Tyler v. People

• Decision Date: 06 June 1860
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Parties: William Tyler v. The People

8 Mich. 320

William Tyler v. The People

Supreme Court of Michigan

June 6, 1860

Heard May 1, 1860 [Syllabus Material] [Syllabus Material] [Syllabus Material] [Syllabus Material] [Syllabus Material] [Syllabus Material] [Syllabus Material] [Syllabus Material] [Syllabus Material]

Error to St. Clair circuit.

The pleadings in this case may be found in 7 Mich. 162. Subsequent to the decision of the questions there passed upon by this court, the plaintiff in error put in a plea of not guilty, was tried, convicted of murder in the second decree, at the November term, 1859, and sentenced to six years' imprisonment in the state prison. Exceptions were filed, and a writ of error taken to this court.

From the bill of exceptions it appears that the defendant requested the court to charge the jury, first: "That, if they believed, from the evidence introduced tending to show it, that the mortal wound of which the deceased, Henry Jones, died in the county of St. Clair, was given by said William Tyler on the river St. Clair, and not within any county of the state of Michigan, that then said mortal would was not given on the high seas, or any other navigable waters, within the meaning of section eight, of chapter one hundred and ninety-two of the Complied Laws of the state of Michigan, that there was no evidence in support of the second count of said indictment; that such offense proved was not cognizable in said circuit court for the county of St. Clair, and that the prisoner must be acquitted." Second: "That if they believed, from the evidence introduced tending to show it, that at the time of the shooting of said Henry Jones, as charged in the indictment, the defendant was a deputy of the marshal of the United States for the district of Michigan, and had in his possession and exhibited at said time, a writ of attachment of said brig Concord, duly issued under the seal of the district court of the United States for the district of Michigan, sitting in admiralty, and that said defendant at said time, was avowedly attempting to execute said writ, as such deputy Marshal, by taking possession of said brig, unmoored and in motion, or riding at anchor in that part of the river St. Clair lying on the Canadian side of the boundary line between the United States and the province of Canada; that said brig was an American vessel, and that said Henry Jones was the master of said brig, and was at said time forcibly, and with deadly weapons, resisting and intending to resist said defendant, and said writ, at all hazards; that then said shooting and killing was excusable homicide, and the prisoner must be acquitted." Third: "That if they believed, from the evidence introduced tending to show it, that the said mortal would was given outside the state of Michigan, and not on the high seas or waters affected by the ebb and flow of the tide, the court has no jurisdiction under either count of the indictment, and the prisoner must be acquitted." All which instructions the court refused to give, and defendant excepted.

The errors assigned were, first: That the circuit court determined the two questions of law held by said court to arise upon the plea of autre fois convict, replication and demurrer, and the issue of law so joined, in favor of the people. Second: That the circuit court overruled the demurrer to the replication. Third: That, whereas, the construction of the said statute of the United States, of March 3d, 1857, was drawn in question by the said plea, replication and demurrer, and a right, privilege and exemption was specially set up and claimed by said William Tyler under the said statute of the United States by his said plea of autre fois convict and demurrer, the said circuit court decided against said right, privilege and exemption so claimed as aforesaid, whereas, by law, said court ought to have decided in favor of the same." Fourth, fifth and sixth: That the court erred in refusing to give to the jury the three several instructions prayed.

Judgment affirmed.

Walker & Russell, for plaintiff in error:

The matters arising upon the first and third assignments are not discussed, because it is not expected that the court will reconsider the opinion in 7 Mich.

1. We content that there is no jurisdiction in the St. Clair court, on the face of the indictment.

There is no allegation of the nationality of the brig Concord, or of Tyler, or of Jones, or of the relation of either of them to the brig. Aside from Comp. L., § 5944, there is no foundation for the first count, as is shown under point 3d below; and this statute is to be construed as strictly as the U. S. statutes, considered by Campbell J., Tyler's Case, 7 Mich., and cases cited.

Offenses committed by foreigners upon American or foreign vessels, or by Americans upon foreign vessels, are not against the dignity of Michigan, and the death within her limits is not an offense.

