Tyson v. Frutchey

• Decision Date: 21 December 1927
• Docket Number: 493.
• Citation: 140 S.E. 718,194 N.C. 750
• Parties: TYSON v. FRUTCHEY.
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

140 S.E. 718

194 N.C. 750

TYSON v. FRUTCHEY.

No. 493.

Supreme Court of North Carolina

December 21, 1927

Appeal from Superior Court, Montgomery County; Schenck, Judge.

Suit by Spencer Tyson against L. D. Frutchey. Judgment for plaintiff and defendant appeals. Reversed.

Owner loaning truck to another held not liable for injuries in collision without evidence that borrower's driver was incompetent.

The plaintiff instituted suit against the defendant for damages for injury to his automobile, resulting, as plaintiff alleged, from the negligence of the defendant. Upon the issues submitted to the jury there was a verdict for the plaintiff for $200. From judgment upon the verdict, the defendant appealed.

Armstrong & Armstrong, and Claudius Dockery, all of Troy, for appellant.

B. S Hurley, of Troy, and M. C. Lisk, of Wadesboro, for appellee.

BROGDEN J.

There was sufficient evidence of the negligent operation of defendant's truck by the driver thereof to be submitted to the jury, but the real question in the case is whether or not the defendant is liable in damages for such negligent operation.

The undisputed testimony discloses the following facts: The defendant is a farmer and a merchant. On August 29, 1924, he owned a truck which he used in connection with his mercantile business. Bennett Robinson was a tenant living upon the land of the defendant and paying for the use of the land a stipulated rental. Robinson asked the defendant to loan him the truck for the purpose of going to church. The defendant told Robinson that, as his sight was impaired, he would not lend him the truck for such purpose unless he should procure a competent driver. Robinson then went off and thereafter returned and informed the defendant that he could get one Robert Chambers to drive the truck. Whereupon the defendant consented that Robinson could use the truck for the purpose requested. There is no evidence that Chambers was an incompetent driver. At the time the truck left defendant's possession it was in good condition. Chambers did all the driving. In returning from church the evidence tended to show that defendant's truck driven by Chambers collided with the plaintiff's automobile, resulting in the injury complained of.

Upon these admitted facts the principle announced in Reich v Cone, 180 N.C. 267, 104 S.E. 530, applies and determines the rights of the parties. In that case Clark, C.J., said:

"When a

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