Tyler v. Whitehead
Citation | 583 S.W.2d 240 |
Decision Date | 11 June 1979 |
Docket Number | No. KCD,KCD |
Parties | Melvin Leroy TYLER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Chief Deputy WHITEHEAD and Sheriff Charlie Foster, Defendants-Respondents. 29981. |
Court | Court of Appeal of Missouri (US) |
Gary Oxenhandler, Columbia, for plaintiff-appellant.
Milt Harper, Columbia, for defendants-respondents.
Before SHANGLER, P. J., SWOFFORD, C. J., and WASSERSTROM, J.
The circuit court dismissed plaintiff's petition upon the motion of defendants, and plaintiff has appealed. The defendants asserted several grounds for their motion to dismiss the petition, and the record does not show which of these the court adopted in sustaining the motion. They defend the court's action only on the ground that the petition did not state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Rule 55.27(a)(6).
The petition, omitting formal parts and omitting the prayer for declaratory judgment, for injunctive relief, and for compensatory and punitive damages, reads as follows:
(1) Plaintiff is a prisoner confined to the Boone County jail at Columbia, Missouri.
(2) Defendants are the Sheriff and Chief Deputy Sheriff of Boone County, Missouri.
(c) That defendants willfully and maliciously caused plaintiff to be conferred to a dungeon cell without proper ventilation, exercise, shower, access to news media and equal treatment as other prisoners to hinder, deny or obstruct plaintiff in his right to access to courts.
(d) All defendants' acts were done (without procedural due process) deliberately, willfully and maliciously and without authority of law, without motive, right to be heard, to a hearing, impartial review and to call witnesses, to cross-examination and confrontation.
We have concluded that the petition is sufficient as against a motion to dismiss for failure to state a justiciable claim. We must therefore reverse and remand to the trial court for further proceedings.
We remind ourselves of the familiar procedural rule that in searching the petition for a justiciable claim for relief, as against a motion to dismiss, the petition is viewed favorably to the pleader, giving to the petition the benefit of every reasonable intendment. Butler v. Circulus, Inc., 557 S.W.2d 469, 472 (Mo.App.1977); Euge v. Golden, 551 S.W.2d 928, 931 (Mo.App.1977); Associated Grocers' Co. of St. Louis, Mo. v. Crowe, 389 S.W.2d 395, 399 (Mo.App.1965). The petition under the challenge of a motion to dismiss is judged with broad indulgence. What proof the plaintiff may adduce is quite another thing, but that is no concern of the court at this stage of the case. The presence or absence of viable evidence may be tested short of trial by motion for summary judgment. Rule 74.04.
We believe the petition does state a justiciable claim under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. That statute reads as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
If the petition states a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983, the officers do not enjoy any absolute and unqualified immunity. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967); Cohen v. Norris, 300 F.2d 24, 33 (9th Cir. 1962); Beauregard v. Wingard, 230 F.Supp. 167, 174 (S.D.Cal.1964). 1
A claim for relief under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 is stated if the petition charges, first, conduct which is alleged to have subjected the plaintiff to a deprivation of rights, privileges or immunities secured by the U. S. Constitution, and, second, that such conduct was by one acting under color of state law. Jennings v. Davis, 476 F.2d 1271, 1275 (8th Cir. 1973); Jones v. Hopper, 410 F.2d 1323, 1326 (10th Cir. 1969).
As to the first requirement, the petition does not point to a particular constitutional right of which plaintiff has been deprived, but it need not do so, if we can ascertain from the facts alleged that such a constitutional right exists. Gregg v. State of Tennessee, 425 F.Supp. 394, 395 (E.D.Tenn.1976); Williams v. Stone, 339 F.Supp. 1298, 1299 (E.D.Tenn.1971).
The Eighth Amendment ( ) and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution vouchsafes to prisoners especially to pre-trial detainees who have not been convicted, such as this plaintiff the right to detention facilities providing ventilation, outside exposure, and decent hygiene; the right to access to materials for correspondence and pursuit of litigation; and the right to access to newspapers and the like. O'Bryan v. County of Saginaw, Mich., 437 F.Supp. 582, 599-600 (E.D.Mich.1977); Ahrens v. Thomas, 434 F.Supp. 873 (W.D.Mo.1977), modified on other grounds, 570 F.2d 286 (8th Cir. 1978); Rhem v. Malcolm, 371 F.Supp. 594 (S.D.N.Y.1974), modified on other grounds, 507 F.2d 333 (2d Cir. 1974). In fact,
Pre-trial detainees are no more than defendants waiting for trial, entitled to the presumption of innocence, a speedy trial and all the rights of bailees and other ordinary citizens except those necessary to assure their presence at trial and the security of the prison. In providing for their detention, correctional institutions must be more than mere depositories for human baggage and any deprivation or restriction of the detainees' rights beyond those which are necessary for confinement alone, must be justified by a compelling necessity. Detainees of the Brooklyn House of Detention v. Malcolm, 520 F.2d 392, 397 (2d Cir. 1975).
The petition therefore fairly states a deprivation of rights secured by the United States Constitution.
The petition also states facts sufficient to show the alleged acts were done by the defendants Under color of state law. It therefore satisfied the second requirement. It says that the offending conduct was by the defendants as sheriff and deputy sheriff respectively of Boone County, and that plaintiff was a prisoner in the Boone County jail. The sheriff is charged by state statute with keeping the jail and all its prisoners, § 221.020, RSMo 1969. The deputy sheriff has "all the powers and may perform any of the duties" of the sheriff. § 57.270, RSMo 1969. That statute placed the defendants in position to perform the acts which are complained of, and they were done in connection with the duties which it imposed upon them. Cohen v. Norris, supra; Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961).
We inquire whether a § 1983 action is cognizable in our state courts, or whether the Federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction of such cases. Our Supreme Court has concluded that our state courts have concurrent jurisdiction of these cases with the Federal courts. Shapiro v. Columbia Union Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 576 S.W.2d 310, 316 (Mo. banc 1978). To the same effect, See Brown v. Chastain, 416 F.2d 1012, 1014 (5th Cir. 1969); Young v. Board of Ed. of Fremont County School District, RE-3, 416 F.Supp. 1139, 1140-1141 (D.C.Colo.1976); Bennun v. Board of Governors of Rutgers, 413 F.Supp. 1274, 1278-9 (D.C.N.J.1976); New Times,...
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