Tyson v. Superintendent Houtzdale SCI
Decision Date | 24 September 2020 |
Docket Number | No. 19-1391,19-1391 |
Citation | 976 F.3d 382 |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit |
Parties | Aaron Edmonds TYSON, Appellant v. SUPERINTENDENT HOUTZDALE SCI; Attorney General Pennsylvania |
Michael Wiseman [ARGUED], Wiseman & Schwartz, 718 Arch Street, Suite 702, Philadelphia, PA 19106, Counsel for Appellant
Andrew M. Kroeckel [ARGUED], Mark S. Matthews, Monroe County Office of District Attorney, 701 Main Street, Second Floor, Stroudsburg, PA 18360, Counsel for Appellee
Before: JORDAN, RESTREPO and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges
Aaron Edmonds Tyson handed his gun to Otis Powell and waited in the getaway car while Powell shot and killed two men in a stopped van. A jury in Monroe County, Pennsylvania, convicted Tyson of two counts of first-degree murder as an accomplice. In seeking post-conviction relief in state court, Tyson claimed his trial counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the court's erroneous instruction, which he argued allowed the jury to find him guilty without finding he possessed the requisite intent to kill. After the state court deemed the claim meritless, Tyson pursued a habeas petition. The District Court held the state court reasonably applied federal law in finding his trial counsel was not ineffective and denied relief. For the reasons set forth below, we disagree and will reverse the District Court.
The Pennsylvania Superior Court summarized the facts of this case as follows:
Commonwealth v. Tyson , 947 A.2d 834 (Pa. Super. 2008) (unpublished memorandum) at 6-8, appeal denied , 605 Pa. 686, 989 A.2d 917 (Pa. 2009).
Brothers Daniel and Keith Fotiathis died from the gunshot wounds inflicted by Powell. Tyson was charged with being an accomplice to two counts of first and third-degree murder and tried by jury in May of 2006. Kasine George, who was later arrested on unrelated drug charges, provided information to the police and testified for the Commonwealth at trial. Tyson was found guilty as an accomplice to the first-degree murders of the Fotiathis brothers. In July 2006, the trial court sentenced him to the mandatory term of life imprisonment without parole.
Under Pennsylvania law, the specific intent to kill is an element of first-degree murder. Commonwealth v. Thomas , 194 A.3d 159, 167 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 2018). To be guilty as an accomplice in Pennsylvania, a person must act with the same intention of promoting or facilitating the crime as the principal. 18 Pa.C.S. § 306(c), (d). Thus, to be guilty as an accomplice to first-degree murder, the state must prove the accused possessed the specific intent to kill. Commonwealth v. Speight , 578 Pa. 520, 854 A.2d 450, 460 (2004). See also Everett v. Beard , 290 F.3d 500, 513 (3d Cir. 2002) () (abrogated on other grounds, Porter v. McCollum , 558 U.S. 30, 130, 130 S.Ct. 447, 175 L.Ed.2d 398 (2009) ).
At trial, the Commonwealth's theory of the case was that Tyson was guilty because he assisted the principal, Powell. In his closing argument, the prosecutor stated that the "rule" in Pennsylvania is "if you help a shooter kill, you are as guilty as a shooter." A-885. He expounded on this statement with an analogy:
So in a bank robbery, when there's a look out sitting outside the bank and he tells his friends who are armed now, don't go shooting any bank guards. Go and get the money and come back out. And I am going to stay in the car and we will drive off and live happily ever after. And the two friends go in a shoot a bank guard. Guess what? He is as guilty as they are even though he told them not to shoot because the law can sometimes be sensible, especially with a criminal.
A-885-86. The prosecutor concluded the explanation by stating that A-886.
The Commonwealth's explanation of accomplice liability was a misstatement of Pennsylvania law. The court's jury instruction reinforced this misstatement and similarly failed to convey that an accomplice to first-degree murder must possess the intent to kill. After emphasizing that Tyson was charged as an accomplice, not the principal, the court defined both first and third-degree murder by focusing entirely on the mental state of "the killer." A-926. In explaining the elements of first-degree murder, the court mistakenly identified Powell as the accomplice and told the jury he committed an intentional killing, stating that A-927. The instruction was further marred by the court mistakenly naming the elements of first-degree murder as the elements of third-degree murder.
The court's instruction for accomplice liability was general and not tied to either murder charge. Instead, the court explained that Tyson "is an accomplice if with the intent to promote or facilitate the commission of a crime he encourages, requests or commands the other person to commit it or agrees or aids or agrees to aid or attempts to aid the other person in planning, organizing, committing it." A-930 (emphasis added). The court finished its explanation with a circular statement: "You may find [Tyson] guilty on the theory that he was an accomplice as long as you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the crime was committed; that [Tyson] was an accomplice of the person who actually committed the crime." A-930. The court failed to mention that, under Pennsylvania law, an accomplice to first-degree murder must intend to promote or facilitate a killing.
After the instruction concluded, the court entertained the jury's request for clarification on the degrees of murder. It reiterated the elements of first and third-degree murder, this time correctly, but again focused entirely on the intent of the "killer" without citing the requisite mens rea of the accomplice. A-948. It then practically directed the jury to find for first-degree murder because, "in this particular case," the charge of being an accomplice "almost by definition ... encompasses the concept of first degree murder," while the charge of accomplice to third-degree murder is "offered as another possibility even though it does not fit as well within the confines of the explanation because counsel agreed you may consider that as a possibility." A-950-51.1
Tyson appealed to the Pennsylvania Superior Court, raising numerous claims not relevant to this appeal, and the court affirmed his conviction of two counts of accomplice to first-degree murder. In November 2010, Tyson filed a timely pro se petition and accompanying brief in accordance with the Post-Conviction Relief Act (PCRA) before the trial court. In his petition, Tyson stated he was "deprived of his Constitutional Rights to Due Process and right to effective assistance of counsel." A-172. In the accompanying brief, Tyson articulated that Pennsylvania law requires proof that an accomplice to first-degree murder possess the specific intent to the kill. A-178. He alleged that the trial court's instruction did not convey this burden of proof to the jury, in violation of his due process rights under federal law. A-179.
Counsel was appointed and filed an amended PCRA petition, which expounded upon Tyson's claim that, based on federal law, trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the trial court's instruction. PCRA counsel argued an objection was warranted because "[t]he instruction as given could easily have confused the jury as to what kind of intent must be shown beyond a reasonable doubt." A-182.
A PCRA hearing was held before the trial court in October 2011. Tyson's post-conviction counsel questioned trial counsel about his failure to object to the accomplice instruction; trial counsel responded that he did not remember the charge. A-973. In...
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