Tyson v. Access Servs.

• Decision Date: 25 January 2016
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO. 15-4653
• Citation: 158 F.Supp.3d 309
• Parties: Beth Tyson, Plaintiff, v. Access Services, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania

158 F.Supp.3d 309

Beth Tyson, Plaintiff,

v.Access Services, Defendant.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 15-4653

United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania.

Signed January 25, 2016

John S. Harrison, Broughal & Devito, LLP, Bethlehem, PA, for Plaintiff.

Matthew Fontana, Buchanan Ingersoll & Rooney PC, Philadelphia, PA, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM RE: DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS

Baylson

, District Judge.

I. Introduction

In this employment discrimination and retaliation case, plaintiff Beth Tyson (“Ms. Tyson” or “Plaintiff”) alleges that defendant Access Services (“Access” or “Defendant”), her former employer, violated the Americans With Disabilities Act (“ADA” or the “Act”) by discriminating against her for her association with qualified individuals, as that term is used in the Act, and for retaliation against her. Access has moved to dismiss Ms. Tyson's complaint in its entirety under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6)

, arguing that it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. For the following reasons, the Court will grant Access's motion and dismiss Ms. Tyson's complaint with leave to replead.

II. Procedural History

Ms. Tyson filed her complaint (the “Complaint”) on August 14, 2015. (Compl., Dkt. 1). Ms. Tyson's two-count Complaint alleges violations of the ADA based on Access's discrimination for her association with—and advocacy for—Access's disabled clients, and retaliation. (Compl. 4-6).

Access filed the present Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)

on October 23, 2015 (Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss (“Def.'s Br.”), Dkt. 3). Ms. Tyson filed a response on November 9, 2015 (Pl.'s Response in Opp'n (“Pl.'s Opp'n”), Dkt. 5), to which Access responded in further support of its Motion on November 16, 2015 (Def.'s Reply to Pl.'s Response (“Def.'s Reply”), Dkt. 7).

III. Factual Allegations

In considering this motion to dismiss, the Court accepts Plaintiff's well-pleaded factual allegations as true.

Ms. Tyson was employed by Access for almost four years, during which time she acted as Lifesharing Coordinator. (Compl. ¶ 7). As Lifesharing Coordinator, Ms. Tyson's responsibilities included arranging services for disabled clients, which disabilities included bipolar disorder

, schizophrenia, autism, and cerebral palsy. (Compl. ¶¶ 9-10). Through her role as Lifesharing Coordinator, Ms. Tyson advocated for the rights of these disabled clients. (Compl. ¶ 11). In her role as Lifesharing Coordinator, Ms. Tyson received favorable performance reviews. (Compl. ¶ 23).

In late 2013, a new supervisor started. (Compl. ¶ 12). Thereafter, Ms. Tyson was repeatedly prevented from providing necessary assistance to Access's disabled clients. (Compl. ¶ 12). First, Ms. Tyson fought to keep a disabled patient with cerebral palsy

at home when Access opted for the cheaper option of placing the client in a nursing home. (Compl. ¶ 13). Second, Access charged a disabled client's provider for bed bug removal over Ms. Tyson's objection that the cost of the bed bug removal should be borne by Access. (Comp. 13). Finally, when Access demanded Ms. Tyson prohibit a client with slight mental retardation from driving, Ms. Tyson complained that such action was not only illegal but detrimental to the client's well-being. (Compl. 13).

Around this same time, Ms. Tyson complained to her supervisors that Access was not only failing to meet the needs of disabled clients, but also discriminating against them. (Compl. ¶ 14). After such complaints, Access faulted Ms. Tyson's performance and disciplined her. (Compl. ¶¶ 16-17). On December 17, 2013, Access suspended Ms. Tyson without pay. (Compl. ¶ 18). When Ms. Tyson inquired as to the cause of her suspension, she received a perfunctory “I don't know” in response. (Compl. ¶ 19). On January 14, 2014, Access terminated Ms. Tyson. (Compl. ¶ 20). Ms. Tyson alleges that there are other employees, similarly situated to her but who did not advocate for the rights of disabled clients, who Access did not unjustly discipline. (Compl. ¶ 27).

