Tyre v. Swain
| Citation | 946 A.2d 1189 |
| Decision Date | 13 May 2008 |
| Docket Number | No. 2006-183-Appeal.,2006-183-Appeal. |
| Parties | Richard TYRE and Lisa Tyre, as natural parents and heirs of Shelley Arden Tyre v. David SWAIN, individually and as executor of the estate of Shelley Arden Tyre. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Rhode Island |
J. Renn Olenn, Esq., Warwick, Julie Olenn, Esq., pro hac vice, for Plaintiff.
Anthony R. Leone, Esq., for Defendant.
Present: WILLIAMS, C.J., GOLDBERG, FLAHERTY, SUTTELL, and ROBINSON, JJ.
After years without closure with respect to their daughter's untimely death, the plaintiffs, Richard and Lisa Tyre (collectively plaintiffs), in their capacity as natural parents and heirs of Shelley Arden Tyre, filed this wrongful death action against the defendant, David Swain (defendant).1 The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs, and a judgment was entered declaring that the defendant was a slayer, pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 33-1.1-1(3), and awarding the plaintiffs compensatory damages, with interest, totaling $2,815,085.46 and punitive damages of $2 million, from which judgment the defendant appeals. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.
On March 12, 1999, Shelley Arden Tyre (Shelley), formerly of Jamestown, died while scuba diving off the coast of Tortola in the British Virgin Islands. More than a week later, her husband, defendant, returned to the United States and visited plaintiffs, Shelley's parents, to inform them that he did not know what had happened to Shelley but that he was not diving with her when she drowned.
On March 5, 2002, plaintiffs filed a complaint against defendant in Superior Court in their capacities as Shelley's natural parents and as her heirs. The three-count complaint alleged that defendant (1) was a slayer, pursuant to § 33-1.1-1(3); (2) caused Shelley's wrongful death; and (3) should be subject to civil liability for a criminal act, pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 9-1-2.
Over the next four years, various hearings on pretrial motions and scheduling conferences took place before the trial justice to address the status of defendant's counsel and the trial start date.
The defendant initially was represented by an attorney who handled various matters before the probate court (the probate attorney). Although defendant's probate attorney also entered her appearance in this wrongful death action, she eventually realized that the case was beyond her level of expertise and it was necessary to engage an experienced trial attorney for this complex litigation. With his probate attorney's assistance, defendant retained a trial attorney, who entered his appearance on defendant's behalf in June 2003. Subsequently, however, defendant's trial attorney became seriously ill and was court-excused. Finally, in June 2004, defendant's probate attorney sought to withdraw from representing defendant in the wrongful death action, explaining that she was reluctant to continue representing defendant given her lack of significant trial experience. During a hearing on the motion, the probate attorney further explained that the trial attorney had been defendant's lead trial counsel in the action for the past year and she was not comfortable about taking the lead role in the case. She would, however, continue to represent defendant in the probate matters. Although he was court-excused, defendant's trial attorney appeared at the hearing and stated that he intended to continue as defendant's counsel when he physically was able to do so. The trial attorney was unable to predict precisely when he would be able to return to work, but he remained optimistic and, in light of his doctors' estimations, believed he could resume full-time work on the case in September 2004. The trial justice denied the probate attorney's motion, expressing her concern that allowing the probate attorney to withdraw while the trial attorney was court-excused could result in the proceedings being stayed indefinitely, especially if the trial attorney's condition did not improve. The trial justice did, however, advise defendant to seek alternate counsel if his trial attorney's condition did not improve.
In August 2005, plaintiffs filed a motion to assign the case for a trial date certain. At a hearing on the motion the trial justice indicated her respect for defendant's desire to have his trial attorney represent him, but believed it was necessary to balance that interest with plaintiffs' interest in an accelerated disposition of their case.2 The trial attorney informed the court that he was feeling better in March 2005 and was present for depositions in Tortola that month. However, while in Tortola, his condition worsened and he underwent additional complex surgery in April 2005. With the status of his health uncertain, he informed the court that he was not sure when he would be able to resume working on the case, but was committed to doing so if his health improved.
The trial justice again advised defendant to consider alternate counsel. "The idea of Mr. Swain having to find different trial counsel is no shock here," she noted. Concerned that continuing the case any more would infringe on plaintiffs' rights, the trial justice assigned the case for trial on October 25, 2005.
In October 2005, defendant moved to stay the start of trial. The defendant's trial attorney informed the court that he was physically unable to represent defendant. He suggested that defendant had two potential attorneys willing to represent him, but both would need an extension of the trial date to prepare. The trial justice, however, expressed the view that defendant was responsible for failing to secure alternate counsel sooner. "This is about Mr. Swain and his failure to see the handwriting on the wall, his failure to take reasonabl[e] and necessary precautions by finding substitute or even co-counsel that can try the case a long time ago," she said. Therefore, the trial justice denied defendant's motion for a stay of the trial proceedings.
The defendant petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari to review the trial justice's denial of defendant's motion to stay the trial proceedings, which this Court granted. Almost immediately thereafter, defendant filed for bankruptcy, automatically staying all proceedings in this action. Therefore, this Court dismissed defendant's petition for a writ of certiorari as moot.
After the bankruptcy court stay was lifted, the trial justice held a scheduling conference in December 2005. At that time plaintiffs requested a trial date. Meanwhile, both of defendant's attorneys filed motions to withdraw, which the trial justice granted, subject to the attorneys' completion of some general housekeeping matters. The trial justice also informed defendant that he could request a continuance, but that she was not inclined to grant it.
After defendant candidly informed the trial justice that he did not intend to present a defense at trial, the trial justice scheduled the trial for February 13, 2006.
The following facts were developed at trial.
In March 1999, Tyre and her husband, defendant, a scuba shop owner and dive instructor, were vacationing on the island of Tortola with their friends Christian and Bernice Thwaites, and the Thwaites's nine-year-old son, Matthew. The two families chartered a yacht and spent the week traveling to various sites off the coast of Tortola where they dived once or twice a day. Because Matthew was not diving on the trip, the couples agreed to dive in pairs so that Matthew would not be alone on the boat.
On the last full day of their vacation, the group traveled to a dive site known as the Twin Wrecks. Shelley and defendant dove first. When defendant returned thirty to forty minutes later, Christian finished putting on his scuba gear and entered the water.
After descending approximately eighty feet, Christian reached the sea bed and swam toward the wrecks. As he approached the wrecks, he noticed a yellow fin embedded in the sand and recognized that it belonged to Shelley. Believing that Shelley would be happy that Christian found her fin, he picked it up, intending to return it to her. Continuing on to the wrecks, Christian saw Shelley twenty to thirty feet away. She was on her back with her face pointing toward the surface of the water. Her eyes were open and her scuba mask was missing. Alarmed, Christian swam rapidly toward Shelley, inserted his spare regulator into her mouth to prevent her from taking in more water, and began to ascend with her. When they reached the surface, Christian immediately shouted in the direction of the boat that there was an emergency. While still in the water, he began to administer mouth-to-mouth resuscitation on Shelley. The defendant navigated a tender boat toward Christian and Shelley and, upon reaching them, pulled Shelley up from the water and into the boat. The defendant attempted to resuscitate his wife once or twice using cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR), but he stopped after making two pushes. Christian tried again to resuscitate Shelley, administering both CPR and mouth-to-mouth resuscitation, but he stopped when defendant told him Christian explained that he followed defendant's instruction, believing that defendant, a...
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