Tyler v. Aspinwall
| Citation | 73 Conn. 493,47 A. 755 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Decision Date | 03 January 1901 |
| Parties | TYLER et al. v. ASPINWALL |
Appeal from superior court, Fairfield county; Alberto T. Roraback, Judge.
Action by Corcelia E. Tyler and others against Florence S. Aspinwall for damages, and to set aside a judgment of divorce. Demurrer to plea in abatement was overruled, and judgment rendered for defendant. Plaintiffs appeal. Affirmed.
All the parties reside out of this state, and the complaint, in substance, alleges the following facts: The plaintiffs are the heirs at law of Charles D. Tyler, who died intestate in Newfoundland in 1897, leaving an estate valued at about $25,000. The defendant, by virtue of an alleged marriage with the deceased, claims an interest in his estate as his widow. In 1882 the defendant was married to Sumner D. Aspinwall, of Newark, N. J., and with him thereafter, as his wife, she resided and had her domicile in that state until May, 1893. In September, 1893, she brought a suit for divorce against Sumner D. Aspinwall to the superior court, in Fairfield county, on the ground of his habitual intemperance and intolerable cruelty towards her; and in February, 1894, said court granted her a divorce on the latter ground. Unless said marriage was dissolved by this judgment, it has never been dissolved, and said Aspinwall is now in full life. Aspinwall was never a resident of this state, "nor had the defendant, at the time of the institution of said suit for divorce, been a resident of Connecticut for a period of three years; neither had she, being domiciled in this state before her mar riage, returned to this state with the intention of permanently remaining, and the court granting said decree was therefore without jurisdiction." The allegations of the complaint that Aspinwall was habitually intemperate and had been guilty of intolerable cruelty, and the testimony of the defendant in support of these allegations, were utterly false and untrue. A willful fraud was committed upon the court, and said judgment of divorce was wrongfully and fraudulently obtained, to the damage and injury of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs have already been damaged by the claims of the defendant upon the estate of the deceased to the extent of $1,000, and, if said judgment of divorce is allowed to stand, will be permanently injured to the extent of $25,000, and they have no adequate remedy at law. The plaintiffs claimed $1,000 damages, and that the judgment of divorce be "set aside, vacated, and annulled." The defendant appeared in court "for the purpose of pleading to the jurisdiction only," and, by way of plea in abatement, she alleged that the court had no jurisdiction, because (1) the parties when the suit was commenced were all nonresidents of this state; (2) no personal service of the process or of the complaint was ever made upon the defendant, nor had any estate of hers been attached in the suit; (3) neither of the plaintiffs were parties to the action of divorce in question, nor did they have any interest therein; (4) no recovery of damages can be bad in this proceeding for the acts of the defendant alleged. The plaintiffs moved to strike out of this plea the third and fourth of the above paragraphs, on the ground that the matters alleged in them were (1) immaterial and impertinent; (2) could not be taken advantage of by plea in abatement; and (3) were not matters of which the defendant could take advantage under an appearance for the sole purpose of pleading to the jurisdiction. The court denied the motion. The plaintiffs then demurred to the plea in abatement for the following reasons: (1) To the whole plea, because the allegations thereof are immaterial and irrelevant; (2) to the paragraphs relating to the nonresidence of the parties, want of personal service on defendant, and the fact that none of her property had been attached, because, in substance, this was a proceeding to set aside a void judgment, or one that had been procured by fraud, which could not be brought in any other jurisdiction, and which invoked the exercise of a power in the court not dependent upon the presence of the parties by whom the fraud was perpetrated; (3) to the third and fourth paragraphs of the plea, as hereinbefore stated, because of the reasons alleged in the motion to strike out. After this the complaint was amended by striking out the prayer for relief by way of damages. The court overruled the demurrer on the grounds (1) that it had acquired no jurisdiction over the defendant; (2) that the plaintiffs had no standing in court, because they were not parties to the action for divorce, and were not legally prejudiced by the judgment therein. The reasons of appeal relate to the action of the court in denying the motion to strike out and in overruling the demurrer.
Joseph P. Turtle and Robert C. Dickenson, for appellants.
Samuel Tweedy, for appellee.
TORRANCE, J. (after stating the facts). The appeal in this case involves to some extent the consideration of the power of the superior court over its recorded judgments, and its duty to exercise that power under certain circumstances. Over its recorded judgments it may exercise two powers, separate and distinct in their purpose and object, if not in their nature, namely, (1) the power to correct and amend the record so that it shall speak truth,—shall truly show what the judicial action really was; (2) the power to set aside, annul, and vacate such judgment. Many of the limitations and conditions under which it will exercise one of these powers may not limit or condition its exercise of the other. It may rightfully exercise its powers merely to amend or correct the record of the judgment so as to make it speak truthfully, under circumstances which would not at all justify it in exercising its power to vacate the judgment. As the record is a history of the court proceedings, the power to make it speak truthfully is one of necessity belonging to every court of...
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Old Colony Trust Co. v. Porter
...attack upon a divorce decree, by a person not a party to it in circumstances comparable to these, was allowed. In Tyler v. Aspinwall, 73 Conn. 493, 47 A. 755,54 A.L.R. 758, and in Brokaw v. Brokaw, 99 Ind.App. 385, 192 N.E. 728, it was held that such an attack could not be made. It is true ......
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Blake v. Blake
...at which they were rendered. Steve Viglione Sheet Metal Co. v. Sakonchick, 190 Conn. 707, 710, 462 A.2d 1037 (1983); Tyler v. Aspinwall, 73 Conn. 493, 497, 47 A. 755 (1901). 'During the continuance of a term of court the judge holding it has, in a sense, absolute control over judgments rend......
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Reger v. Reger
...were valid, the heirs of the second husband have no standing to maintain proceedings to vacate the judgment of divorce." In Tyler v. Aspinwall, 73 Conn. 493, l. c. 498, who were the heirs-at-law of defendant's deceased second husband (as in the case at bar), sued in equity to set aside a de......
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Kirby v. Kent
...of the decree and the record. The question raised here by the appellants places them in the same position as the heirs at law in the Aspinwall case, supra, when they sought to have set aside decree of divorce obtained by Mrs. Aspinwall prior to her marriage to their intestate, Tyler. In the......