Tyler v. Schoenherr

• Decision Date: 12 July 2012
• Docket Number: No. 2011AP2075.,2011AP2075.
• Citation: 344 Wis.2d 124,820 N.W.2d 156,2012 WI App 97
• Parties: David TYLER and Karen Tyler, Plaintiffs–Respondents, v. Jacqueline SCHOENHERR, Defendant–Appellant, Associated Banc–Corp., Defendant.
• Court: Wisconsin Court of Appeals

344 Wis.2d 124

820 N.W.2d 156

2012 WI App 97

David TYLER and Karen Tyler, Plaintiffs–Respondents,

v. Jacqueline SCHOENHERR, Defendant–Appellant,Associated Banc–Corp., Defendant.

No. 2011AP2075.

Court of Appeals of Wisconsin.

July 12, 2012.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HEREAppeal from a judgment of the circuit court for Clark County: Thomas T. Flugaur, Judge. Affirmed.

Before VERGERONT, HIGGINBOTHAM and BLANCHARD, JJ.¶ 1BLANCHARD, J.

This case involving a property boundary line dispute resulted in a trial to the circuit court, after which the court entered judgment for reformation of a real estate warranty deed in favor of David and Karen Tyler. Neighboring property owner Jacqueline Schoenherr appeals that judgment.

¶ 2 Schoenherr argues that the circuit court erred in concluding that the Tylers' complaint: (1) alleges a claim for reformation; (2) pleads mistake with sufficient particularity; and (3) is not barred by the six-year statute of limitations for “action on contract,” under Wis. Stat. § 893.43 (2009–10). ¹ In addition, Schoenherr argues that the court erred in finding at trial that the Tylers proved by clear and convincing evidence that there was a mutual mistake meriting reformation of the deed conveying real estate to the Tylers in 2000.

¶ 3 For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment.

BACKGROUND

¶ 4 Relevant history begins with a parcel of property owned by Linda and William Ganther. The Ganthers' parcel included farm land, a single-family residence, and various farm structures (such as a dairy barn, silo, and various sheds and coops). When the Ganthers put the parcel up for sale in 1993, one potential buyer, Larry Naedler, wanted to buy only the farm-related portions of the parcel, not the residence and not the real property or improvements immediately surrounding the residence. As the circuit court summarized the evidence, Naedler was a farmer who “had no use for the homestead.”

¶ 5 Consistent with this goal, in the fall of 1993, Naedler and his father, Marvin Naedler, “measured off” and then drove stakes into the ground to delineate all farm-related property, including farmland, the barn, a silo, and a steel pole machine shed—as distinguished from house-related property, such as the house itself and some structures near the house. Marvin Naedler testified that the stakes created a boundary line that “would work out for Larry's [Naedler's] interests” in raising crops. The Naedlers drove the stakes with permission from the Realtor handling the sale for the Ganthers and the Realtor visited the property after the stakes were in and inspected it without objecting to the placement of the stakes.

¶ 6 Subsequently, in early 1994, the Ganthers sold their parcel in two separate transactions: one warranty deed executed and recorded in January 1994 conveyed to Larry Naedler farm land and property that included the barn, but not the single-family residence; a second warranty deed executed and recorded in March 1994 conveyed the single-family residence and a surrounding area to Harry Burkhalter.

¶ 7 The stakes were still in place when Burkhalter purchased the residence-related property, and they remained in place until the summer of 1994, when Burkhalter removed them so that he could mow the lawn around his house, the barn, and a machine shed.

¶ 8 In October 2000, Harry and Michelle Burkhalter sold the residence-related property to Schoenherr, who is Harry Burkhalter's sister. In November 2000, Larry Naedler sold the farm-related property to the Tylers, through an executed and recorded warranty deed conveying real estate that is the focus of this case.

¶ 9 In 2010, a disagreement over an issue unrelated to the boundary line at issue here developed between the Tylers and Schoenherr. In the course of that unrelated dispute, the Tylers discovered what they believed was a discrepancy between the recorded boundary line and the actual boundary line. In July 2010, the Tylers filed this action in circuit court naming Schoenherr as a defendant. ² The complaint is described in more detail below, but summarizing briefly here, it recited the legal descriptions reflected on the respective deeds held by Schoenherr and the Tylers. It alleged that property that the Tylers believed to be theirs “may actually be included within the legal description of the Schoenherr Property,” creating an area of “Disputed Property.” The complaint sought relief, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 841.01, ³ declaring the Tylers' “legal interest in the Disputed Property.” The complaint alleged that the Tylers were “entitled to legal ownership of the Disputed Property pursuant to” Wis. Stat. § 706.04 (equitable relief regarding property transactions) or Wis. Stat. § 893.27 (possession based on seven years' uninterrupted adverse possession). Among the prayers for relief was the following: “For declaratory judgment defining [the Tylers] as the legal owners of the Disputed Property and for the execution and recording of the appropriate legal instruments to that effect.”

