Tyler v. Byrd

• Decision Date: 26 July 2016
• Docket Number: C/A No.: 4:16-400-MGL-BM
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina
• Parties: Larry James Tyler, Plaintiff, v. Wayne Byrd, Paul M. Burch, James Bogle, J. Richard Jones, Defendants.

Larry James Tyler, Plaintiff, v. Wayne Byrd, Paul M. Burch, James Bogle,J. Richard Jones, Defendants.

C/A No.: 4:16-400-MGL-BM

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA

July 26, 2016

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

(partial summary dismissal)

This is a civil action filed by the Plaintiff, Larry James Tyler, pro se. Plaintiff, who is detained at the Darlington County Detention Center while awaiting civil commitment proceedings pursuant to the South Carolina Sexually Violent Predator (SVP) Act, S.C. Code Ann. §§ 44-48-10 through 44-48-170, seeks relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.¹ See Complaint, ECF No. 1 at 3.

The Complaint is before the Court for pre-service review. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); In re Prison Litigation Reform Act, 105 F.3d 1131, 1134 (6th Cir.1997)[pleadings by non-prisoners should also be screened]. Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of the pro se complaint herein pursuant to the procedural provisions of § 1915 and in light of the following precedents: Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25 (1992);Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972); Nasim v. Warden, Maryland House of Corr., 64 F.3d 951 (4th Cir.1995) (en banc); and Todd v. Baskerville, 712 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1983). Section 1915 permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in federal court without paying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit. However, to protect against possible abuses of this privilege, the statute allows a district court to dismiss the case upon a finding that the action "is frivolous or malicious," "fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted," or "seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). A finding of frivolousness can be made where the complaint "lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact." Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. at 31. Hence, under § 1915(e)(2)(B), a claim based on a meritless legal theory may be dismissed sua sponte. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319.

Further, while this Court is also required to liberally construe pro se documents, holding them to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)(quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)), the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim currently cognizable in a federal court. Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990). Here, after a careful review of the Complaint pursuant to this liberal standard, the undersigned finds for the reasons set forth hereinbelow that Plaintiff's claims relating to his custody status and criminal convictions are subject to summary dismissal. Further, the Defendants Paul M. Burch, James Bogle, and J. Richard Jones are entitled to summary dismissal as party Defendants in this case.

Discussion

Records from Darlington County² indicate that Plaintiff was convicted on February 27, 2013 (jury trial) on the charges of criminal solicitation of a minor, sexual exploitation of a minor (second degree), and disseminating harmful material or exhibiting harmful performance to minors, and was sentenced to eight years imprisonment as to each conviction (concurrent sentences). See Darlington County Fourth Judicial Circuit Public Index, http://publicindex.sccourts.org/Darlington/PublicIndex/CaseDetails.aspx?County=16&CourtAgency=16001&Casenum=2013GS1600603&CaseType=C; http://publicindex.sccourts.org/Darlington/PublicIndex/CaseDetails.aspx?County=16&CourtAgency=16001&Casenum=2013GS1600604&CaseType=C; http://publicindex.sccourts.org/Darlington/PublicIndex/CaseDetails.aspx?County=16&CourtAgency=16001&Casenum=2013GS1600606&CaseType=C (last visited July 21, 2016). Plaintiff was also sentenced to three years concurrent as to his conviction of contributing to the delinquency of a minor. See http://publicindex.sccourts.org/Darlington/PublicIndex/PIError.aspx?County=16&CourtAgency=16001&Casenum=2013GS1600605&CaseType=C (last visited July 21, 2016).

Plaintiff alleges that on October 26, 2015, he was taken to the Darlington County Courthouse for a surprise hearing. He claims he met with an attorney less than ten minutes before going before the Defendant Burch, a South Carolina Circuit Judge, and that Judge Burch "sentenced" him to a mental sexual evaluation pursuant to the SVP Act. The Defendant Bogle, an AssistantAttorney General, allegedly brought the charges against him. Plaintiff appears to allege claims concerning his prior convictions, including that the Defendant Bogle³ brought the wrong charges against him (such that he was charged with a violent rather than a non-violent crime); that Judge Burch failed to stop the bringing of the wrong charges and is currently seeking retaliation against Plaintiff (because Plaintiff filed a complaint against Judge Burch for allegedly failing to address a motion for a directed verdict); and that the Defendant Jones, a Public Defender, failed to protect Plaintiff from Bogle's deceptive trick, such that Plaintiff is currently incorrectly being subjected to SVP proceedings. Additionally, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Sheriff Wayne Byrd has tampered with his mail, refused to make copies of his documents, and stopped his mail from coming in and going out of the Darlington County Detention Center. Complaint, ECF No. 1 at 3-6. Plaintiff requests monetary damages, release from detention, and that the State of South Carolina be ordered to admit that he is a non-violent sex offender and correct his records. Additionally, Plaintiff requests that his driver's license be reinstated, and that the Sheriff's office be ordered to stop tampering with his mail. ECF No. 1 at 7.

