Tyler v. Hot Springs School Dist. No. 6

Decision Date04 September 1987
Docket NumberNo. 6,No. 6 and D,A,No. 86-1905,6 and D,6,86-1905
Citation827 F.2d 1227
Parties44 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 37,358, 41 Ed. Law Rep. 497 Tyrone TYLER, Appellant, v. HOT SPRINGS SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 6; Dale Cook; Orville Poole and Doris Qualls, Individually and as Members of the Board of Directors of Hot Springs School Districtelbert Garner, Individually and as Principal of Hot Springs School Districtppellees.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

John W. Walker, Little Rock, Ark., for appellant.

Dan F. Bufford, Little Rock, Ark., for appellees.

Before ROSS, * Circuit Judge, FLOYD R. GIBSON, Senior Circuit Judge, and JOHN R. GIBSON, Circuit Judge.

JOHN R. GIBSON, Circuit Judge.

Tyrone Tyler brought this action under 42 U.S.C. Secs. 1981 and 1983 (1982), claiming that because he is black the Hot Springs School District No. 6 1 did not renew his employment contract as band director at one of the School District's junior high schools. He argues on appeal that the district court 2 committed reversible error in giving improper jury instructions and in refusing to allow Tyler to introduce evidence concerning the conduct of the white teacher who replaced him as band director. He also argues that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury's verdict. We affirm.

In August 1982, Tyler began his employment with the School District as band director of Southwest Junior High School in Hot Springs, Arkansas. Tyler was qualified for the position. He held a doctorate from New York University in music education and had taught music in several other schools before returning home to teach in Hot Springs. During the 1982-83 school year, problems developed between Tyler and Delbert Garner, the principal of Southwest Junior High School and Tyler's immediate supervisor. In April 1983, Garner recommended to the School District's assistant superintendent that Tyler's teaching contract not be renewed. The recommendation letter, which was signed by Garner and Assistant Principal Martha Coble, cited numerous factors supporting the recommendation. 3 Tyler contended that Garner's recommendation lacked factual support and was based on subjective criteria. Tyler pointed to the written evaluation given to all teachers in the School District. That evaluation scores each teacher from "one" ("good") to "four" ("unsatisfactory") on a number of matters relating to the teacher's personal qualities, professional qualities, and professional effectiveness. On April 1, 1983, three days before Garner recommended nonrenewal, Tyler received an overall evaluation of 1.7, which placed him between "good" and "average." After receiving Garner's recommendation, the School District's board of directors decided not to follow it and instead voted to renew Tyler's contract.

The problems between Tyler and his supervisors continued into the 1983-84 school year. In September 1983, Tyler met with Garner to discuss certain incidents including, according to Garner, Tyler's leaving campus unannounced while on duty, threatening students with physical retaliation and their parents with legal action in response to complaints regarding Tyler's performance, and allowing students to smoke in the band room. Garner offered Tyler several suggestions to resolve these problems. According to Garner, the problems persisted, and on March 2, 1984 Garner and Tyler again met to discuss certain concerns and possible solutions. Finally, on April 11, 1984, Garner recommended to the assistant superintendent that Tyler's contract not be renewed, stating in his recommendation letter that:

My reasons for this recommendation are: (1) Parental concern over the lack of order and consistency in the band program. (2) Lack of consistent concern and care of equipment and band facilities. (3) The band program is very loosely structured. (4) The director does not provide the type of leadership and command the type of respect from students and parents that provides for a quality program. (5) Lack of organizational skills.

Some of the specific instances or occurrences included in these reasons are: Improper discipline methods used, language directed at students, failure to maintain order and control of classroom, neglect in turning in required reports, information and entries for activities, allowing band equipment, room and materials to be damaged or destroyed, not following procedures regarding transportation, leaving campus, issuance of uniforms and being absent without knowledge of administrators.

Once again, Tyler, whose overall evaluation for the 1983-84 school year was 1.93, argued that Garner's recommendation lacked foundation. Tyler presented his defense at a hearing before the School District's board of directors on May 9, 1984. After the hearing, the board of directors voted four to two in favor of nonrenewal.

