Tyson et al. v. School Directors of Halifax Township

• Decision Date: 25 June 1866
• Citation: 51 Pa. 9
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court
• Parties: Tyson <I>et al. versus</I> The School Directors of Halifax Township.

Page 9

51 Pa. 9

Tyson et al. versus The School Directors of Halifax Township.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

June 25, 1866.

APPEAL from the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin county, in equity.

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J. C. Kunkel, R. A. Lamberton, and J. W. Simonton, for the appellants.—The object of the association was to free themselves; the only object was to secure its own members from draft. There is no evidence that there was a hope in those giving, that the money would be refunded. It was not the object to free the township.

The object was to be attained by assessing $30 on each member, and soliciting contributions from those not liable. Money so raised, cannot be said to be loaned or "advanced."

It may be doubted that the legislature can require school directors to borrow money to free a township from an impending draft; but certainly it cannot require them to borrow money to pay an existing debt of a bounty association.

The language of the act is imperative; the directors have no discretion. But if they had discretion, all the directors but one being members of the association, they have determined to borrow money to refund to themselves money which they had no thought of receiving back when they paid it.

Before the passage of the law, the township owed them nothing the act creates a debt in their favour, and gives them power to enforce its payment.

It is claimed that the act authorizes the payment for more men than were needed to fill the quota. This act, providing a mode of taxation out of the course of the ordinary laws of taxation, is to be strictly construed: Bennett v. The Borough of Birmingham, 7 Casey 15-17; Goepp v. Borough of Bethlehem, 4 Id. 255.

The wisdom and expediency of the act are not open to discussion. The naked question is, does the statute contravene the fundamental law as contained in the constitution? Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 696; People v. Manhattan Company, 9 Wend. 351. To overthrow the presumption in favour of the constitutionalty of a law, it must appear and be shown to violate the constitution: Ex parte McCullem, 1 Cowen 564; Morris v. The People, 3 Denio 338; Erie v. N. E. R. R. Co., 2 Casey 303.

The Constitution (Art. XI., § 7) prohibits a township from obtaining money for or loaning "its credit to any corporation, association, institution, or party." Statutes such as the present had, before this provision in the constitution, been declared constitutional: Sharpless v. The Mayor of Philadelphia, 9 Harris 147; Commonwealth ex rel. Thomas v. Commissioners of Allegheny County, 8 Casey 218.

The evil of such laws became serious, and the constitution was amended by Article XI. This law is in the teeth of this explicit provision. The money was voluntarily advanced to escape a personal service, with no hope of repayment. It was no debt upon the township, and differs nothing from a subscription to a railroad company; one would be to a corporation, the other to a voluntary association. The act attempted to create a debt against the township, which would be a judicial act, decreeing a liability when none had been incurred. It was therefore unconstitutional: Mengel v. Dentler, 9 Casey 495; Sharpless v. Mayor of Philadelphia, 9 Harris 169; Philadelphia Association v. Wood, 3 Wright 82; Soens v. City of Racine, 10 Wis. 279.

D. Fleming and C. C. Rawn, for appellees.—The proceedings of the association show its object to be to devise means to fill the quota of the "township," avoid the draft, * * * and to raise money to procure volunteers to be "credited to Halifax township." All the other provisions were in harmony with this view and in terrorem, to bring in as many as possible to share the burden.

The legislature had passed a general law, requiring counties and townships to complete all contracts for filling quotas by refunding advancements made. Legislation of the same kind was had by numerous special laws. The action of the people at home, as well as of their representatives, shows that paying bounties was considered a duty which property-holders owed then to their country. This, then, being a debt or moral obligation, does not come within the constitutional prohibition; the association lent its credit to the township. If this act is unconstitutional, all general and special bounty laws, since the commencement of the war, are unconstitutional. These laws, by the almost unanimous consent of the people, have been acquiesced in. This court will not disturb the act unless shown to be clearly unconstitutional.

The opinion of the court was delivered, June 25th 1866, by THOMPSON, J.

The point which will engross our attention in this case is, whether the school directors of Halifax township are authorized, by the special act of the 25th August 1864, to levy and collect a tax to repay money borrowed to reimburse the "Bounty Association of Halifax Township" for money expended by it to procure volunteers to fill the quota of the township under the call of the President therein mentioned for troops. Other questions are incidentally discussed in argument; but the material point is this mentioned, and to it this opinion will be confined, without the expression of any opinion on the others.

The act mentioned "authorizes and requires" the school directors to borrow money to reimburse the "Halifax Bounty Association" moneys advanced to free said township from the draft, &c.

The first inquiry therefore is, were the moneys paid out by the association, advancements in aid of the township within the meaning of the act, or only an appropriation by it of the voluntary contributions of its members to relieve themselves.

The expression "moneys advanced" in its connection in the act must be understood in a business or commercial sense, and that is defined by Webster, to be "giving beforehand, furnishing of something on contract, before an equivalent is received, as money or goods, towards a capital or stock, or on loan. A furnishing of money or goods for others in expectation of reimbursement."

We are bound to regard the statute as an authority to reimburse what was intended by the association as advances made to the township, with the intent or understanding, to be reimbursed or returned to those contributing. This was the light in which the learned judge below regarded the terms used; and unless this appears in support of the present levy by the school directors, they are acting without authority. But the learned judge, if I properly comprehend his meaning, did not give sufficient importance to these terms, and hence I apprehend he fell into error. He does not seem to have considered it material whether the association paid its money voluntarily in aid of its own members, or expressly to aid the township in saving its people from a draft, with the understanding that it was advanced in the character of a loan, if the legislature chose to direct its repayment, and the school directors chose to act upon the authority conferred. This we cannot agree to. Such an enactment would not be legislation at all. It would be in the nature of judicial action it is true, but wanting the justice of notice to parties to be affected by the hearing, trial, and all that gives sanction and force to regular judicial proceedings; it would much more resemble an imperial rescript than constitutional legislation; first, in declaring an obligation where none was created or previously existed; and next in...