—and applying the requisite deferential standard—for the reasons that follow, the undersigned concludes that the determination resulted from the application of proper legal principles and is supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the Commissioner's motion for judgment on the pleadings is granted, the plaintiff's motion is denied, and the determination of the Commissioner is affirmed.
Plaintiff was born on November 3, 1990. See T. 36-37. He has an eighth-grade education, although his medical records occasionally reflect that he completed the tenth grade. Compare T. 36-37, 334, 399, with T. 389 (), 458. In September 2007, an Individualized Education Program was implemented for plaintiff's 2007/2008 academic year with plaintiff having been identified as a student with a learning disability in reading decoding and written expression. See T. 37-38, 217-224, 288-92.
Plaintiff's work history is limited, with plaintiff having worked as a laborer from June 2014 through September 2014 and a stocker in September 2014. See T. 70, 236, 256; but see T. 334 (). In the past, plaintiff lived with his wife, children, and stepchildren, but at the time of the hearing, he reported living with his girlfriend and his girlfriend's family. See T. 50, 334.
Plaintiff protectively filed an application for supplemental security income, alleging disability beginning on September 25, 2014.4 See T. 204-11. Plaintiff's claim was initially denied on March 1, 2016. See T. 74-81. On March 24, 2016, plaintiff requested a hearing that was subsequently held on March 29, 2018 before Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") Jo Ann L. Draper. See T. 31-60. On June 5, 2018, ALJ Draper rendered an unfavorable decision and plaintiff appealed See T. 9-30, 201-03; see also T. 7-8 (). On February 25, 2019, the Appeals Council denied plaintiff's request for review, making those findings the final determination of the Commissioner. See T. 1-6. Thereafter, plaintiff timely commenced this action on April 9, 2019. See Dkt. No. 1.
Applying the five-step sequential analysis, the ALJ first determined that plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since November 6, 2015. See T. 15 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(b), 416.971 et seq.). At step two, the ALJ found that plaintiff suffers from several severe impairments, including "learning disorders, asthma, sarcoidosis, social anxiety disorder, substance induced anxiety and depressive disorder, and attention deficit disorder[.]" T. 15-16 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(c)). Proceeding to step three, the ALJ held that plaintiff's impairments—including his substance use disorder—satisfied the criteria for Listing 12.06.5 See T. at 16-17; see also 20 C.F.R. Pt 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, § 12.06 (). ALJ Draper then concluded that in the absence of substance of abuse, plaintiff's physical and mental impairments would continue to be severe, but that he "would not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals any of the impairments listed in 20 [C.F.R.] Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1[.]" Id. at 17-19 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(d)).
Proceeding to the next step, the ALJ determined that in the absence of plaintiff's substance abuse, plaintiff would retain the residual functional capacity ("RFC"):
to perform medium work . . . except he can have no exposure to excessive pulmonary irritants such as fumes, odors, dust, and gases. He could perform tasks learned in 30 days or less involving simple, work-related decisions requiring little to no judgment with only occasional workplace changes. He can have no interaction with the public and nomore than occasional interaction with coworkers or supervisors. He is unable to work in close proximity to others (not standing next to and not being involved in tasks being performed by others).
T. 19-24 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.967(c)). In considering plaintiff's mental impairments the ALJ concluded that limitations of simple, work-related decisions, nonjudgment, occasional workplace changes, no public interaction, no work in close proximity to others, and no more than occasional interaction with co-workers and supervisors" was sufficient to accommodate both plaintiff's subjectively reported limitations, as well as the restrictions set forth in his medical records. See T. 22-24.
At step five, the ALJ determined that when considering plaintiff's age, education, work experience, and his RFC, in the absence of substance abuse, plaintiff could still perform a significant number of jobs in the national economy. See T. 24-25 (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.960(c), 416.966). This encompassed medium, unskilled occupations—with a level two Specific Vocational Preparation ("SVP")—including a stubber (DOT code 222.687-034), spiral binder, and pork cutlet maker (DOT code 529.686-022). See T. 25. Ultimately, ALJ Draper determined that "[b]ecause the substance use disorder is a contributing factor material to the determination of disability, the [plaintiff] has not been disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act at any time from the date the application was filed through the date of this decision." T. 25 (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(g), 416.935).
In support of reversal, plaintiff advances several interrelated arguments. See Dkt. No. 9. First, plaintiff argues that the RFC is unsupported by substantial evidencebecause ALJ Draper failed to assess any limitations to plaintiff's work pace and/or attendance. See id. at 8-11. Second, he argues that the ALJ improperly weighed certain medical opinions. See id. at 12-20. Third, plaintiff argues that the conclusion that plaintiff was capable of working a position with a level two SVP is inconsistent with his social limitations. See id. at 20-21. Finally, plaintiff argues that the ALJ's conclusion at step five is not supported by substantial evidence because it failed to account for the full extent of plaintiff's limitations. See id. at 21-22.
The Commissioner argues in opposition that the ALJ properly weighed all of the medical opinions in arriving at plaintiff's RFC. See Dkt. No. 11 at 4-11. Second, the Commissioner argues that the SVP determination is irrelevant to plaintiff's social limitations. See id. at 11-12. Finally, the Commissioner argues that the step five determination was supported by substantial evidence. See id. at 12-13.
In reviewing a final decision of the Commissioner, a district court may not determine de novo whether an individual is disabled. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Wagner v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 906 F.2d 856, 860 (2d Cir. 1990). Rather, the determination of the Commissioner will only be reversed if the correct legal standards were not applied, or the determination was not supported by substantial evidence. See Johnson v. Bowen, 817 F.2d 983, 985 (2d Cir. 1987); Berry v. Schweiker, 675 F.2d 464, 467 (2d Cir. 1982).
Substantial evidence is "more than a mere scintilla," which means that in the record one can find "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Halloran v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 28, 31 (2d Cir. 2004) (citing Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (internal citations omitted)). Under this standard, "once an ALJ finds facts, we can reject those facts 'only if a reasonable factfinder would have to conclude otherwise.'" Brault v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Comm'r, 683 F.3d 443, 448 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Warren v. Shalala, 29 F.3d 1287, 1290 (8th Cir. 1994)). Substantial evidence is "a very deferential standard of review-even more so than the 'clearly erroneous' standard." Brault, 683 F.3d at 448 (quoting Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 153 (1999)).
Where there is reasonable doubt as to whether the Commissioner applied the proper legal standards, the decision should not be affirmed even though the ultimate conclusion is arguably supported by substantial evidence. See Martone v. Apfel, 70 F. Supp. 2d 145, 148 (N.D.N.Y. 1999) (citing Johnson, 817 F.2d at 986). However, if the correct legal standards were applied—and the ALJ's finding is supported by substantial evidence—the determination must be sustained "even where substantial evidence may support the plaintiff's position and despite that the court's independent analysis of the evidence may differ from the [Commissioner's]." Rosado v. Sullivan, 805 F. Supp. 147, 153 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (citation omitted).
"Every individual who is under a disability shall be entitled to a disability . . . benefit[.]" 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1)....
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