Tyler brought an action in the district court contending that the School District discriminated against him on the basis of his race in refusing to renew his contract. After a five-day trial, the jury found that race was not a determining factor in the nonrenewal decision. The district court entered judgment in the School District's favor, and this appeal followed.

I.

Tyler first argues that the jury instructions regarding liability and causation were erroneous. The district court instructed the jury to answer an interrogatory that asked whether "discrimination against the plaintiff because of his race was a determining factor in all or some of the defendants' decision of nonrenewal of the plaintiff's contract for the 1984-85 school year." Tr. 1155. At several other points in the instructions, the court reiterated that the jury was to decide whether Tyler's race was "a determining factor" in the employment decision. Tyler objected to this interrogatory and these instructions, arguing that mixed motives played a part in the employment decision, and therefore, based on Bibbs v. Block, 778 F.2d 1318 (8th Cir.1985), the jury should have been asked whether race was "a factor" (as opposed to "a determining factor") in the decision to not renew Tyler's contract. 4

Bibbs v. Block is not applicable for a number of reasons. In Bibbs this court en banc held that the language of Title VII, specifically 42 U.S.C. Secs. 2000e-2(a) and -5(g), authorizes declaratory or injunctive relief, but not retroactive promotion, reinstatement, or back pay, when there is a finding in a mixed-motive case that an unlawful motive was a "discernible factor" in the employment decision, but not a "determining" or "but-for" factor. 778 F.2d at 1320-24. Here Tyler does not assert a claim under Title VII; the jury was instructed solely on his claims for damages caused by constitutional and section 1983 violations. 5 We were careful in Bibbs to distinguish our Title VII analysis from the analysis in cases, such as Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 97 S.Ct. 555, 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977), and Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 97 S.Ct. 568, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977), where a plaintiff seeks damages for a constitutional violation. In Hervey v. City of Little Rock, 787 F.2d 1223 (8th Cir.1986), we applied the principles of these latter cases to an employment race discrimination case, expressly rejecting the need for a dual Bibbs -type finding when a plaintiff seeks relief for a violation of his constitutional rights. Id. at 1233, 1233 n. 7. A constitutional race discrimination claimant is entitled to relief only if race was a motivating or determining factor in the employment decision. Id. at 1233 (citing Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. at 265-66, 97 S.Ct. at 563-64); cf. Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v Doyle, 429 U.S. at 285-87, 97 S.Ct. at 575-76 (formulating "a test of causation which distinguishes between a result caused by a constitutional violation and one not so caused"). If a jury were instructed that the claimant could recover if the constitutional violation was "a factor" or "a discernible factor" in the employment decision, this "could place an employee in a better position as a result of the exercise of constitutionally protected conduct than he would have occupied had he done nothing." Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 285, 97 S.Ct. at 575. On the other hand, an instruction that requires the unlawful motive to be a determining or motivating factor in the employment decision "protects against the invasion of constitutional rights without commanding undesirable consequences not necessary to the assurance of those rights." Id. at 287, 97 S.Ct. at 576.

Tyler's second argument regarding the jury instructions is that the district court erred in not instructing the jury on Ark.Stat.Ann. Sec. 80.1266.6, the section of the Arkansas Teacher Fair Dismissal Act that requires a school administrator to provide written notice to a teacher having problems that could lead to nonrenewal and to document the efforts undertaken to assist the teacher in correcting the problems. 6 Tyler did not bring a pendent cause of action under the Arkansas Teacher Fair Dismissal Act, and the jury was not instructed that Tyler could recover under the Act. He argues on appeal, however, that the School District violated section 80-1266.6, and this violation should have been specifically considered by the jury as bearing on the School District's discriminatory intent. In essence, therefore, Tyler is arguing that the jury instructions regarding intent were deficient.

The district court instructed the jury that in deciding whether race was a determining factor in the employment decision, it could "consider any statement made or act done or omitted by a party whose intent is an issue and all other facts and circumstances which indicate his state of mind." Tr. 1168. Section 80-1266.6 relates to one type of conduct the jury could have considered in assessing the intent...

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