Tyler v. George Wash. Med. Faculty Assocs., 11–AA–1127.

• Decision Date: 12 September 2013
• Docket Number: No. 11–AA–1127.,11–AA–1127.
• Citation: 75 A.3d 211
• Parties: LaShawn P. TYLER, Petitioner, v. GEORGE WASHINGTON MEDICAL FACULTY ASSOCIATES, Respondent.
• Court: D.C. Court of Appeals

75 A.3d 211

LaShawn P. TYLER, Petitioner,

v.GEORGE WASHINGTON MEDICAL FACULTY ASSOCIATES, Respondent.

No. 11–AA–1127.

District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

Argued March 5, 2013.

Decided Sept. 12, 2013.

Ryan C. Morris, Washington, DC, for petitioner.

Raymond C. Baldwin, Washington, DC, with whom Virginia E. Robinson was on the brief, for respondent.

Before EASTERLY and McLEESE, Associate Judges, and FERREN, Senior Judge.

McLEESE, Associate Judge:

An Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) at the Office of Administrative Hearings (“OAH”) found that petitioner LaShawn P. Tyler was disqualified from receiving certain unemployment-compensation benefits, because she had been terminated from her job with George Washington Medical Faculty Associates (“GWMFA”) for misconduct. On review, Ms. Tyler contends that the ALJ erred as a matter of law in finding that she committed misconduct and that GWMFA should be equitably estopped from asserting that Ms. Tyler committed misconduct. We vacate and remand for further proceedings.

I.

After holding an evidentiary hearing, the ALJ found the following. Ms. Tyler worked for GWMFA at George Washington University Hospital as a Front End Patient Service Specialist. In May 2010, a patient's financial information was stolen at the hospital and used to make transactions. GWMFA's Patient Relations Manager and Privacy Officer, Keisha Mullings–Smith, investigated the matter. As part of the investigation, Ms. Mullings–Smith interviewed all staff members who had access to the patient's file or worked in the area where the incident occurred.

GWMFA had a policy prohibiting employees from discussing matters under investigation, in part to prevent interviewed employees from influencing employees who had not yet been questioned. Before Ms. Tyler was interviewed, her co-worker Kenyetta Howard was questioned by Ms. Mullings–Smith. Soon thereafter, Ms. Howard revealed to Ms. Tyler information about her interview and the pending investigation, including that the matter concerned stolen credit-card information. Ms. Tyler subsequently told her supervisor, Cynthia Leonard, that Ms. Howard had shared this information with her.

The next morning, Ms. Mullings–Smith interviewed Ms. Tyler. At the conclusion of the interview, Ms. Mullings–Smith asked Ms. Tyler whether she had talked with anyone about the investigation or about Ms. Howard's interview of the prior day. Ms. Tyler replied that she had not discussed that information.

Following the interview, Ms. Leonard reported to Ms. Mullings–Smith that Ms. Tyler had in fact previously discussed with others the investigation and Ms. Howard's interview. After speaking with Ms. Leonard, Ms. Mullings–Smith interviewed Ms. Tyler a second time, on the same day as Ms. Tyler's initial interview. Ms. Mullings–Smith specifically asked Ms. Tyler whether she had learned any information from Ms. Howard about Ms. Howard's interview. Ms. Tyler once again responded that she had not. Ms. Tyler also stated that she did not recall making statements to anyone else concerning Ms. Howard's interview.

Following Ms. Tyler's second interview, Ms. Mullings–Smith indicated to Ms. Tyler that Ms. Mullings–Smith would allow Ms. Tyler to change her previous statements and would “honor a new statement.” The same day, Ms. Mullings–Smith interviewed Ms. Tyler a third time. At that point Ms. Tyler admitted that Ms. Howard had discussed the details of her interview and that Ms. Howard had told Ms. Tyler that the investigation related to credit-card theft. Ms. Tyler apologized for her actions and explained that she was initially untruthful because she feared that her co-workers would be fired. GWMFA subsequently terminated Ms. Tyler for failure to be truthful during an internal investigation.

The ALJ found that Ms. Tyler's actions constituted simple but not gross misconduct, concluding that although Ms. Tyler's behavior was not serious and did not significantly harm GWMFA, her dishonesty was a breach of her duties as an employee.

II.

We affirm an agency decision if the decision contains findings on each material, contested issue of fact; substantial evidence supports each factual finding; the decision's legal conclusions flow rationally from the factual findings; and the decision is not arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise contrary to law. Berkley v. District of Columbia Transit, Inc., 950 A.2d 749, 759 (D.C.2008). “We defer to the ALJ's factual findings if they are supported by substantial evidence, but legal conclusions, including whether a fired employee's conduct constitutes misconduct, are reviewed de novo.” Johnson v. So Others Might Eat, Inc., 53 A.3d 323, 326 (D.C.2012).

