Tyree v. US
Decision Date | 29 July 1993 |
Docket Number | No. 92-CF-78.,92-CF-78. |
Citation | 629 A.2d 20 |
Parties | Hayward G. TYREE, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES, Appellee. |
Court | D.C. Court of Appeals |
Clark U. Fleckinger, II, Silver Spring, MD, for appellant.
D. Shane Read, Asst. U.S. Atty., with whom Jay B. Stephens, U.S. Atty. at time brief was filed, John R. Fisher, Kevin F. Flynn and Thomas C. Black, Asst. U.S. Attys., Washington, DC, were on the brief, for appellee.
Before ROGERS, Chief Judge, STEADMAN and KING, Associate Judges.
Appellant pleaded guilty to carrying a pistol without a license ("license offense")1 and possession of an unregistered firearm ("registration offense").2 He was sentenced to consecutive one year terms for each offense; the sentences were suspended and appellant was placed on probation for two years. Appellant claims that these sentences violate the Double Jeopardy Clause because his conduct constituted a single incident. Thus, he claims it was error to impose consecutive sentences and, therefore, the sentences must merge. We disagree and affirm.
The operative facts are not in dispute. On June 18, 1991, police were called to 4854 Burroughs Avenue, N.E., to respond to an altercation. Upon arrival, witnesses directed the officers to a van parked nearby which was owned by appellant. A handgun was recovered from inside the van. Appellant admitted that the weapon was his, that it was not registered, and that he did not have a license to carry it. He was charged with a number of offenses stemming from the incident but, pursuant to a plea agreement, he entered pleas of guilty to the license offense and the registration offense and was sentenced as indicated.
Appellant contended in his brief, citing Arnold v. United States, 467 A.2d 136 (D.C.1983), that under the evidence presented, the same facts necessarily proved both offenses and the offenses therefore must merge. The government responded by citing Byrd v. United States, 598 A.2d 386, 390 (D.C.1991) (en banc), where we observed that the Because of this observation and our subsequent cases5 interpreting Byrd, counsel for appellant conceded at oral argument that his fact-based argument based on Arnold has no continuing vitality. We agree.
At oral argument, appellant presented a new theory in support of his merger claim that had not been raised in the trial court or in his brief. He observed that the regulations, which were promulgated to implement the license and registration provisions of the two statutes, require that a license to carry be issued only for a specific pistol. See 24 DCMR § 2304.3 (1985).6 Further, the regulations also provide that no license can be issued for a pistol unless the pistol is itself registered. See 24 DCMR § 2304.15 (1985).7 Therefore, he contended that the act of becoming licensed to carry a pistol functionally is the same as that of obtaining a registration for the same pistol. In short, appellant is essentially arguing that because of these requirements the registration offense is included within the license offense, meaning that the registration offense must necessarily be an offense included within the license offense. See Super.Ct.Crim.R. 31(c). But that cannot be so, however, since the registration offense is never proven when the license offense is, unless additional evidence is presented, i.e., evidence that the pistol has not been registered.
We start our analysis by observing that if someone is not licensed to carry a pistol, it does not necessarily follow that the pistol in question is not registered. It may be that in order to obtain a license to carry a particular pistol one must have a registration for that same pistol. That is not the same, however, as saying if one has no license, one therefore has no registration. Indeed, it seems fairly clear that one could lawfully have a registration for the pistol and not have a license to carry it. Thus, an unlicensed person carrying a registered pistol on the street would be guilty of the license offense but not the registration offense. Moreover, it can hardly be said that the registration offense is included within the license offense since the registration offense's coverage is broader on the dominion and control element (possession — broad — versus carrying — narrower), the weapon element (firearm versus pistol)8 and the location of offense element (anywhere in the District versus outside the home, place of business, etc.). And just as one who carries a pistol may be guilty of the license offense and not the registration offense as we observed above, a person carrying an unlicensed and unregistered pistol in his own home would be guilty of the registration offense but not the license offense because of the home, place of business, etc., exception to the license offense's coverage.9
Appellant's argument also fails under the Blockburger analysis which, as we observed earlier in our discussion of Byrd, holds that: "Where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not." Blockburger, supra, 284 U.S. at 304, 52 S.Ct. at 182 (citation omitted). The Blockburger rule was codified in D.C.Code § 23-112 (1989). See Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 691-92, 100 S.Ct. 1432, 1437-38, 63 L.Ed.2d 715 (1980). Thus, in order to avoid merger under the Blockburger test, and § 23-112, each offense must require proof of a fact that the other does not. That is clearly the case with these two offenses. For example, the license offense requires proof of at least four facts which proof of the registration offense does not.10 On the other hand, the registration offense requires proof of non-registration which the license offense does not. Thus, under Blockburger, the two offenses do not merge.11
In sum, appellant contends that consecutive sentences for these offenses cannot be imposed. This court squarely rejected an identical claim in Irby v. United States, 585 A.2d 759, 766 n. 11 (D.C.1991), where we held that the registration offense and the license offense each require "proof of an additional fact which the other offense does not." See also Copening v. United States, 353 A.2d 305, 308 n. 6 (D.C.1976). Therefore the offenses do not merge. Because the offenses do not merge, the trial judge was free to impose consecutive sentences. See D.C.Code § 23-112 (1989).
1 D.C.Code § 22-3204(a) (1992 Supp.). It provides, in pertinent part:
(a) No person shall within the District of Columbia carry either openly or concealed on or about his person, except in his dwelling house or place of business or on other land possessed by him, a pistol, without a license...
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