First, as Plaintiff has not shown a favorable termination or disposition with respect to his state court convictions, any claims Plaintiff is asserting concerning those convictions (Plaintiff may be attempting to allege false imprisonment and/or due process violations) are barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 481 (1994), and should be dismissed. Heck requires that a defendant must show that his criminal convictions have been overturned or otherwise called into questionbefore he can sue for relief relating to such convictions under § 1983. See also Lambert v. Williams, 223 F.3d 257, 260-261 (4th Cir. 2000)[claim for malicious prosecution requires a showing that the initiation or maintenance of a proceeding against the plaintiff was without probable cause to support it and a termination thereof occurred in favor of the plaintiff], cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1130 (2001); Brooks v. City of Winston-Salem, 85 F.3d 178, 183 (4th Cir. 1996)[Claim for malicious prosecution does "not accrue until a favorable termination is obtained."]; Roesch v. Otarola, 980 F.2d 850, 853-854 (2d Cir. 1992)[holding that requirement that a plaintiff receive favorable termination applies to claims of false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution]. Plaintiff has not alleged a favorable disposition of any of his criminal charges in his Complaint.

The Fourth Circuit, in Wilson v. Johnson, 535 F.3d 262 (4th Cir. 2008), did indicate that Heck does not bar a § 1983 action where "a prisoner could not, as a practical matter, seek habeas relief." Wilson, 535 F.3d at 268. However, even if Plaintiff is currently no longer "in custody" as to the challenged convictions, he had ample time to bring his habeas claims while in custody and has not alleged that circumstances beyond his control existed to prevent him from pursuing habeas relief. See Bishop v. County of Macon, 484 F. App'x 753, 754 (4th Cir. 2012)[Finding that the Wilson exception only applies where the plaintiff can show that circumstances beyond his control left him unable to pursue habeas remedies and warning that "Wilson does not permit a plaintiff to end-run Heck by simply sitting on his rights until all avenues for challenging a conviction have closed."]; see also Covey v. Assessor of Ohio County, 777 F.3d 186, 197 (4th Cir. 2015) [In order for the Heck bar not to apply, the claimant must not only no longer be in custody because the sentence has been served, but also could not have practicably sought habeas relief while in custody]; cf. Ballenger v. Owens, 515 F. App'x 192, 195 n.5 (4th Cir. 2013)[Noting that where a claimant had sufficient timeto pursue post conviction relief, and indeed had actually done so and was unsuccessful, the Heck bar remains even after termination of the underlying conviction or sentence].

Further, Plaintiff currently has a pending application for post-conviction relief pending in the South Carolina Courts. See http://publicindex.sccourts.org/Darlington/PublicIndex/PIError.aspx?County=16&CourtAgency=16002&Casenum=2015CP1600016&CaseType=V (last visited July 21, 2016). Hence, to the extent that Plaintiff is requesting that this Court interfere with his pending state court action (his APCR), federal courts are not authorized to interfere with a State's pending criminal proceedings absent extraordinary circumstances. See, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971); Cinema Blue of Charlotte, Inc. v. Gilchrist, 887 F.2d 49, 50-53 (4th Cir. 1989). Any pending proceedings in the state court (e.g., pending applications for post-conviction relief) are still part of his "pending criminal case" as that terminology is understood under Younger and its progeny. See, e.g., Howell v. Wilson, No. 4:13-2812-JFA-TER, 2014 WL 1233703 (Mar. 25, 2014)[applying Younger as to the plaintiff's request that the district court provide direction to state court judges as to the plaintiff's PGR, criminal, and/or DNA testing cases]; Smith v. Bravo, No. 99 C 5077, 2000 WL 1051855, *5 (N.D.Ill. 2000)[presuming that Younger abstention would apply to civil case that could interfere with post-conviction proceedings]; Lockheart v. Chicago Police Dep't, ...