III.

An employee whose termination was the result of misconduct is disqualified from receiving certain unemployment-compensation benefits. SeeD.C.Code § 51–110 (2012 Repl.). Misconduct is not defined in the statute. The applicable regulations define “gross misconduct” as “an act which deliberately or willfully violates the employer's rules, deliberately or willfully threatens or violates the employer's interests, shows a repeated disregard for the employee's obligation to the employer, or disregards standards of behavior which an employer has a right to expect of its employee.” 7 DCMR § 312.3 (2013). Examples of gross misconduct include dishonesty and insubordination. 7 DCMR § 312.4(e), (f). “Other than gross misconduct,” also known as simple misconduct, is defined as “an act or omission by an employee which constitutes a breach of the employee's duties or obligations to the employer, a breach of the employment agreement or contract, or which adversely affects a material employer interest.” 7 DCMR § 312.5. Simple misconduct includesactions “where the severity, degree, or other mitigating circumstances do not support a finding of gross misconduct.” Id.

Read broadly, the regulations might seem to permit a finding of misconduct based on virtually any conduct that falls short of an employer's reasonable expectations. See Capitol Entm't Servs., Inc. v. McCormick, 25 A.3d 19, 24–25 (D.C.2011). It is well settled, however, that the regulations are not to be read so broadly. Id. Because our unemployment-compensation law was designed to protect employees from the consequences of temporary unemployment, we read the definition of misconduct with an eye towards the statute's humanitarian purpose. Id. at 27. Thus, under this court's cases, a finding of misconduct requires more than that “the employer was justified in his decision to discharge the employee.” Jadallah v. District of Columbia Dept. of Emp't Servs., 476 A.2d 671, 675 (D.C.1984). More than mere negligence by an employee is required for a finding of misconduct. Capitol Entm't, 25 A.3d at 27. Rather, there must be “[i]ntentionality or conscious disregard amounting to recklessness.” Id. at 26;see also id. at 28 (“misconduct may be demonstrated by ... an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interest or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer”) (internal quotation marks omitted).

In this case, Ms. Tyler lied to a fellow employee who was investigating an important matter. The lie was about whether employees had violated a reasonable policy of GWMFA, and was in response to a question that was potentially of significance to the investigation. Barring mitigating circumstances, such a lie in our view should normally be viewed as misconduct, because it shows “an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interest.” Capitol Entm't, 25 A.3d at 28;cf.7 DCMR § 312.4 (listing dishonesty as form of gross misconduct). It is true, as Ms. Tyler points out, that this court's unemployment-compensation cases finding misconduct based on false statements have arisen in circumstances more aggravated than those of this case. Nothing in the holdings or the reasoning of the cases upon which Ms. Tyler relies, however, suggests that additional aggravating circumstances are required for a material, work-related lie to one's employer to support a finding of misconduct. Courts in other jurisdictions have found misconduct in contexts comparable to those of this case. See, e.g., In re Barton, 92 A.D.3d 1011, 937 N.Y.S.2d 719, 719 (2012) (employee who discussed employer's internal investigation when instructed not to, and lied about having discussed investigation, committed disqualifying misconduct); Lewis v. Director, 90 Ark. App. 219, 205 S.W.3d 161, 163–64 (2005) (upholding denial of unemployment benefits based on misconduct; employee's untruthful response to question about whether bank procedures were followed, asked during internal investigation into whether deposit bags were missing, was “dishonesty and an intentional disregard for her obligations as well as her employer's interest”); White v. Employment Appeal Bd., 448 N.W.2d 691, 692 (Iowa Ct.App.1989) (employee's lack of candor during interview about workplace incident constituted disqualifying misconduct).

In contrast, Ms. Tyler cites no remotely similar case, either from this jurisdiction or elsewhere, holding that a material, work-related lie did not constitute misconduct. The cases on which Ms. Tyler does rely are factually quite different from the present case. See Jones v. District of Columbia Dept. of Emp't Servs., 558 A.2d 341, 344 (D.C.1989) (single act of giving access to unauthorized person did not constitute misconduct, where acting company president seemed to condone employee's act, there was minimal evidence of enforcement of employer's policy, and employee's conduct was “at best permissible and at worst merely negligent”); Jadallah, 476 A.2d at 677 (no substantial evidence that employee intended to act dishonestly); Green v. District of Columbia Unemp't Comp. Bd., 273 A.2d 479, 480 (D.C.1971) (employee who notified supervisors of absence from work due to personal business did not commit misconduct, because no company rule required request be accompanied...