On September 24, 2014, Ms. Tyson filed a Charge alleging disability discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), and received a right to sue letter. (Compl. ¶ 4).

IV. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review

The Court has jurisdiction over Plaintiff's federal claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331

. Venue is proper in this District pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2).

When deciding a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

, the Court may look only to the facts alleged in the complaint. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel , 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir.1994). The Court must accept as true all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Angelastro v. Prudential–Bache Sec., Inc. , 764 F.2d 939, 944 (3d Cir.1985).

A valid complaint requires only “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)

. “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). Iqbal clarified that the Court's decision in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) “expounded the pleading standard for ‘all civil actions.’ ” Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 684, 129 S.Ct. 1937.

The Court in Iqbal

explained that, although a court must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in a complaint, that requirement does not apply to legal conclusions; therefore, pleadings must include factual allegations to support the legal claims asserted. Id. at 678, 684, 129 S.Ct. 1937. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (citing Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ); see also Phillips v. County of Allegheny , 515 F.3d 224, 232 (3d Cir.2008) (“We caution that without some factual allegation in the complaint, a claimant cannot satisfy the requirement that he or she provide not only ‘fair notice,’ but also the ‘grounds' on which the claim rests.”) (citing Twombly , 550 U.S. at 556 n. 3, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). Accordingly, to survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plead “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (citing Twombly , 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). To evaluate whether a plaintiff has met this standard the Third Circuit has instructed:

First, the court must take note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim. Second, the court should identify allegations that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth. Finally, where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.

Santiago v. Warminster Twp. , 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir.2010)

(citations, alteration, footnote, and internal quotation marks omitted). In doing so, the court must “also disregard ‘naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.’ ” Id. at 131 (quoting Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 ).

V. Discussion

The ADA prohibits employers from discriminating against “a qualified individual on the basis of disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a)

. The Act defines a “qualified individual” as “an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions” of the job. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). The protections of the ADA are not limited to disabled employees. “Discrimination” includes adverse employment actions against qualified individuals because of their association with a disabled individual. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(4). Specifically, the Act provides that employers are prohibited from “excluding or otherwise denying equal jobs or benefits to a qualified individual because of the known disability of an individual with whom the qualified individual is known to have a relationship or association.” Id. Accordingly, the ADA prohibits employers from taking adverse employment actions against employees because of their own condition, as well as employees deemed protected “because of the known disability of an individual with whom the qualified individual is known to have a relationship or association.” Reddinger v. Hosp. Central Servs., Inc. , 4 F.Supp.2d 405, 408 (E.D.Pa.1998). This type of discrimination has been referred to as “association” discrimination. See Dollinger v. State Ins. Fund , 44 F.Supp.2d 467, 480 (N.D.N.Y.1999).

The ADA also protects against retaliatory action, stating that “no person shall discriminate against any individual because such individual has opposed any act or practice made unlawful by” the ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a)

.

Ms. Tyson brings claims under the ADA for both associational discrimination and retaliation. The Court takes each claim in turn.

A. Plaintiff's ADA Associational Discrimination Claim Fails as a Matter of Law

The ADA's “association provision” protects qualified individuals from employment discrimination based on the “known disability of an individual with whom the qualified individual is known to have a relationship or association.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(4)

. While the Third Circuit has not enunciated a test for purposes of establishing associational discrimination,¹ it has enumerated certain circumstances under which a plaintiff might establish such a claim:

(1) termination based on a disabled relative's perceived health care costs to the company; (2) termination based on fear of an employee contracting or spreading a relative's disease; (3) termination because an employee is somewhat distracted by a relative's disability, yet not so distracted that he requires accommodations to satisfactorily perform

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