Tyler v. Insurance Co. of North America, Inc.

Decision Date07 May 1976
Docket NumberCER--4
Citation331 So.2d 641
PartiesMrs. Net V. TYLER, Administratrix of the Estate of Cecil H. Tyler, Deceased v. INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH AMERICA, INC.
CourtAlabama Supreme Court

ANSWERS TO CERTIFICATE FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT TO THE SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA

HEFLIN, Chief Justice.

This case is before the court on certified questions from the United States Court of Appeals, Fifty Circuit, under the authority of Section 6.02(b)(3) of Amendment 328 to the Alabama Constitution, 1901 (Section 140(b)(3), Constitution, amended, appearing in the unofficial 1958 Recompiled Code--1973 Cum.Supp.) and Rule 18, Alabama Rules of Appellate Procedure (ARAP). Suit was begun in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, where plaintiff sought to recover for the death of her husband under the terms of a limited accident insurance policy. On cross-motions for summary judgment, supported by the pleadings and the deposition of the deceased's son-in-law, the district court found for the defendant insurance company on the ground that there was no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that plaintiff had not stated a legal cause of action under the provisions of the insurance policy. On appeal to the Fifty Circuit, that Court found that certain questions of Alabama law were controlling and has certified those questions for decision by this court.

The facts in this case are all stipulated. This court accepts the facts as they are set out in the memorandum opinion of the district court:

Early on the morning of June 18, 1973, seventy-nine year old Mr. Tyler and his son-in-law, Mr. Lutz, embarked on a fishing trip to the Holt Lock and Dam. They went in Mr. Lutz's car, to which was attached a boat trailer, which carried a 17 1/2 foot, flatbottomed fishing boat. When they arrived at the launching ramp, Mr. Lutz positioned the car and the trailer on the ramp about fifteen to twenty feet from the water. As was their custom, Mr. Tyler then got out of the car and proceeded to undo the boat and get it ready to launch. Part of his activity during this phase of the launching was to loosen and hold the 'floating' rope, about thirty feet long, while the trailer was backed into the water. He would then hold this floating rope to secure the now-free boat, while Mr. Lutz drove the car and trailer forty to sixty feet away to park. At this point, the rope in Mr. Tyler's hand was attached to the boat, which was still on the trailer, which in turn was attached to the car.

All went routinely until Mr. Lutz, mistakenly thinking the boat had floated free, drove up the ramp and parked the vehicle. While locking the passenger side door, he heard Mr. Tyler's pleas for help, and, looking back through the passenger-side window, saw Mr. Tyler lying on the ground, seriously injured. He managed to get Mr. Tyler to the hospital. There he learned from Mr. Tyler that the boat had not floated free and that the deceased, assuming his son-in-law would pull forward and back in again, had continued to hold the floating rope. As soon as he saw that Mr. Lutz planned to park the car, he dropped the rope, not realizing that he was standing on it. The force of the car pulling forward looped the rope around the instep of Mr. Tyler's left foot, resulting in his being pulled off his feet and dragged along behind the car and trailer. Mr. Lutz was oblivious to this series of events because the windows of his car were closed, and the back window was fogged.

On July 11, 1973, Mr. Tyler died from the injuries sustained in this accident.

The language of the insurance policy under which Mrs. Tyler seeks to recover reads,

'* * * the company insures (Mr. Tyler) * * * against loss of life * * * resulting * * * from bodily injuries * * * caused by accident occurring while this policy is in force and arising out of the following specific hazards:

(c) driving * * * or riding in or on, boarding or alighting from

(1) any pleasure type automobile * * * or

(d) being struck by any automobile, truck or public conveyance.'

The district court found the sole issue before it to be 'whether the decedent's death as a result of being pulled off his feet and dragged by a rope connected indirectly to an automobile may be said to have arisen out of alighting from an automobile and/or out of being struck by an automobile.' By granting the defendant's motion for summary judgment, the district court concluded that the plaintiff's deceased was not insured as a matter of Alabama law and that there were no facts which could properly go to a jury on the issue of coverage. The Court of Appeals found that Alabama law was uncertain in regard to the interpretation of several pertinent phrases in the insurance contract and concluded that this was a proper case for certification. The Court of Appeals therefore has certified the following questions to this court:

'1. Whether as a matter of Alabama law the word 'alighting' contained in clause (c) of the Insuring Agreement of the subject insurance contract can be construed to include the activity in which the insured was engaged at the time the chain of events concluding in his injury began.

'2. Whether as a matter of Alabama law the word 'struck' contained in clause (d) of the Insurance Agreement must be construed as requiring some sudden impact rather than any contact resulting from the motive force of the automobile and ending in injury.

'3. Whether as a matter of Alabama law the phrase 'by any automobile, truck or public conveyance' can be construed to include being struck, as defined by the answer to question 2 above, by a tangible object attached or connected to the automobile but not properly part of the automobile itself.

'4. Whether as a matter of Alabama law being pulled down and dragged by a rope attached to a boat which is resting on a boat trailer connected to an automobile, on which the insured was accidentally standing when the automobile started forward, can be construed as being covered under the provisions of clause (d) of the Insuring Agreement.'

As a general rule of Alabama law, an insurance contract will be construed most strongly against the party who framed it. Life Ins. Co. of Georgia v. Miller, 292 Ala. 525, 531, 296 So.2d 900, 905 (1974). The contract of insurance will be construed strictly against the insurer and liberally in favor of the insured. Life Ins. Co. of Georgia v. Miller,supra; Southern Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 214 Ala. 373, 108 So. 5 (1926). Finally, ambiguous provisions of an insurance policy will be construed most strongly against the insurer and in favor of the insured. E.g., National Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Lokey, 166 Ala. 174, 52 So. 45 (1910).

There are two provisions of the policy here involved which the Court of Appeals has asked this court to construe:

(1) 'alighting from * * * any pleasure type automobile' and

(2) 'being struck by an automobile, truck or public conveyance.'

This court has not been presented the occasion, prior to this case, to construe the phrase 'alighting from' as used in an automobile insurance policy. Still, other courts have considered this question and at least two have rendered decisions which seem particularly pertinent to our deliberations.

In the case of Carta v. Providence Washington Indemnity Co., 143 Conn. 372, 122 A.2d 734 (1957), the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut discussed a similar provision stating:

'It is not reasonable to believe that the parties intended the coverage to end for one who gets both feet on the ground after emerging from the vehicle and, while then in the act, let us say, of closing the door is struck by a passing automobile. Some reasonable length of time must be allowed a person, after getting out, for the completion of acts which can reasonably be expected from those in similar situations.'

The court then went on to apply the following negative test in order to determine...

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