Tyson v. Town of Ramapo

• Decision Date: 25 March 2019
• Docket Number: No. 17-CV-4990 (KMK),17-CV-4990 (KMK)
• Parties: YOLANDA D. TYSON, Plaintiff, v. THE TOWN OF RAMAPO; CHRISTOPHER P. ST. LAWRENCE, as Town Supervisor; YITZCHOK ULLMAN, as Councilman; SAMUEL TRESS, as Councilman; BRENDEL CHARLES aka BRENDEL LOGAN, as Councilwoman; PATRICK J. WITHERS, as Councilman; BRAD R. WEIDEL, as Chief of Police, Police Department Town of Ramapo; PETER F. BROWER, as Former Chief of Police, Police Department Town of Ramapo; and THOMAS COKELEY, as Captain, Police Department Town of Ramapo, each sued individually and in their official capacities as employees of THE TOWN OF RAMAPO, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

YOLANDA D. TYSON, Plaintiff, v. THE TOWN OF RAMAPO; CHRISTOPHER P. ST. LAWRENCE,as Town Supervisor; YITZCHOK ULLMAN, as Councilman; SAMUEL TRESS,as Councilman; BRENDEL CHARLES aka BRENDEL LOGAN,as Councilwoman; PATRICK J. WITHERS, as Councilman; BRAD R. WEIDEL,as Chief of Police, Police Department Town of Ramapo; PETER F. BROWER,as Former Chief of Police, Police Department Town of Ramapo;and THOMAS COKELEY, as Captain, Police Department Town of Ramapo,each sued individually and in their official capacities as employees of THE TOWN OF RAMAPO, Defendants.

No. 17-CV-4990 (KMK)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

March 25, 2019

OPINION & ORDER

Appearances:

Eric Sanders, Esq.

The Sanders Firm, P.C.

New York, NY

Counsel for Plaintiff

Steven C. Stern, Esq.

Alison Cullen, Esq.

Sokoloff Stern, LLP

Carle Place, NY

Counsel for Defendants

KENNETH M. KARAS, District Judge:

Plaintiff Yolanda D. Tyson ("Plaintiff") brings this action against the Town of Ramapo (the "Town" or "Ramapo"), Town Supervisor Christopher P. St. Lawrence ("St. Lawrence"), Councilman Yitzchok Ullman ("Ullman"), Councilman Samuel Tress ("Tress"), Councilwoman Brendel Charles aka Brendel Logan ("Brendel"), Councilman Patrick J. Withers ("Withers"), Chief of Police of the Police Department of the Town of Ramapo ("Ramapo PD") Brad R. Weidel ("Weidel"), former Ramapo PD Chief of Police Peter F. Brower ("Brower"), and Ramapo PD Captain Thomas Cokeley ("Cokeley") (collectively, "Defendants"), alleging that Defendants discriminated against her on the basis of gender and race, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the New York State Human Rights Law ("NYSHRL"), N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, when they denied her certain benefits and accommodations after she suffered work-related injuries and when they ultimately terminated her as a Police Officer with the Ramapo PD. (See Am. Compl. (Dkt. No. 43).) Before the Court is Defendants' Motion To Dismiss the Amended Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (Not. Of Mot. (Dkt. No. 48).). For the following reasons, Defendants' Motion is granted in part and denied in part.

I. Background

A. Materials Considered

As a threshold matter, the Court considers the proper treatment of exhibits submitted by Defendants in support of their Motion. Defendants filed several exhibits along with the instant Motion To Dismiss. (See Decl. of Steven C. Stern, Esq. ("Stern Decl.") (Dkt. No. 49).) Exhibit A is a copy of the decision In the Matter of the Application of Yolanda D. Tyson v. Town of Ramapo, Index. No. 001012/2016, by the New York Supreme Court for the County of Rockland, dated April 5, 2017. (See Stern Decl. Ex. A.) Exhibit B is a copy of Hearing Officer William E.Sherwood's Decision, dated May 9, 2015, In the Matter of 207-c Application of Police Officer Yolanda Tyson ("Section 207-c Decision"), and the "Agreed Statement of Facts" jointly submitted by the parties in that proceeding. (See Stern Decl. Ex. B.) Exhibit C is a copy of the January 29, 2016 and May 18, 2016 letters (respectively, "January 29, 2016 Letter" and "May 18, 2016 Letter") referenced by Plaintiff in the Amended Complaint. (See Stern Decl. Ex. C.) Additionally, on October 12, 2018, counsel for Defendants submitted a letter alerting the Court that the New York State Appellate Division affirmed the state trial court's determination in Plaintiff's Article 78 proceeding, and attached the Appellate Division Decision. (See Letter from Steven C. Stern, Esq. to Court (Dkt. No. 54); Tyson v. Town of Ramapo, 85 N.Y.S.3d 569 (App. Div. 2018).)

Plaintiff argues at length that the Court may not consider these exhibits because that would impermissibly convert Defendants' Motion To Dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. (Pl.'s Mem. of Law in Opp'n to Mot. To Dismiss ("Pl.'s Mem.") 5-10 (Dkt. No. 52).) Defendants correctly point out that the state court opinions and the decision of the hearing officer are matters of public record that the Court may take judicial notice of, and that the two letters are incorporated by reference into Plaintiff's Amended Complaint. (See Defs.' Mem. of Law in Further Supp. of Mot. To Dismiss ("Defs.' Reply") 1-2 (Dkt. No. 53).)