¶ 10 Following a two-day trial, the court made oral rulings that were subsequently memorialized in a judgment for reformation of the Tylers' deed to include the Disputed Property, which had been included in the property description in the Schoenherr's deed. After the oral rulings and before entry of the judgment, by written order the court denied Schoenherr's motion for reconsideration of the court's denial of Schoenherr's motion to dismiss based on the statute of limitations. The court accomplished the reformation by ordering that the Tylers' deed be reformed to include an “outlot” described in a recorded certified survey map and that Schoenherr “shall have no right, title or interest in” the outlot. Schoenherr appeals the judgment.

DISCUSSION

I. Claim for Reformation

¶ 11 Schoenherr argues that the complaint did not put her or the court “on fair notice that” the Tylers “would seek reformation based on mutual mistake,” and therefore the circuit court should have dismissed the complaint because the only potentially viable claim proven by the Tylers at trial was reformation.⁴ The circuit court concluded that the Tylers' complaint stated a cause of action requesting reformation of the Tylers' deed based on mutual mistake.⁵ For the following reasons, we conclude that the circuit court's legal determination was correct.

¶ 12 Whether a complaint states a claim for relief is a question of law that appellate courts review de novo. Wausau Tile, Inc. v. County Concrete Corp., 226 Wis.2d 235, 245, 593 N.W.2d 445 (1999).

¶ 13 In addressing motions to dismiss for failure to state claims, courts are to:

(1) accept all facts pleaded as true; (2) derive all reasonable inferences from those facts; and (3) construe those facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Thus, a court properly grants a motion to dismiss only if it is clear that “a plaintiff cannot recover under any circumstances.”

Preston v. Meriter Hosp., Inc., 2005 WI 122, ¶ 13, 284 Wis.2d 264, 700 N.W.2d 158 (citations omitted); see also Doe v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 2005 WI 123, ¶ 20, 284 Wis.2d 307, 700 N.W.2d 180 (claims should be dismissed only “if it is ‘quite clear’ that there are no conditions under which ... plaintiff could recover”) (citations omitted).⁶

¶ 14 The requirement that it be “quite clear” that a complaint is inadequate in order to sustain a motion to dismiss is premised on the notice pleading standard, Wis. Stat. § 802.02(1)(a), which provides that a pleading seeking relief

shall contain all of the following:

(a) A short and plain statement of the claim, identifying the transaction or occurrence or series of transactions or occurrences out of which the claim arises and showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.

(b) A demand for judgment for the relief the pleader seeks.

In addition, “[e]ach averment of a pleading shall be simple, concise, and direct. No technical forms of pleading or motions are required.” § 802.02(5). In a similar vein, “[a]ll pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial justice.” § 802.02(6).

¶ 15 However, our supreme court has explained that, while only a “short and plain statement” identifying key facts is required,

a complaint cannot be completely devoid of factual allegations. The notice pleading rule, while intended to eliminate many technical requirements of pleading, nevertheless requires the plaintiff to set forth a statement of circumstances, occurrences and events in support of the claim presented. For example, a claim in negligence must state general facts setting forth that the defendant had knowledge or should have had knowledge of a potential and unreasonable risk. A bare conclusion does not fulfill a plaintiff's duty of stating the elements of a claim in general terms. In short, we will dismiss a complaint if, under the guise of notice pleading, the complaint before us requires the court to indulge in too much speculation leaving too much to the imagination of the court. It is not enough for the plaintiff to contend that the requisite facts will be supplied by the discovery process.

Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 284 Wis.2d 307, ¶ 36, 700 N.W.2d 180 (citations, quotation marks, and brackets omitted).

¶ 16 We begin our analysis by observing that reformation has been described both as “a cause of action,” Vandenberg v. Continental Ins. Co., 2001 WI 85, ¶ 53, 244 Wis.2d 802, 628 N.W.2d 876 (citation omitted), and as a “remedy,” id., ¶ 59. However, in this appeal, the parties generally proceed under the assumption that reformation is a cause of action, so we will do the same. We now summarize what must be shown to prove a reformation claim.

¶ 17 “[A] court in equity can reform written instruments that, by mutual mistake, do not express the true intentions of the parties.” Chandelle Enters., LLC v. XLNT Dairy Farm, Inc., 2005 WI App 110, ¶ 18, 282 Wis.2d 806, 699 N.W.2d 241 (addressing equitable power of court to reform a deed) (citing Van Brunt v. Ferguson, 163 Wis. 540,...