Tyler v. Commonwealth

• Decision Date: 11 January 1917
• Citation: 91 S.E. 171
• Parties: TYLER v. COMMONWEALTH.
• Court: Virginia Supreme Court

91 S.E. 171

(120 Va. 863)

TYLER

v.COMMONWEALTH.

Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia.

Jan. 11, 1917.

Error to Corporation Court of Staunton.

Thomas Tyler was convicted of housebreaking, and he brings error. Reversed.

L. Travis White, of Staunton, for plaintiff in error.

The Attorney General, for the Commonwealth.

SIMS, J. In this case the indictment charged the accused with feloniously breaking and entering, in the nighttime, a storehouse of one S. P. Mann, with the intent to commit larceny, and that the accused did feloniously steal, take, and carry away one gold watch charm of the value of $5, of the goods and chattels of the said S. P. Mann in the said storehouse then and there being found, etc. There were two trials. Upon the first trial the jury were unable to agree. Upon the second trial the verdict of the jury was as follows:

"We, the jury, find the prisoner guilty of housebreaking and fix his punishment at three years in the penitentiary."

The accused moved the court below to set aside the verdict as contrary to the law and the evidence and grant him (accused) a new trial. This motion the court overruled, and entered judgment passing sentence in accordance with said verdict. To this action and judgment of the court the accused excepted, and in his petition to this court for a writ of error and supersedeas assigns three grounds of error, which raise practically two questions only, both of them questions of fact: a. Whether there is any evidence in the case of "other inculpatory circumstances, " in addition to the possession of the stolen goods, to warrant the jury in finding the accused guilty of housebreaking.

b. Whether there is sufficient evidence in the case to sustain the burden which rests upon the commonwealth to prove that the alleged possession of the stolen goods by the accused was an exclusive possession.

The law in Virginia is well settled that the possession of stolen goods is of itself not even prima facie evidence of housebreaking or of burglary. Gravely's Case, 86 Va. 396, 10 S. E. 431; Walker's Case, 28 Grat. (69 Va.) 969; Porterfield's Case, 91 Va. 801, 22 S. E. 352.

The rule in Virginia, however, is that: " * * * Whore goods have been obtained by means of a burglary or housebreaking, the fact of such possession is a most material circumstance to be considered by the jury, and where, in addition to such possession, other inculpatory circumstances are proved, such, for example, as the refusal of the accused to give any account, or his giving a false account, of how he came by the goods, such proof will warrant a conviction. In other words, to use the language of the books, there should be some evidence of guilty conduct, besides the bare possession of the stolen property, before the presumption of burglary or housebreaking is superadded to that of larceny, but extrinsic mechanical indications may constitute such additional evidence." Gravely's Case, supra.

It is also well-settled law that the possession of stolen goods contemplated by the rule in Virginia above referred to is an exclusive possession on the part of-the accused; otherwise such rule is not applicable.

"The exclusive possession of money recently stolen, unaccompanied by a reasonable account of how the possession was acquired, creates a presumption that the possessor is the thief." Porterfield's Case, 91 Va. 801, 805, 22 S. E. 352, 354.

"But to raise the presumption of guilt from the possession of the fruits of [or] the instruments of crime by the prisoner it is necessary that they bo found in his exclusive possession. A constructive possession, like constructive notice or knowledge, though sufficient to create a civil liability, is not sufficient to hold the prisoner to a criminal charge. He can only be required to account for the possession of things which he actually and knowingly possessed, as, for example, where they are found upon his person, or in his private apartment, or in a place of which he kept the key. If they are found upon premises owned or occupied as well by others as himself, or in a place to which others had equal facility and right of access, there seems no good...