Tyler v. Ahmed

• Citation: 813 F.2d 1114
• Decision Date: 03 April 1987
• Docket Number: No. 86-3133,86-3133
• Parties: Lois J. TYLER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Shafatt AHMED, M.D., and Robert M. Bolt, M.D., Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (11th Circuit)

Page 1114

813 F.2d 1114

Lois J. TYLER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Shafatt AHMED, M.D., and Robert M. Bolt, M.D., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 86-3133.

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

April 3, 1987.

Michael J. Dewberry, Jacksonville, Fla., for plaintiff-appellant.

James W. Smith, Daytona Beach, Fla., for Ahmed.

Taraska, Grower & Unger, Joseph M. Taraska, Orlando, Fla., for Bolt.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida.

Before RONEY, Chief Judge, EDMONDSON, Circuit Judge, and TUTTLE, Senior Circuit Judge.

TUTTLE, Senior Circuit Judge:

This case involves the principle of subrogation under Florida law. The district court held that Lois Tyler could not sue her physicians for medical malpractice because she had obtained settlements, predominately from her insurance company, which fully compensated her for the injuries she incurred in previous automobile accidents and for any alleged medical malpractice that stemmed from her physicians' treatment of those injuries. Under Florida law, Tyler's malpractice claim resided with her insurer once she elected to be compensated by that entity. As such, Tyler was not the proper party to bring suit against her physicians. Accordingly, the district court granted summary judgment in the defendants' favor. We affirm.

I.

In 1977, Tyler was involved in two unrelated automobile accidents. As a result of one or both of the accidents she suffered a neck injury. In an effort to remedy this injury, Tyler would later undergo surgery.

Prior to her surgery in 1980, Tyler compromised her claims against the two adverse drivers involved in the 1977 accidents and their respective insurers for $60,000. Apparently, this sum failed to compensate Tyler fully for her injuries because she also made a claim against her insurer, American Fire and Casualty Company ("American Fire"), under the underinsured/uninsured motorist provision of her policy. This provision allows an insured to receive compensation from his or her own insurance company in the event that a tortfeasor lacks insurance or retains insufficient coverage. Tyler's settlement with American Fire, the linchpin of this litigation, occurred in December of 1980. She received $130,000.

In July of 1980, Tyler underwent the surgical treatment for her neck injury. Drs. Ahmed and Bolt sought to fuse the vertebrae in her neck by grafting bone from her hip. Complications, which Tyler claims were caused by malpractice, developed at the donor site. As a result, in October of 1980 Tyler was forced to undergo corrective surgery to remedy the problems in her hip.

As stated, in December of 1980, Tyler settled her claim against American Fire. It is undisputed that this settlement was intended to compensate her for all of the injuries resulting from the 1977 accidents, including any alleged medical malpractice she sustained in undergoing treatment. Notwithstanding this settlement, Tyler filed an action for medical malpractice against her physicians in July of 1982. After extensive discovery, the trial court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment on the basis of the Florida Court of Appeals' decision in McCutcheon v. Hertz Corp., 463 So.2d 1226 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1985), pet. for rev. denied, 476 So.2d 674 (Fla.).

II.

McCutcheon addressed the issue of whether a plaintiff who was fully compensated by a settlement for both the injuries incurred in an automobile accident and the alleged aggravation of those injuries by subsequent medical malpractice could thereafter sue the physician. McCutcheon held that a suit by a fully compensated plaintiff was improper. The cause of action against the physician shifted to the party from whom McCutcheon received her compensation under the doctrine of subrogation.

The facts of McCutcheon can be summarized as follows. In 1971, Mrs. McCutcheon was injured as the result of an automobile collision with a Hertz lessee. Her injuries were aggravated by the allegedly negligent treatment of her physician. McCutcheon sued Hertz and its driver for all of her injuries since Florida follows the rule that an initial tortfeasor is liable for the subsequent aggravation of an injury even if the aggravation is the result of medical malpractice. Prior to trial, Hertz attempted to join the physician in order to seek indemnity but was not allowed. On the morning of trial Hertz reached a settlement with McCutcheon. Meanwhile, McCutcheon had filed a separate suit against her physician claiming medical malpractice.

After paying McCutcheon, Hertz sued her physician in a separate action under the theory of subrogation. Hertz alleged that all or part of McCutcheon's damages were caused by the physician's malpractice. Since Hertz was liable under the law for all of McCutcheon's damages, Hertz alleged McCutcheon's physician was liable to Hertz for that portion of the settlement that compensated McCutcheon for his malpractice. The Florida court dismissed McCutcheon's complaint against her physician because of its decision that the cause of action resided with Hertz. McCutcheon, of course, had sought and obtained full recovery from Hertz for all of her injuries. Thus, she was not entitled to seek a second recovery from her physician.

The Florida court gave two intertwined rationales for dismissing McCutcheon's complaint. The first was to avoid the inequitable result of exposing the physicians to double liability. Once to McCutcheon on her malpractice claim and a second time to Hertz on its action for subrogation. The court's other rationale concerned McCutcheon's potential windfall. Having been compensated by Hertz for her physician's alleged malpractice, any remuneration she received from her doctor would be duplicative.

In deciding that McCutcheon's malpractice claim should be dismissed, the Florida court placed special emphasis on McCutcheon's election to settle with Hertz for all of her damages. The court stressed that McCutcheon could have chosen to settle with Hertz for only the injuries directly related to the automobile accident, reserving her claim against her physician for disposition at another time. In light of her election to seek complete redress from Hertz, her claim was properly dismissed.

III.

The district court found this case to be identical to the McCutcheon case in all relevant respects. Here, American Fire stood in the shoes of the original tortfeasor by virtue of its responsibility to Tyler under the underinsured motorist provision of her policy. As such, American Fire's role was identical to that of Hertz in the McCutcheon case. Second, the record shows that Tyler expressly settled with American Fire for all of her injuries, including those stemming from her physician's alleged medical malpractice. As such, any right to recovery against the physicians transferred to American Fire. Given these considerations, the district court granted summary judgment.

The heart of Tyler's challenge to the application of McCutcheon to her case concerns the end result she claims the application will have. Tyler argues that her physicians...