2. The first instruction prayed was improperly refused. That part of the St. Clair river where the wound was given in this case is within none of the descriptions in the statute. The word "navigable" does not cover it. It is a technical word of the common law, used with high seas, in a penal statute, borrowed from English legislation.

When legislation is upon subjects relating to courts and legal proceedings, or is borrowed from old statutes, we are to consider the legislature as speaking technically in respect to the subject matter, and employing a given word in its established sense: Dwarris Stat., 670, 693, 696; Sedgwick Stat. Law, 261, 262, 263; 6 Mod. 143; Campbell J., 7 Mich. 211.

The language is "high seas or any other navigable waters;" i. e., any waters of like character with the sea; salt and tide--bays, creeks and rivers, connected with the sea: 7 Mich. 211; and see Sedgwick, 437.

Penal statutes are strictly construed, i. e., "when there is a doubt, the judiciary will not so construe as to inflict a punishment which the legislature may not have intended:" Sedgwick, 327; see also 324, 336, 333.

If it be said that the words "within the state," apply to the phrase "navigable waters," and that, therefore, fresh waters must have been intended, we reply that those words apply to the word land, just previously used, according to grammatical construction; but, if not, they apply to "high seas" as much as to "navigable waters," and there are no high seas in the state.

It is no answer to say that the word "navigable," in § 21, 1 Comp. L., 194, referring to streams in this state, is not made use of in the common law sense, as well as in article 18, § 4 of the constitution. The word in these instances means simply floatable streams. See Moore v. Sanborne, 2 Mich. 519. The word "land" covers such streams. The common law knows no waters, in description of locality, except salt and tide.

And it has been expressly held by this court that the Detroit and St. Clair rivers are land covered by water, susceptible of private ownership, and, although public streams, yet not navigable in the legal sense: People v. Tyler, 7 Mich., Lorman v. Benson, ante, p. 18.

3. Aside from the statute, the St. Clair court would have no jurisdiction if the injury was inflicted out of the county. This statute, and § 7 previous, were copied from the Massachusetts act of 1795, c. 45; 2 Pick. 550, 559. That was from statute Edw. VI., passed before the settlement of this country: Ibid., 558; 1 Russ. Cr., 101, 554, citing 9 Geo. IV., c. 31.

The second count alleges that the wound was given in St. Clair county, at Port Huron. Under the instruction prayed, as to the locality of the shooting, there would be no evidence in support of that count, and there being none under the first count, unless the St. Clair, in Canada, be navigable waters, the instruction prayed should have been given.

4. The plaintiff in error had a right to arrest the "Concord" in the waters of the St. Clair on the Canadian side of the boundary line, the process being regular on its face. By the law of nations, and by the treaty of 1842, the right of passage with vessels was secured; by the constitution of 1789, and the act of 1845, the United States acquired admiralty jurisdiction over the lakes and connecting waters--not common law civil jurisdiction, but the right to take cognizance of matters of contract and tort concerning vessels, the instruments of commerce; and, as a necessary consequence, the right to take possession of vessels, in exercising jurisdiction. To arrest an American vessel in the waters in question is not the exercise of sovereign power over the territory of Canada, but over movable parts of our territory, which, on being moved into these waters, common for passage, and under admiralty jurisdiction, do not lose their subjection to our process, by becoming subject also to the foreign law. The deputy marshal is invested with official power while upon an American vessel in admiralty waters, although those waters may be subject to the absolute territorial jurisdiction of Canada. Border navigable waters are like the high seas for practical maritime purposes. Territorial jurisdiction over the lakes is mere abstraction. Who can give any county, state or province, as the scene of the battle of lake Erie?

For such purposes these waters are common, and both Canadian and United States jurisdiction may subsist together over the same vessels in some sort, as state and federal jurisdiction subsist over the same vessels on this side. The United States authority, of course, can be exercised only as against private persons in possession of our vessels, and could not interfere with local authority.

This power to take the ship is a highly different thing from the power to arrest a criminal. Our commerce can not be "regulated" unless the power to...