Generally, "[i]n adjudicating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a district court must confine its consideration to facts stated on the face of the complaint, in documents appended to the complaint or incorporated in the complaint by reference, and to matters of which judicial notice may be taken." Leonard F. v. Isr. Disc. Bank of N.Y., 199 F.3d 99, 107 (2d Cir. 1999) (quotation marks omitted). "To go beyond the allegations in the [c]omplaint would convert the . . . motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment." Thomas v. Westchester County Health Care Corp.,232 F. Supp. 2d 273, 275 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). There are a few notable exceptions to this rule. In addition to the complaint, a court ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion "may consider . . . any written instrument attached to the complaint as an exhibit[,] or any statements or documents incorporated in it by reference," as well as "matters of which judicial notice may be taken, and documents either in [the] plaintiffs' possession or of which [the] plaintiffs had knowledge and relied on in bringing suit." Kalyanaram v. Am. Ass'n of Univ. Professors at N.Y. Inst. of Tech., Inc., 742 F.3d 42, 44 n.1 (2d Cir. 2014) (alterations and quotation marks omitted); Wang v. Palmisano, 157 F. Supp. 3d 306, 317 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (same).

"To be incorporated by reference, the [c]omplaint must make a clear, definite[,] and substantial reference to the documents." Thomas, 232 F. Supp. 2d at 275. Additionally, even if not attached or incorporated by reference, a document upon which the complaint "solely relies and which is integral to the complaint may be considered by the court in ruling on such a motion." Roth v. Jennings, 489 F.3d 499, 509 (2d Cir. 2007) (emphasis and quotation marks omitted). Documents are "integral" where the plaintiff had to rely on their content "in order to explain what the actual unlawful course of conduct was on which the [d]efendants embarked." Thomas, 232 F. Supp. 2d at 276; see also Munno v. Town of Orangetown, 391 F. Supp. 2d 263, 269 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (finding documents were integral to the complaint where the plaintiff "relied heavily upon [them] in framing the [c]omplaint"); Gantt v. Ferrara, No. 15-CV-7661, 2017 WL 1192889, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2017) (same). Additionally, "no serious question as to [the document's] authenticity can exist." Kramer v. Time Warner Inc., 937 F.2d 767, 774 (2d Cir. 1991). Here, Plaintiff expressly cites to the January 29, 2016 and May 18, 2016 letters related to her termination in her Amended Complaint and discusses them at some length. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 61-64.) These letters relate to her termination, which is a matter at the core of thiscase. The letters attached as Exhibit C are thus incorporated by reference and the Court may consider them.

The Court also is entitled to take notice of matters of public records. See Pani v. Empire Blue Cross Blue Shield, 152 F.3d 67, 75 (2d Cir. 1998) (noting that "a district court may rely on matters of public record in deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), including case law and statutes"); Medcalf v. Thompson Hine LLP, 84 F. Supp. 3d 313, 321 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) ("In considering a motion to dismiss, a court is permitted to take judicial notice of public records . . . ."); see also Hason v. Office of Prof'l Med. Conduct, 314 F. Supp. 2d 241, 246 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (holding that court may consider state administrative decisions in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion). The two state court opinions related to Plaintiff's termination attached as Exhibit A and by Plaintiff's October 12, 2018 letter, (Dkt. No. 54), and the decision of the hearing officer related to Plaintiff's application for benefits under Section 207-c of the General Municipal Law ("GML"), attached as Exhibit B, are matters of public record and the Court may consider them.

However, in taking judicial notice of such public records, the Court does so only to establish "the fact of such litigation," not for the truth of the matters asserted in each proceeding. See Global Network Commc'ns, Inc. v. City of New York, 458 F.3d 150, 157 (2d Cir. 2006) ("A court may take judicial notice of a document filed in another court . . . to establish the fact of such litigation and related filings." (quotation marks omitted)); see also Roth, 489 F.3d at 509 ("If the court takes judicial notice, it does so in order to determine what statements [a document] contained—but again not for the truth of the matters asserted." (quotation marks omitted)). For these reasons, the Court may consider Defendants' Exhibits.¹

B. Factual Background

The facts recounted below are taken from Plaintiff's Amended Complaint and are assumed to be true for purposes of resolving the Motion. Where relevant, the Court also recounts facts stated in the two state court opinions related to Plaintiff's termination, In the Matter of the Application of Yolanda D. Tyson, Index. No. 001012/2016 and Tyson, 85 N.Y.S.3d 569, the state hearing officer's decision related to Plaintiff's application for benefits under Section 207-c (Section 207-c Decision), and the January 29, 2016 and May 18, 2016 letters.

Plaintiff identifies as an African-American female. (Am. Compl. ¶ 16.) Prior to being a Police Officer with the Ramapo PD, Plaintiff was employed by the New York City Police Department ("NYPD"). (Id. ¶ 17.) She was hired by the NYPD in 2015 and assigned to attend the Police Academy. (Id. ¶ 18.) After she graduated from the NYPD Police Academy, she applied for a job with Ramapo PD. (Id. ¶ 19.) In February 2006, Plaintiff was appointed as a Police Officer with the Ramapo PD. (Id. ¶ 20.)

Plaintiff alleges that on January 31, 2012, she was involved in an on-duty accident with her department vehicle. (Id. ¶ 27.) On February 29, 2012, the Town and Brower approved Plainti...