Tyree v. Riley
Decision Date | 07 February 1992 |
Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 88-2494 (AJL). |
Citation | 783 F. Supp. 877 |
Parties | George R. TYREE, Plaintiff, v. John H. RILEY, Administrator, United States Department of Transportation, Federal Railroad Administration, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey |
George R. Tyree, pro se.
Michael A. Chagares, Asst. U.S. Atty., Newark, N.J., for defendant.
SUPPLEMENTAL OPINION
This is an employment discrimination action brought by pro se plaintiff George R. Tyree ("Tyree") under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII") against defendant John H. Riley ("Riley"), Administrator of Federal Railroad Administration (the "FRA") of the United States Department of Transportation.1 Jurisdiction is alleged pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343.
On 18 December 1991 Tyree filed a motion for a jury trial and compensatory damages as permitted under the recently enacted Civil Rights Act of 1991 (the "1991 Civil Rights Act") Pub.L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 2000e et seq. (1991).2 On 27 January 1992, this motion was denied by a Letter-Opinion and Order, filed 27 January 1992 (the "27 January 1992 Opinion and Order"). The 27 January 1992 Opinion and Order was a four-page opinion which was designed to put the parties on notice for the trial scheduled for 6 March 1992. This supplemental opinion provides a more detailed rationale behind the 27 January 1992 Opinion and Order.
As discussed below, courts in most of the circuits prior to the enactment of the 1991 Civil Rights Act have almost unanimously denied jury trials in Title VII cases. The 1991 Civil Rights Act, however, specifically provides for jury trials in Title VII cases. At issue is whether this provision applies retroactively to cases that were pending while the 1991 Civil Rights Act was passed and enacted into law.3
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g).
Courts have construed this section to bar compensatory and punitive relief and accordingly have limited Title VII relief to reinstatement and back pay. See, e.g., Eastman v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. and State Univ., 939 F.2d 204, 208 (4th Cir.1991); Swanson v. Elmhurst Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 882 F.2d 1235, 1237 (7th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1036, 110 S.Ct. 758, 107 L.Ed.2d 774 (1990); Bennett v. Corroon & Black Corp., 845 F.2d 104, 106 (5th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1020, 109 S.Ct. 1140, 103 L.Ed.2d 201 (1989).
The right to a jury trial is established by examining the "procedural and remedial sections of the statute creating the right." Cox v. Keystone Carbon Co., 861 F.2d 390, 392 (3d Cir.1988), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 47, 112 L.Ed.2d 23 (1990) ( ). Where the "particular remedial section in the statute provides for only equitable remedies then no right to a jury trial exists." Cox, 861 F.2d at 392 (citations omitted).
In deciding whether a statute provides for a jury trial, courts are to examine the statute's legislative history to determine whether Congress contemplated a jury trial. Id. at 393; Garcia v. PPG Indus., Inc., 139 F.R.D. 63, 64 (D.N.J.1991). If no legislative intent favoring a jury trial is found, courts are to examine whether the Seventh Amendment provides for a jury trial. Cox, 861 F.2d at 393; Garcia, at 64.
The courts of appeals which have examined the statutory framework of Title VII prior to the 1991 Civil Rights Act have been almost unanimous in concluding that Title VII does not afford plaintiffs a right to a jury trial. See, e.g., Ramos v. Roche Products, Inc., 936 F.2d 43, 49-50 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 379, 116 L.Ed.2d 330 (1991); Skinner v. Total Petroleum, Inc., 859 F.2d 1439, 1443-44 (10th Cir.1988); Wade v. Orange County Sheriff's Office, 844 F.2d 951, 953 (2d Cir.1988); Yatvin v. Madison Metro. School Dist., 840 F.2d 412, 418 (7th Cir. 1988); Davis v. West Community Hosp., 786 F.2d 677, 683 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 790 F.2d 890 (5th Cir.1986); see also Great Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366, 374-75, 99 S.Ct. 2345, 2350, 60 L.Ed.2d 957 (1979).4
The Third Circuit has also declined to afford a jury trial to Title VII plaintiffs. See, e.g., Hayes v. Community Gen. Osteopathic Hosp., 940 F.2d 54, 57 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 940, 117 L.Ed.2d 110 (1992) ( ); Andrews v. Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1471 (3d Cir.1990) ( ); Roebuck v. Drexel Univ., 852 F.2d 715, 737 n. 40 (3d Cir.1988) () (citations omitted); Molthan v. Temple Univ., 778 F.2d 955, 960 (3d Cir. 1985) ( ).
The Supreme Court has not expressed a view on whether a Title VII plaintiff is entitled to a jury trial. Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 572, 110 S.Ct. 1339, 1348, 108 L.Ed.2d 519 (1990) (); Lytle v. Household Mfg., Inc., 494 U.S. 545, 549 n. 1, 110 S.Ct. 1331, 1335 n. 1, 108 L.Ed.2d 504 (1990) ( ); Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 211, 109 S.Ct. 2363, 2391, 105 L.Ed.2d 132 (1989), superseded by 1991 Civil Rights Act ( )(Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Lorillard, 434 U.S. at 583-84, 98 S.Ct. at 872 (); Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 196-97, 94 S.Ct. 1005, 1009-10, 39 L.Ed.2d 260 (1974) ( ); see also Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156, 164, 101 S.Ct. 2698, 2703, 69 L.Ed.2d 548 (1981) ( ); Novotny, 442 U.S. at 375, 99 S.Ct. at 2350 (same); see also Garcia, 139 F.R.D. at 66.
Courts which have rejected jury trial rights for Title VII cases focus on whether the text of the statute contemplated equitable relief or legal relief. In Cox, for example, the Third Circuit searched the statute at issue and, finding references only to "equitable relief" and not to "legal relief" in the statute, declined to find a jury trial right existed. 861 F.2d at 393.
The Supreme Court has relied on the same analysis in determining whether a statute provides for a jury trial right. In Lorillard, the Supreme Court considered whether the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, § 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq. (the "ADEA"), allowed for a jury trial. 434 U.S. at 577, 98 S.Ct. at 868. The Supreme Court analyzed the statute and determined that it specifically "empowers a court to grant `legal or equitable relief.'" Id. at 583, 98 S.Ct. at 871.5 Accordingly, the court reasoned:
As for "legal relief" under Title VII, the Lorillard Court stated: "We note that Congress specifically provided for both `legal or equitable relief' in the ADEA, but did not authorize `legal' relief in so many words under Title VII." 434 U.S. at 584, 98 S.Ct. at 872.
The Supreme Court has held that back pay is most accurately characterized as equitable in nature. See Terry, 494 U.S. at 572-73, 110 S.Ct. at 1348-49 ( ); Curtis, 415 U.S. at 197, 94 S.Ct. at 1010 ( ); Lorillard, 434 U.S. at 584, 98 S.Ct. at 872 ( ); see also Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 443, 95 S.Ct. 2362, 2385, 45 L.Ed.2d 280 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (). Accordingly, under case law prior to the 1991 Civil Rights Act, Tyree would not be entitled to a jury trial.6
Section 102(c) of the 1991 Civil Rights Act adds 42 U.S.C. § 1981a which provides:
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