Tyler v. Harper, 84-1006
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (8th Circuit) |
| Citation | 744 F.2d 653 |
| Docket Number | No. 84-1006,84-1006 |
| Parties | Melvin Leroy TYLER, Appellant, v. Milt HARPER, Cris Egbert and Gary McConnell, Appellees. |
| Decision Date | 23 October 1984 |
Page 653
v.
Milt HARPER, Cris Egbert and Gary McConnell, Appellees.
Eighth Circuit.
Decided Sept. 28, 1984.
Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied Oct. 23, 1984.
Page 654
John Ashcroft, Atty. Gen., Kelly Mescher, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, Mo., for appellees.
Thompson & Mitchell, Donald J. Stohr, St. Louis, Mo., for appellee Gary McConnell.
Melvin Leroy Tyler, pro se.
Kortenhof & Ely, John G. Enright, St. Louis, Mo., for appellee Chris Egbert.
Before BRIGHT, JOHN R. GIBSON and BOWMAN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
Melvin Leroy Tyler appeals from the district court's 1 entry of summary judgment against him in this civil rights action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 (1982). For reversal Tyler argues that the district court (1) incorrectly applied the doctrine of collateral estoppel to bar his claims of witness intimidation and destruction of exculpatory evidence; (2) erred in denying him an opportunity to respond to appellee McConnell's motion for summary judgment; and (3) erred in failing to mail him copies of its orders granting summary judgment against him. We affirm the grant of summary judgment as to all three appellees.
In 1977 Tyler was convicted in Missouri circuit court of first-degree robbery, rape, kidnapping and armed criminal action. The conviction was affirmed on appeal. State v. Tyler, 587 S.W.2d 918 (Mo.Ct.App.1979).
In 1980 Tyler filed this section 1983 action against Milt Harper, the former prosecuting attorney for Boone County, Missouri, who prosecuted the case against him, Gary McConnell, an investigator for the Boone County prosecutor's office who assisted Harper in investigating the case, and Cris Egbert, a Columbia, Missouri police officer who also assisted in the investigation. Tyler alleged in his complaint that Harper, McConnell and Egbert had interfered with his right to a fair trial by intimidating and harassing several alibi witnesses. He further alleged that Harper and McConnell erased recorded tapes that were exculpatory evidence.
On December 7, 1983, the district court entered summary judgment for all three defendants, finding that since the issues of witness intimidation and destruction of evidence had been fully litigated and decided in Tyler's state criminal proceeding, Tyler was barred by collateral estoppel from relitigating them. This appeal followed.
I. THE GRANT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE GROUND OF COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL
In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, this court applies the same standard as does the district court: summary judgment should be granted only if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P.
Page 655
56(c). In applying this standard, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, giving that party the benefit of all inferences that may be reasonably drawn from the evidence. Elbe v. Yankton Independent School District No. 1, 714 F.2d 848, 850 (8th Cir.1983).Tyler argues that the district court erred in granting summary judgment because there are several issues of material fact. He also argues that the court erred, as a matter of law, by misapplying the doctrine of collateral estoppel to bar his claims.
Two recent Supreme Court cases govern our review of Tyler's collateral estoppel argument. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 101 S.Ct. 411, 66 L.Ed.2d 308 (1980), made clear that collateral estoppel can bar the relitigation of constitutional claims in a section 1983 action when they were fully and fairly litigated and decided in a prior state criminal proceeding. Further, Migra v. Warren City School District Board of Education, --- U.S. ----, 104 S.Ct. 892, 79 L.Ed.2d 56, 61 (1984), emphasized that the Full Faith and Credit Statute, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1738 (1982), requires federal courts to give the same preclusive effect to a state court judgment as would the state's own courts. Here, since Tyler was convicted in Missouri circuit court, we must apply the Missouri standard for collateral estoppel. In Missouri, the appropriateness of the application of collateral estoppel by a stranger to the prior suit is to be determined on a case-by-case basis. The court is to consider whether: (1) the issue decided in the prior adjudication is identical to the issue in the present action; (2) the prior adjudication resulted in a judgment on the merits; (3) the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication; and (4) the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior suit. Oates v. Safeco Insurance Co. of America, 583 S.W.2d 713, 719 (Mo.1979) (en banc); Retirement Board of the Police Retirement System v. Noel, 652 S.W.2d 874, 877-78 (Mo.Ct.App.1983).
A. The Witness Intimidation Claim
Tyler contends that Harper, Egbert and McConnell interfered with his right to a fair trial by harassing and intimidating several of his alibi witnesses. Harper, Egbert and McConnell argue that this witness intimidation claim was fully litigated and resolved against Tyler in the state criminal proceeding.
Before his trial commenced, Tyler filed a motion to dismiss the prosecution on several grounds, including "for proceeding with dirty hands of the prosecutor, and police allowing intimidation, threating (sic), and harassment of the defendant's alibi witnesses." Judge Kinder, the state circuit judge who presided over Tyler's trial, held a two-day hearing on the motion during which Tyler, with the aid of four attorneys, represented himself on a pro se basis. 2 Tyler presented eleven witnesses at the hearing. Of the eleven witnesses, six denied being intimidated by the police, and the remaining five were prisoners at the time of the hearing. Judge Kinder denied the motion to dismiss. Tyler raised the witness intimidation claim again in his motion for a new trial, and in denying the motion Judge Kinder stated, "There was an...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Rice v. Barnes, 95-0756-CV-W-5.
...the trial court, collateral estoppel would act as a bar to defendant relitigating those claims through a § 1983 action.); Tyler v. Harper, 744 F.2d 653, 655-56 (8th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1057, 105 S.Ct. 1767, 84 L.Ed.2d 828 (1985) (Section 1983 claim held to be barred under Miss......
-
Scheckel v. Iowa, C16-2100-LRR
...2006); Haberer v. Woodbury Cty., 188 F.3d 957, 961 (8th Cir. 1999); Gross v. Heikien, 957 F.2d 531, 532 (8th Cir. 1992); Tyler v. Harper, 744 F.2d 653, 655 (8th Cir. 1984). The doctrine of collateral estoppel, see Hunter v. City of Des Moines, 300 N.W.2d 121, 123 (Iowa 1981) (setting forth ......
-
US v. Bliss, 84-200C(1).
...(1984). Thus, this Court must apply to the Missouri judgment the same issue preclusion standards as a Missouri court. In Tyler v. Harper, 744 F.2d 653, 655 (8th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1057, 105 S.Ct. 1767, 84 L.Ed.2d 828 (1985), the Eighth Circuit set out the application of offen......
-
Porters Bldg. Ctrs., Inc. v. Lumber, Case No. 16-06055-CV-SJ-ODS
...be reasonably drawn from the evidence. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588-89 (1986); Tyler v. Harper, 744 F.2d 653, 655 (8th Cir. 1984). A party opposing a motion for summary judgment "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the...pleadings, bu......